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All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and the State wherein they reside. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although legal scholars tend to focus on the second sentence of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in trying to determine the
original meaning of the Amendment,2 the first sentence of the Amendment is, arguably, equally important. As the majority of the Supreme
Court in the Slaughter-House Cases noted, the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a "definition of citizenship," a matter
of great controversy prior to ratification of the Amendment. 3 According

1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Much recent scholarship has focused on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Amendment. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1262-84 (1992) (proposing a method of "refined
incorporation" for incorporating certain rights in the Bill of Rights through the Privileges
or Immunities Clause); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1457-62 (1992) (proposing an interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as prohibiting "caste legislation" and providing
"antidiscrimination" protection with respect to rights traditionally within the regulatory
control of the state governments).
3. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). Justice Miller
recounted the history of the controversy concerning the definition of "citizenship" and
the relevance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. According to
Justice Miller, "[n]o such definition was previously found in the Constitution, nor had
any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of
much discussion in the courts, by the executive departments, and in the public journals."
Id. Miller stated that the Dred Scott decision,
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to Justice Miller in his Slaughter-House majority opinion, controversy
existed not only concerning whether individuals of African descent were
citizens of the United States, but also concerning whether residents of
the District of Columbia or of the territories were citizens of the United
States, as they were not citizens of any state.4 The Amendment ended
this controversy by providing a definition of "citizenship of the United
States" as well as citizenship of a state. 5
However, technically, the language of the first sentence of Section 1
does not provide a true "definition" of the term "citizen," but rather a
statement of the conditions sufficient for attaining the status of "citizen"
of a state as well as of the United States. The meaning of the term
"citizen," as used within the legal culture of the United States prior to
ratification of the Amendment, involved something more than merely
being a person "born or naturalized in the United States." Accompanying the status of "citizen" were certain powers or capacities, privileges
and immunities of citizenship. 6 For example, Representative William
Lawrence of Ohio stated:
[T]here are certain absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are
inherent, and of which a state cannot constitutionally deprive him.
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal
security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These
are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there
are others, as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and

while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled; and if it was to be
accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the
negro race who had recently been made freemen, were still, not only not
citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added). This was also the conclusion of Thomas Cooley, a contemporary
constitutional scholar, who thought that the purpose of the first Clause was "to put at rest
forever the question whether colored persons were to be recognized as citizens." 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 653
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. Little, Brown, and Co. 1873).
4. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72-73. In 1805 Chief Justice Marshall
concluded that citizens of the District of Columbia were not state citizens. Hepburn v.
Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 453 (1805).
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73.
6. As Justice Bradley stated in his Slaughter-House dissent, "[c]itizenship of the
United States ought to be, and, according to the Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted
title to equal rights in any and every State[ ] in this Union, subject to such regulations
as the legislature may rightfully prescribe." Id. at 113.
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enjoy property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and
property. 7

Furthermore, both the majority and the dissenters in the Slaughter-House
Cases believed there were certain rights inherent in citizenship, which
were to be protected under Section 1 of the Amendment, although they
disagreed concerning the nature of the privileges and immunities of
"citizens of the United States" guaranteed under the Amendment. 8
An understanding of the concept of citizenship and the privileges and
immunities of citizens is crucial to a comprehension of the meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1. The importance of the
concept of citizenship was emphasized by Justice Bradley in his dissent
in the Slaughter-House Cases. According to Justice Bradley:
In this free country, the people of which inherited certain traditionary rights and
privileges from their ancestors, citizenship means something. It has certain
privileges and immunities attached to it which the government, whether
restricted by express or implied limitations, cannot take away or impair. It may
do so temporarily by force, but it cannot do so by right. And these privileges

7. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866). Other members of Congress
stated that the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect those
fundamental rights inherent in citizenship of the United States. For example,
Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont stated that the proposed amendment
"merely gives the power to Congress to enact those laws which will give to a citizen of
the United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship." Id. at 1088.
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio stated in the context of the debate over the
Civil Rights Act that the rights of life and liberty were inherent and existed anterior to
the establishment of government. According to Representative Lawrence:
It has never been deemed necessary to enact in any constitution or law that
citizens should have the right to life or liberty or the right to acquire property.
These rights are recognized by the Constitution as existing anterior to and
independently of all laws and constitutions.
Without further authority I may assume, then, that there are certain absolute
rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and of which a State
cannot constitutionally deprive him. But not only are these rights inherent and
indestructible, but the means whereby they may be possessed and enjoyed are
equally so.
Id. at 1833. Similarly, Representative Henry J. Raymond of New York, a member of
the Joint Committee, stated that "the right of citizenship involves everything else. Make
the colored man a citizen of the United States and he has every right which you or I
have as citizens of the United States under the laws and constitution of the United
States." Id. at 1266.
8. For example, the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases argued that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed certain "common rights" that were inherent
in the concept of citizenship in the United States. Justice Field argued that "[t]he
[fourteenth] amendment was adopted to obviate objections which had been raised and
pressed with great force to the validity of the Civil Rights Act, and to place the common
rights of American citizens under the protection of the National government." SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 93.
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and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the United States as to
citizenship of the States. 9

This passage from Justice Bradley's Slaughter-House dissent indicates
.that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges and immunities of
citizens were understood to be those privileges and immunities that were
essential to citizenship, or inherent in the status of "citizen."10 One's
status as a citizen was sufficient, in and of itself, for entitlement to
certain powers or capacities. Justice Field also stated that the Amendment "assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which
belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be

9. Id. at 114 (emphasis added). Justice Bradley later wrote: "I think sufficient
has been said to show that citizenship is not an empty name, but that, in this country at
least, it has connected with it certain incidental rights, privileges, and immunities of the
greatest importance." Id. at 116. Justice Bradley also stated the rights of citizenship in
terms of the Lockean triumvirate of life, liberty, and property. For example, in
discussing the Declaration of Independence Justice Bradley stated:
Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of freemen,
asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty and property. These are
the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law,
and which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be
modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of all;
and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every free government.
Id. at 116.
I 0. These were the "common rights" of citizens that had been recognized by the
common law in England. For example, Justice Field declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment "was intended to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of
inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer,
but only recognizes." Id. at 105. Field elaborated concerning the mechanism by which
citizens of the United States were entitled to these "common rights":
The common law of England is the basis of the jurisprudence of the United
States. It was brought to this country by the colonists, together with the
English statutes, and was established here so far as it was applicable to their
condition. That law and the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed
at the time of their colonization, and which they had by experience found to
be applicable to their circumstances, were claimed by the Congress of the
United Colonies in 1774 as a part of their "indubitable rights and liberties."
Id. at 104.
Field seems to have been in agreement with arguments made by plaintiffs' counsel.
As counsel for the plaintiffs argued, the Privileges or Immunities Clause dictated that the
citizen's "'privileges and immunities' must not be impaired, and all the privileges of the
English Magna Charta in favor of freemen are collected upon him and overshadow him
as derived from this amendment." Id. at 54. According to plaintiffs' counsel, the
privileges and immunities were ''undoubtedly the personal and civil rights which usage,
tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sentiments of people have
recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country." Id. at 55.
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abridged by State legislation." 11 Whether these powers or capacities
were to be uniform throughout the United States and receive substantive
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Justice Bradley
contended, or whether they were to receive merely antidiscrimination
protection, is debatable. 12 However, it would seem that some form of
both substantive and antidiscrimination protection was envisioned under
the Clause. 13
The peculiar characteristic of dual citizenship established under the
complex federal system of the Constitution complicated the issue of
citizenship in the United States. 14 Individuals within the jurisdiction of
the United States may be both citizens of a state and citizens of the
United States. The distinction between these two forms of citizenship,
and the privileges and immunities attaching to each, is the crucial
distinction that the Miller majority recognized in its decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases. In Slaughter-House the majority held that the
privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment are certain limited privileges and immunities
of national citizenship alone. 15 The Fourteenth Amendment declares

11. Id. at 96.
12. John Harrison, among others, has argued that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is primarily an antidiscrimination provision. See Harrison, supra note 2.
Harrison reasons that "[t]hese rights [the privileges and immunities of state citizenship]
are not minimum Lockean freedoms but rather a full specification of state law on basic
subjects." Id. at 1418. Michael Kent Curtis has noted that the Republicans often spoke
of securing "an equality of basic rights to citizens." MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1986).
Similarly, William Nelson has contended that "[b]y understanding section one as an
equality guarantee, the puzzle of how Congress could simultaneously have power to
enforce the Bill of Rights and not have power to impose a specific provision of the Bill
on a state is resolved." WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 119
(1988). Nelson notes that many of the states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did
not provide for all of the same Bill of Rights protections in their state constitutions and
yet did not oppose ratification of, or change their constitutions to reflect, the federal Bill
of Rights after ratification. Id. at 117.
13. See infra Part V.B.
14. Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the political complexities of this dual status "were never rigorously analyzed." See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870, at 248 (1978). However, the
subject certainly arose in legal discussion prior to ratification. For example Justice
Bushrod Washington, who would later render the opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, which
was cited by Republicans in the Forty-Second Congress as providing the accepted usage
of the terms "privileges" and "immunities," stated in 1820 that "[e]very citizen ofa State
owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and participates in the government
of both the State and the United States." Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 33
(1820).
15. As Justice Miller stated in the majority opinion:
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a
citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend
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that individuals born or naturalized in the United States shall be citizens
of both the "State wherein they reside" and the "United States." 16
Therefore, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized the
distinction between state citizenship and citizenship of the United States.
This distinction was also acknowledged prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v.
Sandford17 and played an important role in the debate over the citizenship of freed blacks and their entitlement to the privileges and immunities of citizenship in the United States. 18 An understanding of this
distinction is therefore necessary to determine the original meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although a distinction may have been made between
citizenship of a state and citizenship of the United States, that does not
mean that there existed no single conception of the meaning of the term
"citizen" and the accompanying privileges and immunities of citizenship.
An analysis of this distinction in terms of social compact theory
indicates that the Miller majority's reading in the Slaughter-House Cases
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as only guaranteeing certain
limited privileges and immunities of national citizenship, was in error.
Part II of this Article examines the meaning of the term "citizen" as
used in the social compact theories of various natural law theorists and
in the Roman law. The theories of John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean
Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel are discussed in detail, as
these theories are representative of social compact theories influential in
nineteenth century America. The theories of such political philosophers,
as well as the Roman law of persons, with its gradation of status into
several different levels, provided important models of citizenship that
influenced nineteenth .century thinking concerning the meaning of
citizenship.

upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.
We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of
great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section,
which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak
of those of citizens of the several States.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added).
16. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
17. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
18. See infra Part III.
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Part III examines the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford in terms of the historical-theoretical framework developed in
Part II. In particular, Part III analyzes the Court's treatment of the
problem of dual citizenship. Both the majority's and dissenters'
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 are examined in relation to the conferral of state and national
citizenship.
Part IV discusses the implications of the Court's dicta concerning
citizenship in Dred Scott and its creation of a constitutionally-mandated
system of caste with respect to United States citizenship, and constitutionally-permitted systems of caste with respect to state citizenship. The
term "caste," as used in this Article, implicates an intermediate status
between that of the slave and that of the citizen, members of which do
not have a right to exercise all of the privileges and immunities
traditionally inherent in the status of "citizen." 19 Both the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were designed to eliminate
the caste systems that arose in the form of Black Codes in the United

19. This term "caste" was explicitly used to refer to the degraded status of blacks
under the Black Codes in the Southern States. For example, William Nelson has noted
that J.H. Martindale, the Attorney General of New York, made the argument that blacks
in the South were placed in an inferior caste and therefore could not exercise all of the
political and civil rights inherent in citizenship.
[N]early all precedents in the General & State Govts. up to the time of the late
amendment abolishing slavery have recognized the power to classify the
inhabitants of African descent, and to deprive them of political & civil rights.
As to them, exclusion from the suffrage has not been the result of a want of
intelligence to acquire property or education, or any other qualifications, which
by the customs of the country, and the Constitution of the U.S. might be
imposed by the several States, on the electors of public officers. The disability
of the negro penetrated deeper than the rules of qualification for the ballot;
which rules simply define some conditions that an honest, diligent, &
intelligent citizen may usually acquire. His disability was one of caste or
class, which made him and his race liable to be enslaved. . . . The amendment
to the constitution has abolished the liability and all its consequences. . . .
There does not remain a logical argument on which to rest the exclusion of the
native born black man from all the civil and political rights inherent in
citizenship.
NELSON, supra note 12, at 128 (quoting Letter from J.H. Martindale to John Sherman
(May 12, 1866), in SHERMAN PAPERS (emphasis in original)). However, other sources
indicate that certain rights of free blacks were recognized in the south:
Free Negroes, without any of the political rights which belong to a citizen, are
still, to some extent, regarded by the law as possessing both natural and civil
rights. The rights of life, liberty and property, belong to them, and must be
protected by the community in which they are suffered to live. They are
regarded, in law, as persons capable of committing and receiving an injury;
and for the one, they are liable to punishment, and for the other, they are
entitled to redress.
State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 152, 153 (1832).
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States. However, the flaws in both necessitated ratification of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, Part V discusses the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment upon
citizenship in the United States. Given the understanding of the terms
"citizen," "privileges," and "immunities" derived in Parts II through IV,
it becomes clear that the text of Section 1 itself dictates an interpretation
of the Amendment as nationalizing citizenship in the United
States----making citizenship of the United States the primary form of
citizenship, and citizenship of a state derivative. .As a result, this Article
concludes that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to provide both
substantive and antidiscrimination protection for a core set of privileges
and immunities understood to be inherent in American citizenship. The
implication of this theory is that "incorporation" of certain provisions of
the Bill of Rights is a misnomer,2° a conclusion reached by other
commentators for varying reasons. 21
The view presented in this Article might be termed a "declaratory"
theory of Section 1. However, it is a positivist declaratory theory in that
the rights declared are acknowledged as embodied in positive law.
Under this theory, the privileges and immunities of citizens are
understood to be those powers or capacities of citizens existing anterior
20.

This conclusion should hardly be surprising. As Justice Frankfurter noted in

Adamson v. California, "[t]hose reading the English language with the meaning which
it ordinarily conveys ... would hardly recognize the Fourteenth Amendment as a cover
for the various explicit provisions of the first eight Amendments." 332 U.S. 46, 63
(1947). See also RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT]; RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1997) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]; Raoul Berger, Constitutional
Interpretation and Activist Fantasies, 82 KY. L.J. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Berger, Activist
Fantasies]; Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's Wishing
Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Berger, Wishing Well]; Raoul Berger,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis's Response, 44 Omo ST.
L.J. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Berger, Reply to Curtis]; Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights: A Response to Michael Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Berger, Response to Zuckert]; Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing against incorporation).
21. The view articulated in this Article is similar to the theory of "refined
incorporation" recently espoused by Akhil Amar, who concluded that "the very metaphor
of incorporation may mislead." Amar, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at
1266. However, there are some differences between the view of fundamental privileges
and immunities advanced in this Article and Amar's hypothesis. See infra Part V.
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to the establishment of all government, and the states remain free to
regulate the manner of exercise of these privileges and immunities.
Consequently, some overlap between the privileges or immunities
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and the privileges and
immunities protected under the Bill of Rights is not surprising, insofar
as some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are declaratory of certain
fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens to be protected against
abridgement, or perhaps even regulation, by the federal government.
However, this conclusion does not dictate that the privileges and
immunities guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to
the provisions of the Bill of Rights, or that the state governments are
bound to the same standards as the federal government under the Bill of
Rights. Finally, because the term "citizen" used in Section 1 referred to
a status inherent in which were certain fundamental rights and because
the Citizenship Clause of the Amendment does not employ the "No state
shall" language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment may apply to the federal government as well as to the state
governments. The Citizenship Clause of Section 1 may be interpreted
to represent a guarantee binding upon both the state and federal
governments of certain fundamental rights inherent in the concept of
citizenship as understood at the time of ratification of the Amendment.
Thus, "citizenship" was a central concept in Section 1 of the
Amendment. The term "citizen" must be viewed as a legal term of art
possessing a well-developed meaning within the legal community. 22
An understanding of the meaning of this concept within the nineteenth
century legal community is crucial to achieving an understanding of the
original meaning of Section 1. Therefore, this Article begins its analysis
with the first sentence of Section 1 and the definition of the term
"citizen."

22. Raoul Berger has noted that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" already
had a well-established meaning prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that they were consequently legal "words of art having a circumscribed meaning."
Berger, Activist Fantasies, supra note 20, at 5; see also Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 305 (1988)
("An examination of antebellum thought reveals that equal protection, due process, and
privileges and immunities were terms symbolizing a core set of basic rights in which
there was substantial agreement in both free state and slave state society."). The same
may certainly be said with respect to the term "citizen." The argument presented in this
Article is that there was a well-developed and specialized meaning attached to this legal
term well before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.

690

Citizenship

[VOL. 34: 681, 1997]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

IL

THE DEFINITION OF "CITIZEN"

The body of the Constitution nowhere defined the term "citizen" prior
to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 Although controversy
existed concerning which individuals were included in this class of
persons, there was widespread agreement concerning the meaning of the
term "citizen" within the legal community. For example, Thomas
Cooley, a contemporary constitutional scholar, gave a definition of
citizenship as used in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
indicated that, in his view, as used within Section 1, there was a
relatively determinate meaning of this term. According to Cooley,
"citizen" meant "a person owing allegiance to the government, and
entitled to protection from it."24 Cooley stated that individuals who
qualified as citizens included "females as well as males, minors as well
as adults, those who do not as well as those who do possess the
privileges of the elective franchise."25 Therefore, political privileges
such as the right to vote or to participate in government were not viewed
as being essential to citizenship.26 Individuals could still possess the
23. As Attorney General Bates noted in 1862: "The Constitution of the United
States does not declare who are and who are not citizens, nor does it attempt to describe
the constituent elements of citizenship." Edward Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Gen.
382, 385 (W.H. & O.H. Morrison eds., 1868).
24. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 654. This notion of citizenship as owing allegiance
to the government based upon compact was also expressed in Blackstone, who stated:
[T]he original contract of society [is] . . . that the whole should protect all its
parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or,
in other words, that the community should guard the rights of each individual
member, and that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit
to the laws of the community . . . .
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47-*48.
25. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 654.
26. For example, James H. Kettner has noted that during the antebellum years "the
right to the elective franchise had never seemed absolutely inherent in the status" of
citizen. KETTNER, supra note 14, at 323. See also CURTIS, supra note 12, at 29.
Attorney General Bates in his opinion concerning citizenship stated that "it is manifest
that American citizenship does not necessarily depend upon nor coexist with the legal
capacity to hold office and the right of suffrage, either or both of them." Bates, supra
note 23, at 387. According to Senator Bingham, "All free persons ... born and
domiciled in any State of the Union, are citizens of the United States; and, although not
equal in respect of political rights, are equal in respect of natural rights." CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). As William Lawrence noted, speaking of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Section 2, the privileges referred to were
"such as are fundamental civil rights, not political rights nor those dependent on local
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status of "citizen" without being entitled to exercise certain political
privileges.27 Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
problem was not so much one of defining the term "citizen" as defining
the conditions sufficient for attaining this status. As a consequence,

law ...." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866). Political rights were not
thought to be conferred under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, either. As Congressman
Russell Thayer noted, the words in the Civil Rights Bill were "'civil rights and
immunities,' not political privileges ...." Id. at 1151. Furthermore, many Republicans
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote upon free blacks.
Id. at 2539-40 (Farnsworth), 2058 (Boutwell), 2462 (Garfield). However, exercise of
political rights was an indication of one's status as a citizen. As the Democrats
observed, according to the Webster's Dictionary definition of the term "citizen," a citizen
was one "who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise." James E.. Bond,
The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 451 (1985).
This distinction between the political and civil rights of citizens is also found in the
Roman law. Edward Poste, a contemporary translator of Gaius, identified a bifurcation
in the rights of citizens under the Roman Law into political rights involving electoral and
legislative power (jus suffeagii) and capacity for office (jus honorum) and civil rights
involving power over property (commercium) and marriage (connubium). GAIUS,
ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 45 (Edward Poste trans., 2d ed. 1875). Chief Justice Taney
also recognized the distinction between political and civil rights in his Dred Scott
opinion. According to Taney, citizenship was neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for the power to exercise political rights.
Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community
who from the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political
power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and
minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a
property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who
have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold office, yet they are
citizens.
So too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not
a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union
foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. And the State may give the
right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not make them citizens of
the State, and still less of the United States.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422 (1856). Justice Curtis also
mentioned the elective franchise in h_is dissent as being "one of the chiefest attributes of
citizenship under the American Constitutions." Id. at 581. However, he conceded that
it was not "essential to citizenship." Id.
27. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 654. Cooley also pointed to the opinion of Attorney
General Bates in order to show that no political privileges were conveyed under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
See this point discussed at length in Opinion of Attorney-General Bates of
Nov. 29, 1962. He very correctly remarks that "no person in the United States
ever did exercise the right of suffrage in virtue of the naked unassisted fact of
citizenship. In every instance the right depends upon some additional fact and
cumulative qualification, which may as perfectly exist without as with
citizenship."
Id. at 654 n.2. This passage indicates that the privileges and immunities protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment were those privileges and immunities that were inherent in
the concept of citizenship, "privileges or immunities of citizens." In other words, they
were those privileges and immunities for which citizenship alone was a prerequisite.

692

[VOL. 34: 681, 1997]

Citizenship
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a true
definition of the term "citizen" so much as it defines the conditions
sufficient for attaining the status of "citizen".
One of the purposes of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to embody these conditions within the text of the United States
Constitution, thereby removing from the states (and Congress) any power
to deny citizenship of a state or of the United States to individuals
meeting these qualifications. As Thomas Cooley noted, "the rights of
a class of persons still suffering under a ban of prejudice could never be
deemed entirely secure when at any moment it was within the power of
an unfriendly majority in Congress to take them away by repealing the
act which conferred them. " 28 According to Cooley, the first sentence
was also designed to constitutionalize that part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 that declared "the right of colored persons to citizenship" in the
wake of the Dred Scott decision in which the Supreme Court had held
that freed blacks were not citizens of the United States and could not
become citizens of the United States through any mechanism except,
perhaps, amendment of the Constitution of the United States.29 As
Justice Miller noted in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court in Dred
Scott held that freed blacks "were incapable of becoming [citizens] . . .
by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution."30 According
to the Court in Dred Scott, Congress did not possess the constitutional
authority to confer this status through legislation. 31 Therefore, by
expressing certain conditions that were sufficient for the conferral of
both state and national citizenship in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the framers of the Amendment placed the ability to deny
both state and national citizenship beyond the reach not only of the state
governments, but also of the federal government. They made it possible
for free blacks to be citizens of the United States, thereby annihilating
the constitutionally-mandated system of caste with respect to United
States citizenship that resulted from the Court's decision in Dred Scott.

28. Id. at 653.
29. Cooley noted that the Dred Scott decision "remained unreversed by any formal
determination of the court, and if that decision was to be followed, it might be doubtful
whether the Civil Rights Act itself would be held to be within the powers conferred upon
Congress." Id.
30. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-73 (1873).
31. See infra Part III.B.
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As Cooley noted, the term "citizen" had a well established legal
meaning prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 32 In order
to understand the meaning of the term "citizen" as used in Section 1, it
is useful to examine two influential models of citizenship: the social
compact theories of the natural law theorists and the Roman law of
persons. Prior to ratification of the Amendment, it was widely
acknowledged that a citizen was one who owed allegiance to the state,
a member of the "political community" or "body politic" composing the
state. 33 For example, Justice Story stated that it was commonly thought
that "civil society . . . depend[ s] upon a social compact of the people
composing the nation."34 Under these social compact theories, citizens
were described variously as "members of a civil society,"35 a "body
politic,"36 or a "political body."37 The nature of this relationship is
elaborated in these writings, with which the framers of the Amendment
and the public in general were familiar.
Subpart II.A discusses the prominence of social compact theories in
nineteenth century legal thought. Legal scholars such as Justice Story

32. However, the phrase "citizen of the United States" may not have had such a
well-established meaning. As Attorney General Bates stated in his opinion concerning
citizenship in 1862:
Who is a citizen? What constitutes a citizen of the United States? I have
often been pained by the fruitless search in our law books and the records of
our courts, for a clear and satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the
United States. I find no such definition, no authoritative establishment of the
meaning of the phrase, neither by a course of judicial decisions in our courts,
nor by the continued and consentaneous action of the different branches of our
political government. For aught I see to the contrary, the subject is now as
little understood in its details and elements, and the question as open to
argument and to speculative criticism, as it was at the beginning of the
Government.
Bates, supra note 23, at 383.
33. As James H. Kettner has described it, "Citizenship constituted membership in
a federal community requiring allegiance to nation and state." KETTNER, supra note 14,
at 287. Attorney General Bates stated in his widely-cited opinion concerning citizenship
that this was what was meant by the term citizen as used in the United States
Constitution:
In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word citizen only to express the
political quality of the individual in his relations to the nation; to declare that
he is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal
obligation of allegiance on the one side and protection on the other.
Bates, supra note 23, at 388. Senator Bingham also indicated that being a citizen
involved being a member of the "body-politic." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983
(1859).
34. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 225-26.
35. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW 87 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution ofWashington 1916).
36. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 145.
37. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
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and Chancellor Kent featured some version of these theories in their
influential works on American law. Furthermore, several members of
Congress referred to the Lockean triumvirate oflife, liberty, and property
in describing the nature of the rights to be protected under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, a precursor of the Fourteenth Amendment,38 as
well as under the Amendment itself. The theories of John Locke,
Samuel Pufendorf, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel
are discussed in detail. 39 The conclusion reached is that the privileges

38. Several members of Congress indicated that Section 1 of the Amendment
merely incorporated the principles of the Civil Rights Bill. For example, George Latham
stated that "the 'civil rights bill,' which is now law ... covers exactly the same ground
as this amendment," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866), and Martin
Thayer stated that the Amendment was "but incorporating in the Constitution of the
United States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a law."
ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONS1RUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 213 (1967). The Civil
Rights Bill was also thought to guarantee the rights of citizenship. In the words of
Martin Thayer, the purpose of the Bill was to secure "the fundamental rights of
citizenship; those rights which constitute the essence of freedom . . . . [T]hose rights
which secure life, liberty, and property, and which make all men equal before the law."
Id. at 169.
39. These natural law theorists and others were important since colonial times.
Among the philosophers who were widely read by the American colonists were Hugo
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel. See
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27
(1967); CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1760-76, at 83-84 n.10 (1933); CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE
ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 224 (1953); Edwards.
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 149, 365, 380-82 (1928). According to Mullet, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui,
Montesquieu, and Vattel were "scarcely, ifat all, less authoritative than the most popular
English writers." MULLETT, supra, at 32. Furthermore, as James Wilson stated
concerning the rights of citizens:
All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf [sic] down to Vattel,
have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate
of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights, appertaining to the
people as men and as citizens.
James Wilson, Speech of Dec. 4, 1787, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 470 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
In addition, social compact theories seem to have served as the conceptual background
for the various bills of rights found in state constitutions. For example, Virginia's
Declaration of Rights asserted:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot,
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
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and immunities essential to citizenship are certain fundamental powers
or capacities inherent in persons, as well as those powers or capacities
flowing from the conditions of the social compact. An implication of
this theory is that these terms encompass civil but not political rights, or
rights of participation in the government. Furthermore, under these
theories, such privileges and immunities are outside of the power of the
government to abridge since they existed anterior to the establishment
of the government.
Subpart II.B discusses the influence of Roman law on the development
of natural law theories and legal thought in the United States. This
influence is evident in statements made by certain Justices in Dred Scott
v. Sandford, abolitionist writings of the antebellum era, and statements
made by members of Congress responsible for approving the Amendment. Also addressed are the nature of the privileges and immunities of
Roman citizens and the etymological roots of the terms "privileges" and
"immunities," as well as the complex system under the Roman law of
according different grades of civil status to persons. The conclusion
reached is that the Taney Court adhered to this model in declaring that
freed blacks occupied an intermediate level of status below citizen, that
of freedman. As a result, the Court concluded that freed blacks were not
constitutionally entitled to all of the privileges and immunities essential
to citizenship in the United States.

A.

Citizenship and Social Compact Theory

The concept of citizenship that serves as a foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment originates in the social compact theories of John
Locke and other natural law theorists. 40 As Justice Swayne, one of the

THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1776: BILL OF RIGHTS§ 1, reprinted in 10 SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (William F. Swindler ed.,
1979). Similarly, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared:
The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a
social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and
each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws
for the common good.... ; that every man may, at all times, find his security
in them.
CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 1780, preamble reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 92-93 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975).
40. Several other commentators have noted the influence of natural law theories
on the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 12; DANIEL
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990);
HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL
UNDER LAW (2d ed. 1969); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Trisha
Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
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Slaughter-House dissenters, acknowledged, the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified because it was "necessary to enable the government of the
nation to secure to every one within its jurisdiction the rights and
privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of
reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact,
all are entitled to enjoy.',4 1 Justice Story in his Commentaries also
noted the importance of the theory of society as being based upon a
compact, as well as its genesis in the Roman writers:
The doctrine maintained by many eminent writers upon public law in modem
times is, that civil society has its foundation in a voluntary consent or
submission; and, therefore, it is often said to depend upon a social compact of
the people composing the nation. And this, indeed, does not, in substance,
differ from the definition of it by Cicero, Multitudo, Juris consensu et utilitatis
communione sociata; that is, (as Burlamaqui gives it,) a multitude of people
united together by a common interest, and by common laws, to which they
submit with one accord. 42

Justice Story referred to this as a "visionary" idea that was present also
in the work of Blackstone, who described the social compact as forming
the basis of a "union" necessitated by the "weakness and imperfection"
of mankind. 43 According to Story, the state governments in the United
States were based upon compacts among the members of each of the
states.44 Although Story contended that the United States Constitution
was not a compact but rather a fundamental law, he quoted Chief Justice
Jay for the proposition that the United States Constitution as well as the

Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347, 350 · (1995) (concluding that "the
[Privileges and Immunities] Clause must be placed against the backdrop of the classical
natural law tradition embraced by the 39th Congress.").
41. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 129 (1873) (emphasis added).
42. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 225-26 (footnotes omitted).
43. Blackstone, as quoted by Justice Story, stated that the nature of the "original
contract of society" was that "'the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part
should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community
should guard the rights of each individual member; and that in return for this protection
each individual should submit to the laws of the community."' Id. at 227.
44. Justice Story quoted the preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts that
stated, '"the body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; that it is
a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each
citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good."' Id.
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state constitutions were "compacts" among the people based upon their
consent.45
Natural law ideas and concepts were prevalent in the legal culture
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 Like Justice Story,
Chancellor Kent restated the propositions concerning the nature of civil
society found in the writings of social compact theorists such as Locke
in his Commentaries on American Law. According to Kent, "[t]he right
of self-defence is part of the law of our nature, and it is the indispensable duty of civil society to protect its members in the enjoyment of
their rights, both of person and property. This is the fundamental
principle of the social compact."47 The rights of person and property
to which Kent referred were the Lockean rights of "property." The
rights of person correspond to Locke's property in life and liberty, while
the rights of property correspond to Locke's right of property in one's
goods.
Chancellor Kent envisioned the Lockean state of nature more as a state
of war, reminiscent of Hobbes. According to Kent, it was unrealistic to
"suppose a state of man" where individuals lived "in innocence and

45. Id. Justice Story quoted Chief Justice Jay as stating that "'every State
constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern
themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the United States is, likewise,
a compact made by the people of the United States, to govern themselves as to general
objects in a certain manner."' Id.
46. Natural rights theory had been influential in American legal thought since the
time of the Revolution. CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW
CONCEPTS (1930); Corwin, supra note 39; MULLETT, supra note 39; Thomas C. Grey,
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in. American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). Prominent jurists had also espoused natural law
concepts. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810) (Marshall,
C.J.); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); United States v. La
Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, Cir.
J.); Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166-67 (N.Y. 1816) (Kent, C.). See
generally BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW
288-98 (1931) (citing early cases). In particular, many Republicans in Congress were
influenced by natural law theory. Earl A. Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution:
Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Rous. L.
REV. 221, 224 (1987) [hereinafter Reconstruction Without Revolution] (stating that
"Republicans were committed to the concept of natural rights, which they saw as
embodied in the statement of the Declaration of Independence that all men were entitled
to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."'). Earl Maltz has noted the importance of
social compact theory in nineteenth century political thought, which he believes serves
as the basis for what he has termed "'limited absolute equality[,]' ... the proposition
that all men were equally entitled to certain natural rightsc-life, liberty, and property."
Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 505-06 (1985) [hereinafter Maltz, Equal Protection of the
Laws].
47. 1 JAMES KENT, CO!vlMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *48 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., 12th ed. 1873).
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simplicity."48 "It has been truly observed, that the first man who was
born into the world killed the second; and when did the times of
simplicity begin?"49 According to Kent, "[m]an was fitted and intended
by the Author of his being for society and government, and for the
acquisition and enjoyment of property. It is, to speak correctly, the law
of his nature ...." 5 Kent argued that the concept of exclusive
property was consistent with principles of natural reason and, that,
although

°

[t]here have been modem theorists who have considered separate and exclusive
property, and inequalities of property, as the cause of injustice, and the unhappy
result of government and artificial institutions . . . human society would be in
a most unnatural and miserable condition if it were possible to be instituted or
reorganized upon the basis of such speculations. 51

Finally, Kent pointed to the Roman law as the source of some of the
rules of property found in the common law. 52
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, cited not only by
Justice Story but also by Representative James Wilson of Iowa,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, as illustrative of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States under the
Civil Rights Act and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reflects
this well-established natural law theory of exclusive property rights.
Blackstone stated that the right of property is "'that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in the total exclusion of the right of any other individual
in the universe. "'53 In enumerating the rights and liberties of Englishmen, Blackstone listed the Magna Carta, Habeas Corpus Act, Petition of
48. 2id.at*317.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *318.
51. Id. at *319. Kent argued that "[t]he sense of property is graciously bestowed
on mankind for the purpose of rousing them from sloth, and stimulating them to action
...." Id.
52. Id. at *360-61. Chancellor Kent referred to
those general rules which were formed, digested, and refined by the sagacity
and discussions of the Roman lawyers, and transferred from the civil law into
the municipal institutions of the principal nations of Europe. By means of
Bracton they were introduced into the common law of England, and, doubtless,
they now equally pervade the jurisprudence of these United States.
Id. (footnote omitted).
·
53. JAMES TuLLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS
ADVERSARIES 73 (1980) (citation omitted).
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Right, and the Bill of Rights. Subsequently, Blackstone stated that these
rights "consist in a number of private immunities" that are "no other,
than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the
laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience . . . or else those
civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the
natural liberties so given up by individuals."54 Thus, Blackstone seems
to have defined privileges as proxies for certain natural "liberties," while
he defined immunities as the "residuum" of natural liberty. Blackstone
described these rights as "the rights of all mankind" as well as "the right
of people of England." He classified these rights into "three principal
or primary articles[:] ... the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right of private property."55 According to
Blackstone, "the preservation of these, inviolate, may justly be said to
include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most
extensive sense."56
The relevance of Lockean social compact theory to understanding the
meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is clear from the
tenor of the debates in Congress. During the debates over the Civil
Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Lockean triumvirate of
absolute rights was cited frequently as describing those rights protected
under the Bill and the Amendment. 57 For example, Senator James

54. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *125. The use of the terms "privileges" and
"immunities" in Blackstone's Commentaries and Blackstone's importance to congressional Republicans is more fully explored by Michael Kent Curtis. See CURTIS, supra note
12. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois made similar statements concerning the nature
of the "civil liberty" that was to be protected under the Civil Rights Bill. According to
Trumbull, "civil liberty" was that part of "natural liberty" that was left after the creation
of civil society. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
55. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *125.
56. Id.
57. According to Michael Kent Curtis, the "most common Republican refrain in
the Thirty-ninth Congress was that life, liberty, and property of American citizens must
be protected against denial by the states." CURTIS, supra note 12, at 41. John Bingham
stated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to protect "the inborn
rights of every person," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866), and Thaddeus
Stevens stated that there was a need to '"fix the foundations of the government on
principles of eternal justice.'" NELSON, supra note 12, at 66 (quoting fragment of
undated speech draft, THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 2 (Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.)). Senator Trumbull stated that the rights to personal liberty, personal security, and
private property "are declared to be inalienable rights, belonging to every citizen of the
United States ... no matter where he may be." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1757 ( 1866). Congressman Wilson stated that the rights of personal security, personal
liberty, and the right to acquire property were "inalienable." Id. at 1118. In debate over
the Thirteenth Amendment, this natural law or "inalienable rights" philosophy was also
espoused by other members of Congress. For example, Congressman Ebon C. Ingersoll
stated:
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Patterson stated, "[I] am opposed to any law discriminating against
[blacks] in the security and protection of life, liberty, person, [and]
property.... Beyond this I am not prepared to go." 58 Representative
William Lawrence stated, "[i]t is idle to say that a citizen shall have the
right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor, whereby alone he can
live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to live, and
yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the
rewards of labor."59 In discussing the "great fundamental [civil]
rights," James Wilson stated:
Blackstone classifies them under three articles, as follows ... [:]
1. The right of personal security; which he says, "Consists in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health and his reputation."
2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says, "Consists in the power
of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatever
place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law."
3. The right of personal property; which he defines to be, "The free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitionso' without any control or
diminution save only by the laws of the land.''6

I am in favor of the adoption of this amendment because it will secure to the
oppressed slave his natural and God-given rights. I believe that the black man
has certain inalienable rights, which are as sacred in the sight of Heaven as
those of any other race. I believe he has a right to live, and live in state of
freedom. He has a right to breathe the free air and enjoy God's free sunshine.
He has a right to till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and
enjoy the rewards of his own labor. He has a right to the endearments and
enjoyment of family ties; and no white man has any right to rob him of or
infringe upon any of these blessings.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864). The importance of this trilogy was
later recognized by the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the Court stated:
[T]he fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of
constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress
of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of
just and equal laws . . . . [T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) .
. 58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866).
59. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 206.
60. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 74-75. Elsewhere, Wilson stated that the phrase
"Civil rights and immunities" in the Bill did not imply that
in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or
color, shall be equal . . . . Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the
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Finally, Senator Bingham, principal draftsman of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, pointed to the principles of "equality and natural
rights" embodied in the Constitution. According to Bingham, the
advantage of the Constitution
lies in the great democratic idea which it embodies, that all men, before the
law, are equal in respect of those rights of person which God gives and no man
or State may rightfully take away, except as a forfeiture for crime. Before your
constitution, sir, as it is, as I trust it ever will be, all men are sacred, whether
white or black, rich or poor, strong or weak, wise or simple. Before its divine
rule of justice and equality of natural rights, Lazarus in his rags is as sacred as
the rich man clothed in purple and fine linen; the peasant in his hovel, as sacred
as the prince in his palace, or the king on his throne. 61

Thus, it is not improper to assert that, besides influencing the popular
understanding of citizenship and the rights accompanying this status, the
writings of natural law theorists such as Locke influenced members of
Congress responsible for approving the Amendment.
This Article adopts the position that the rights to be protected under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment were not only the natural law rights of person and property, or
absolute rights, but also those rights that flowed from the social compact
among members of society and were binding by principles of natural
reason--the relative rights of citizens including the right to contract, to
testify, to inherit, and if we accept the Lockean notion of exclusive
property based upon consent, the right to hold property. Chancellor
Kent discussed the distinction between absolute and relative rights in his
Commentaries on American Law. According to Chancellor Kent, "[t]he
rights of persons in private life are either absolute, being such as belong
to individuals in a single, unconnected state; or relative, being those

juries, or that their children shall attend the same schools . . . . I understand
civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of individuals, such as-[t]he right
of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and
enjoy property.
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 163 (citation
omitted).
61. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). However, Bingham did not
understand this guarantee of natural rights to extend to what he termed "political or
conventional" rights:
[A]ll ... classes [of] ... free inhabitants, irrespective of age, or sex, or
complexion, and their descendants, were [made] citizens of the United States.
No distinctions were made against the poor and in favor of the rich, or against
the free-born blacks and in favor of the whites. This Government rests upon
the absolute equality of natural rights amongst men. There is not, and cannot
be, any equality in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights ....
Id.
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which arise from the civil and domestic relations." 62 Alternatively, one
might say, as did Representative Lawrence,63 that these relative rights
are "incidents" of the absolute rights of persons in that they arise when
62. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *1. This distinction might have been recognized by
Senator Wilson who stated that the absolute rights of personal security, personal liberty,
and the right to enjoy property were among the "civil rights" guaranteed under the Civil
Rights Act. Fairman, supra note 20, at 38. Michael Kent Curtis has noted that
Republicans often spoke of "absolute rights," which included "the right to freedom of
speech, the right to due process of law, and the right to bear arms." CURTIS, supra note
12, at 104 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (Cowan), 1183 (Garfield),
1263 (Broomall), 1629 (Hart), 1838 (Clarke), 1072 (Nye) (1866)).
Chancellor Kent, himself, identified the absolute rights of persons with the Lockean
triumvirate of life, liberty, and property. According to Kent:
The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property. These rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared,
by the people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalienable. The
effectual security and enjoyment of them depend upon the existence of civil
liberty; and that consists in being protected and governed by laws made, or
assented to, by the representatives of the people, and conducive to the general
welfare.
2 KENT, supra note 47, at *1. The distinction between rights that individuals possessed
before they entered into society (absolute rights) and those that flowed from the social
compact (relative rights) seems also to have been recognized during the founding period.
For example, the Federal Farmer made a distinction between natural and inalienable
rights and constitutional or fundamental rights.
[S]ome [rights] are natural and unalienable, of which even the people cannot
deprive individuals: Some are constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be
altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; but the people, by express acts, may
alter or abolish them-These, such as the trial by jury, the benefits of the writ
of habeas corpus . . . individuals claim under the solemn compacts of the
people, as constitutions, or at least under laws so strengthened by long usuage
[sic] as not to be repealable by the ordinary legislature ... may alter or
abolish at pleasure.
Letters From the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 261 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). James Wilson seems
to have made a similar distinction:
In his unrelated state, man has a natural right to his property, to his
character, to liberty, and to safety. From his peculiar relations, as a husband,
as a father, as a son, he is entitled to the enjoyment of peculiar rights, and
obliged to the performance of peculiar duties .... From his general relations,
he is entitled to other rights, simple in their principle, but, in their operation,
fruitful and extensive . . . . In these general relations, his rights are, to be free
from injury, and to receive the fulfilment [sic] of the engagements, which are
made to him; his duties are, to do no injury, and to fulfil [sic] the engagements, which he has made.
James Wilson, Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 308
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
63. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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individuals aggregate into societies. All of these rights of persons exist
anterior to the formation of the government and involve the properties
of individuals, in the Lockean sense of the term, and individuals' civil
capacities as members of society. These rights are fundamental in the
sense that it is outside of the power of the government to abridge these
rights, which exist anterior to the establishment of the government itself.
Thus, this theory of society based upon a "social compact" where the
"citizens" of a state are the parties to the compact, thereby becoming
members of a political community or body politic, was well-accepted
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Story referred
to John Locke's social compact theory as being representative of these
theories in general. 64 Therefore, an examination of the writings of
Locke is useful for an understanding of what was meant by the term
"citizen" in nineteenth century America.

1.

John Locke

In his Two Treatises of Civil Government, John Locke developed a
comprehensive theory of civil society which was extremely influential
in both nineteenth as well as eighteenth century America. According to
Locke, "citizens" were the members of society, the parties to the social
compact, and this was the foundation of the rights and privileges that
they enjoyed with respect to the civil government. · In his Second
Treatise on Civil Government Locke stated that
because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be
dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son
cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but under the same terms
his father did, by becoming a member of the society, whereby he puts himself
presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other
subject of that commonweal [sic]. 65

Conferral of citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment ensured
that those naturalized or born in the United States would be put "under
the government" or "under its jurisdiction,"66 and therefore, would be

64. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 226 n.l. According to Story, "Mr. Locke is one of
the most eminent authors who have treated on this subject." Id.
65. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 66 (Prometheus
Books 1986) (169-0) (emphasis added).
66. In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller noted that "[t]he phrase, 'subject
to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers,
consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872). This is consistent with the
social compact theory espoused by Locke and other natural law theorists. Individuals
who were citizens of foreign states were parties to a social compact establishing the
society in those states and as a result owed allegiance to those states. This distinction
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qualified to enjoy the "rights and privileges" flowing from the social
compact. Because of the peculiar nature of the federal system, it was
necessary that these individuals be put under both the state and federal
government and made parties to the social compacts that formed the
basis of each in order to enjoy privileges and immunities flowing from
both the state and national compacts. 67
Entering into a compact with the other members of society ended the
state of slavery-a state of civil nonexistence-for freed blacks in the
United States. In the words of Locke, "as soon as compact enters,
slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power and puts an end
to the state of war who enters into conditions with his captive."68 This
conferral of citizenship was the consummation of the social compact
among all who were naturalized or born in the United States, including
the freed blacks who had previously been denied the privileges and
immunities of citizenship under both the state and federal governments.
The object was to make all who were naturalized or born within the
United States members of civil society and to put an end to that state of
war that had existed between freed blacks and Southern whites, ensuring
that freed blacks would no longer be the property of citizens, but would
be citizens themselves possessing all of the powers or capacities that
were inherent in the concept of citizenship in America.
According to Locke, "[w]hen any number of men have so consented
to make one community or government, they are thereby presently

is also the reason for the application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to "citizens,"
while the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses apply to the more inclusive category
of "persons."
67. An example of a privilege or immunity flowing from the state compact might
be the power of contracting, which was traditionally within the regulatory control of the
state governments. One of the privileges or immunities of the national compact was the
right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article III, which was denied to
Dred Scott by the Taney Court because he did not possess the status of "citizen of the
United States." See infra Part III.
68. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 96. Locke's notion that the condition of slavery was
analogous to the condition of living under despotism was mirrored in statements made
by congressional Republicans. For example, Senator Howard stated that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed those "fundamental
rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except
as slaves, subject to a despotism." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
See also Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise--Section
One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 933, 965 (1984) (stating
that "the equal protection and due process components of the Bingham [amendment]
defined the condition which was the antithesis of slavery").
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incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a
right to act and conclude the rest."69 This is perhaps the best statement
of what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying ·to
accomplish with the first sentence of Section 1. They were trying to
better construct "one body politic" from the people of the United States
after the disastrous Civil War by "nationalizing" citizenship and
guaranteeing certain fundamental privileges and immunities inherent in
the concept of citizenship of the United States. In doing so, they
incorporated free blacks into the political community of both the United
States and the several states individually, entitling them to the rights of
citizenship implied by these relations.
Locke's theory of civil government is based on his conception of
property. 70 According to Locke, the nature of property is that it cannot
be taken from an individual without his consent. 71 Locke stated that
there are three things in which individuals have property: their person,
their labor, and their goods, defined as "life," "liberty," and "property,"
respectively. 72 Locke believed that the purpose of government is to
protect these properties and stated that where there is no property, there
exists a state of "slavery."73 According to Locke, "absolute dominion,
however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil society that it is

69. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 54-55.
70. See generally LOCKE, supra note 65. Locke is not the only natural law theorist
who analyzed civil society in terms of a social compact among the members of the
society. Locke was preceded as well as followed by a number of philosophers exhibiting
a continuity in terminology, if not ideas, regarding the fundamental rights of man.
For example, James Tully has pointed out the similarity between Locke's natural law
theory and that of Suarez. See TULLY, supra note 53, at 66. Suarez distinguished
between a right already established in a thing (ius in re) and a right to a thing (ius ad
rem). Id. at 67. Tully notes that these two concepts correspond to Locke's common
property right found in the state of nature and exclusive proprietary right secured by civil
government. Id. Individuals in a state of nature possess a right of common dominion
in things-an equal right to use all of the things in nature. Id. at 67-68. This is
identical to Suarez's concept of a right to a thing. Suarez follows Thomas Aquinas in
using the term dominium in describing this common right of use in the things found in
nature. Id.
Once civil society has been instituted, it becomes possible to establish a secondary
form of property that is exclusive and proprietary in nature. This is identical to Suarez's
concept of a right in the sense of a property in something. Suarez follows Aquinas in
using the term proprietas to denote this exclusive property in a thing. As Suarez states,
"[n]ature has conferred upon all men in common dominion over all things, and
consequently has given every man a power to use those things; but nature has not so
conferred private dominion." Id. at 68 (quoting Francis Suarez, The Laws and God the
Lawgiver§ 2.14.16, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS (G.L. Williams trans., 1944)).
71. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 105. Blackstone stated a similar view. 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *411-12.
72. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 69-70.
73. Id.
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as inconsistent with it as slavery is with property."74 When discussing
"free men" Locke stated that "[t]heir persons are free by a native right,
and their properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their
own dispose ... or else it is no property."75 Thus, under Locke's
theory, the state of "slavery," of being the property of another individual,
is fundamentally at odds with possessing property. 76
According to Locke, in the state of nature, all individuals are born
"with a title to perfect freedom" and "uncontrolled enjoyment of all the
rights and privileges of the law of Nature ... :m In the state of
nature, there is not the kind of exclusive property that exists in civil
society. Individuals hold everything in common with each other, and
possess no exclusive proprietary rights. For example, Locke described
the grant of Dominion given to Adam in Genesis as not a "Private
Dominion, but a Dominion in common."78
74. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 96. During the Constitutional Convention it was also
noted that slavery was inconsistent with "republicanism." Luther Martin stated that
"[s]lavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism, and has the tendency to
destroy those principles on which it is supported ...." WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 76 (1977). This theme
may also be found in antebellum case law. As the court in Crandall v. State noted in
construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, "[T]he reason
why slaves are not citizens, is, because they are held to be property, and not men, and
hence have not freedom of choice or action." Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 352
(1834).
75. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 105.
76. Several Congressmen indicated that it was necessary to protect freed slaves'
natural rights--the Lockean triumvirate ofnatural rights: live, liberty, and property. For
example, Congressman Sidney Homes stated that freed slaves have the right to "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to protection of person and property, [and] to equal
and exact justice and privileges before the law." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1319 (1866). Similarly, Congressman Buckland stated that the government must "insist
upon such measures as will secure to every American citizen the natural rights of life,
liberty, and property in all the states." Id. at 1627.
77. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 48 (emphasis added).
78. TuLLY, supra note 53, at 60 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT § 1.29 (Peter Laslett ed., 1970)). This dominion in common was also
recognized by another natural law theorist, Samuel Pufendorf, who stated:
A right to all things, previous to every human deed, must be understood not
exclusively, but only indefinitely, that is, not that one man may claim
everything for himself to the exclusion of the rest of mankind, but that nature
does not define what particular things belong to one man, and what to another,
before they agree among themselves on their division and allocation.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRJ OCTO (1688), reprinted in
2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather, trans., James
Brown Scott ed., 1934).
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·AU individuals are born with the power to preserve their property in
their lives, liberty, and estates. This right to preservation flows from
"natural reason." However, individuals also have a duty to preserve all
of mankind in the state of nature: "[F]or men being all the workmanship
of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all servants of one
sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His
business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to
last during His, not one another's pleasure."79 The natural right to selfpreservation is retained upon entering civil society, and the duty of
preservation of mankind remains binding upon the members of society,
but also adheres to the government. 80 Therefore, any failure to protect
the citizens on the part of the government is a violation of the principles
of natural reason.
Individuals consent to abandon their natural right to their unrestrained
natural liberty81 in favor of the superior protection that civil society
may afford for their property. 82 According to Locke, it is "consent
which makes any one a member of any commonwealth."83 Individuals
give up their power of self-preservation and the preservation of mankind

79. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 9-10.
80. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *3; 4 id. at *30, *180, *183-84.
81. Blackstone also distinguished between natural liberty, which he defined as "a
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of
nature," 1 id. at *121, and civil liberty, which he defined as "natural liberty so far
restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general
advantage of the public." Id. (citing JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES§ 1.3.1). See also CHARLES
DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. xi, ch. 3, at 200
(David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748). During the nineteenth
century, a similar notion of civil liberty was prevalent. For example, Thomas M.
Cooley, a noted constitutional scholar, stated in his treatise on constitutional law:
Civil liberty may be defined as that condition in which rights are established
and protected, by means of such limitations and restraints upon the action of
individual members of the political society as are needed to prevent what
would be injurious to other individuals, or prejudicial to the general welfare.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 226 (1880).
82. This theme was not only expressed in the writings of Locke, but also was
expounded by Blackstone, who stated that "the principal aim of society is to protect
individuals in the enjoyment of ... rights, which were vested in them by the immutable
laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without mutual assistance and
intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities." 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *120.
83. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 69. This notion that society was based upon consent
was echoed by congressional Republicans. For example, Orris S. Ferry noted "the
fundamental principle on which our system rests, that all governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 855
(1869). According to Ferry, this principle was recognized in the Declaration of
Independence. Id.
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"to be regulated by laws made by the society so far forth as the
preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require ...." 84
For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for
which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the
people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that
by entering into society which was the end for which they entered into it; too
gross an absurdity for any man to own. 85

The exclusive proprietary nature of property in society is secured by the
government. The primary function of government is preservation of
property, which Locke defined as including property in one's life,
property in one's liberty, and property in one's goods. According to
Locke:
[t]o avoid these inconveniencies which disorder men's properties in the state of
Nature, men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the
whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing
rules to bound it by which every one may know what is his. 86

.

This notion of exclusive private property involves individual and
exclusive possession of property as opposed to inclusive possession
inherent in common property. The equality of common property in the
state of nature is replaced by the exclusive nature of private property
through the consent of mankind in forming civil society. 87 According
to Locke, "it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth-I mean out of the bounds
of society and compact; for governments the laws regulate it ...." 88
Through civil society, what is mine and what is thine is made known to
each individual through promulgated, standing laws. Locke reasoned
that "men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of
the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have

84. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 71 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
87. Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford reflects this idea that
government is the origin of property as an exclusive right. According to Justice Curtis,
"[w]ithout government and social order, there can be no property; for without law, its
ownership, its use, and the power of disposing of it, cease to exist, in the sense in which
those words are used and understood in all civilized States." Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 615 (1856).
88. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 30.
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standing rules to bound it by which every one may know what is
his."89
Individuals still retain that part of their right of self-preservation and
the preservation of others that is not necessary to be ceded to society.
A right of self-defense remains, for example, in members of society.
However, slaves who have no property in their lives, whose lives are the
property of their masters, do not have such a right of preservation.
According to Locke, "[h]e that is master of himself and his own life has
a right, too, to the means of preserving it . . .." 90 The true end of
government, according to Locke, is therefore the "preservation of the
property [broadly construed to include property in one's life and one's
liberty] of all of the members of that society, as far as is possible."91
Slaves are not "members of society," or citizens, and therefore have no
such right to preservation.
In Chapter VII of Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government,
entitled Of Political or Civil Society, Locke stated that slaves are "not
capable of any property," are "subjected to the absolute dominion and
arbitrary power of their masters [and] ... cannot in that state be
considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the
preservation of property."92 In Chapter IV of Locke's Second Treatise
on Civil Government, entitled OfSlavery, Locke stated that the condition
of slavery is "nothing else but the state of war continued between a
lawful conqueror and a captive . . .." 93 Therefore, for Locke the
essence of slavery was a total lack of capacity with respect to property-a lack of property in one's life, in one's liberty, and in one's estate.
Although citizens possessed a right to liberty, the nature of liberty in
society was not unrestrained. According to Locke, the laws of society
"in many things confine" the liberty that individuals possess in the state
of nature. 94 The liberty of individuals in society was "to be under no
other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but
what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it."95
Freedom is to have a standing rule "common to every one of that

89. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 96.
91. Id. at 49.
92. Id. at 48. Slaves were defined as "chattel personal" in southern jurisdictions
by the mid-eighteenth century. See William M. Wiecek, The Statutory Law of Slavery
and Race in the Thirteen Mainland Colonies of British America, 34 WILLIAM & MARY
· Q. 258, 264 (3d Ser. 1977).
93. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 18.
94. Id. at 71.
95. Id. at 17.
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society" that restricts one's actions and to be free from the "inconstant,
uncertain, unknown, [and] arbitrary will of another man . . . ." 96
According to Locke:
[L]iberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be
where there is no law; and is not, as we are told, "a liberty for every man to do
what he lists." For who could be free, when every other man's humour might
domineer over him? But a liberty to dispose and order freely as he lists his
person, actions, possessions, and his whole property within the allowance of
those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will
of another, but freely follow his own. 97

Therefore, under Locke's conception of civil society, freedom from
"arbitrary" actions on the part of individuals, including the government,
is the essence of liberty--to be free from "restraint and violence from
others." However, individuals are still subject to the government's
power of regulation of the natural liberty of its citizens. This condition
of liberty certainly was not available to free blacks in the South under
the Black Codes, and it was the purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to guarantee such civil liberty.

2.

Samuel Pufendoif

John Locke was not alone in conceptualizing society as founded upon
a social compact among citizens. Samuel Pufendorf, another natural law
philosopher who was particularly influential in the antebellum period,98
also conceptualized civil society as being founded upon a compact from
which certain "precepts of natural law" could be deduced. 99 For

96. Id.
97. Id. at 33-34.
98. Philip Hamburger has observed that during the founding period,
[t]he arguments of Pufendorfwere among the most scholarly of many [natural
law philosophers] that employed a common vocabulary and mode of analysis.
In popularizing a succinct, generally stated, and attractive version of the stateof-nature analysis, the briefer works of Hutcheson and Pufendorf were
particularly important.
Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907, 914 n.24 (1993).
99. Pufendorf distinguished between pacts by which "a right is constituted which
contributes to the use of all mankind," and those by which "a right arises which benefits
only certain men." PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 454. Pufendorf pointed to the
institutions of "speech, ownership of property, value, and sovereignty or command" as
presupposing "a universal pact, tacit or express, whereby a fixed form has been assigned
them." Id.
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Pufendorf, this social com.pact was dictated by "reason." From. this
social com.pact, certain institutions naturally arose, among them. "speech"
and "the ownership of property." This com.pact arose from. a hypothetical state of nature. Pufendorf posited a natural state of m.an, similar to
that of Locke, wherein individuals enjoyed a "natural liberty." 100 In
this "natural state," individuals
may use and enjoy everything that is open to them, and may secure and do
everything that will lead to their preservation, in so far as no injury is done to
the right of others [and] may use their own judgement and decision, provided,
of course, that it is framed on this natural law, just as they use their own
strength, to secure their own defence and preservation. 101

Therefore, like Locke, Pufendorf concluded that individuals in a state of
nature had a natural right to self-preservation as well as an ability to act
upon natural reason in exercising this fundamental right. From. these
propositions flowed the natural equality of individuals in the state of
nature.
Pufendorf, in his Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, outlined a
conception of society as a political body, which he defined as "several
persons . . . united [so] that both their action and their will are regarded
as the action and will of a single individual, and not of several." 102
Pufendorf termed the mutual agreement upon which society was founded
a union of the people formed through "intervening pacts" whereby the
people reserve to them.selves certain powers or privileges. 103 From. this
com.pact arose the supreme civil sovereignty of a state. 104

100. According to Pufendorf:
[T]he state of nature has come to be described as a natural liberty, since every
man, antecedent to any act of man, is understood to be under his own right
and power, and to be subject to the power of no other man. And so every
man is considered equal to every other man, since neither is the subject of the
other.
Id. at 158.
101. Id.
102. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2 ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI
Duo 20 (1672), reprinted in 15 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown
Scott ed. & William Abbot trans., 1931).
103. Pufendorf stated:
For a multitude, or many men, to become one person, to whom one action can
be attributed and certain rights belong, in so far as this one person is distinct
from individuals, and the rights be such as the individuals cannot attribute to
themselves, it is necessary for them to have united their wills and strength by
intervening pacts, without which a union of several persons equal by nature is
impossible of comprehension.
PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 974.
104. See id. at 1000.
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Pufendorf also subscribed to Locke's view that out of common
ownership, exclusive private property naturally arose. 105
"[P]roprietorship, in so far as it introduces the division of things among
several owners exclusive of others, is due to the suasion of nature, but
that actually it has been established by the pacts of men." 106 Therefore, Pufendorf recognized that property rights are "conventional" in that
civil society defines property rights through compact: "[t]he only
conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction between possessions is
derived from a pact. " 107 Although Pufendorf argued that proprietorship
is "conventional," this convention was binding by principles of natural
law. "[T]he law of nature approves all conventions which have been
introduced about things by men, provided they involve no contradiction
or do not overturn society. Therefore, the proprietorship of things has
resulted immediately from the convention of men, either tacit or express .
• • •" 108 Thus, the agreement flowing from the social compact on the
part of all of the members of society to recognize private property is
binding based on principles of natural law. 109
Like Locke, Pufendorf also indicated that the purpose of forming
states or unions of individuals is protection from injury from others.
"[T]he chief end of states is that men should by mutual understanding
and assistance be insured against losses and injuries which can be and
commonly are brought upon them by other men, and that by these means
they may enjoy peace or have sufficient protection against enemies." 110
Pufendorf reasoned that if it were the case that a union did not afford an
individual greater protection than that individual possessed in a state of
nature, "it would be folly to tum ... [his] back upon natural liberty, in

105. PUFENDORF, supra note 102, at 35.
106. Id.
107. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 538.
108. Id. at 537.
109. Pufendorf recounted the way in which exclusive property, propriety or
dominion, arises from a state of common dominion. See id. at 539-40. Once this
property was established by convention, its inviolability was dictated by natural law or
principles of reason.
[T]he precept of natural law about abstaining from what is another's first
exerted its force when men defined by convention what each should hold to
be another's, and what his own. Till that time it lay dormant, so far as its
strength was concerned, in that general precept about the preservation of pacts
and about not impairing another's right.
Id. at 555-56.
110. Id. at 1011.
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which every man chooses his own means of defence." 111 Therefore,
the formation of the state is necessitated by principles of natural law.
Individuals are by nature sociable, and formation of the state is
reasonable given the natural state of man. 112 Pufendorf concluded that
the duties inherent in being a member of society are based upon natural
reason. According to Pufendorf, "'[a]s all the limbs act in unison,
because it is the interest of the whole body to keep each one of them
safe, so men should spare one another, because we are born for society.
The bond of society, however, cannot exist unless it guards and loves all
its members. "' 113 Therefore, like Locke, it would seem that Pufendorf
recognized a duty of preservation incumbent upon each member of
society toward one another.
Like Locke, Pufendorf also made a distinction between citizens,
possessing an equality of rights, and slaves. The incapacity of slaves to
be citizens was discussed at length by Pufendorf. According to
Pufendorf, "free men need obey only the state and its general laws." 114
However, "slaves serve one who is even a fellow citizen, are subject to
his special orders, penalties, and restraints, and are forced to bear his
harshness, which is all the more irksome the more frequent and intimate
the contact between them." 115 Therefore, the distinction between
slaves and citizens rests not only upon an inequality of birth, but also
upon the slave's being within the power or dominion of another.
Pufendorf elaborated upon this distinction between slaves and free
men under the Roman law in his Elements of Universal Jurisprudence.
According to Pufendorf:
The Roman jurisconsults . . . formulated as the broadest and most general
statuses of men . . . , liberty and servitude . . . . [L]iberty is commonly
conceived as a status in which one has the faculty of undertaking something
upon one's own free will; servitude, on the contrary, as a status in which it is
necessary to do things at the desire of another . . . . In general, however liberty
denotes the status of those who serve merely the state, and not a fellow-citizen

111. Id.
112. Pufendorf quoted Seneca's On Benefits, wherein Seneca stated:
It is by the interchange of benefits alone that we gain some measure of
protection for our lives, and of safety against sudqen disasters. Taken singly,
what should we be? A prey and quarry for wild beasts, a luscious and easy
banquet . . . . Man is covered by a soft skin, . . . weak and naked by himself
he is made strong by union .... Take away union, and you will rend asunder
the association by which the human race preserves its existence. For man
saves man, and city, city; one hand washes the other, and one finger the other;
all our security rests in comrades.
Id. at 208-09 (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 314 (quoting Seneca's On Anger).
114. Id. at 945.
115. Id.
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in addition; who may of their own free will direct any actions whatsoever of
their own about which there has been made no disposition by general laws. 116

Thus, "servitude" involved being within the dominion of others and was
inconsistent with the liberty accorded the citizen. Therefore, Pufendorf
concluded that those not possessing liberty "are understood to have no
citizenship in the state and are enrolled under the head of things, and not
of persons." 117
Pufendorf related the idea of liberty with authority, defining liberty as
"[a]uthority over persons and actions which are one's own." 118 He
defined sovereignty as "[a]uthority over the persons of others ...
whereby another can be enjoined legitimately and efficaciously to supply
something, that is to say, so that another is under obligation not to resist
my order or not to refuse the same." 119 In defining sovereignty,
Pufendorf distinguished between "absolute" and "restricted" sovereignty.
In the case of restricted sovereignty, certain powers are reserved to the
people. 120 Thus, in the writings of Pufendorf there exists a justification for the rights retained by the people as a form of sovereignty. The
sovereignty delegated to the government may be restricted and not
absolute, in the terminology of Pufendorf. Because slaves do not
possess the requisite liberty and are within the private 121 sovereignty
of another, they cannot possess the civil authority or sovereignty retained
by the people in the social compact. An equality of certain privileges
and immunities is a characteristic of one's status as a citizen. However,
status as a slave precludes one from sharing in these equal rights flowing

116. PUFENDORF, supra note 102, at 14.
117. Id. at 14-15.
118. Id. at 56.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 57. Pufendorf distinguished between private and public sovereignty.
According to Pufendorf:
The former belongs to persons as private individuals for the use of each as
such. Species of this command are the authority of a father, the authority of
a master or owners of slaves, the authority of husbands over wives, preceptors
over pupils, guardians over wards, &c. Public sovereignty is that which comes
to persons in their public capacity for the use of civil society. If this
sovereignty be supreme in the state it has an adjunct authority, which men call
eminent, over the persons and property of subjects, an authority which is
stronger than any rights whatsoever of individuals, but one to be exercised
only for the public safety.
Id.
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from a compact among the members of society because slaves are not
and cannot be parties to any such compact. This was the position to
which the Taney Court adhered in Dred Scott v. Sandford. As Justice
Daniel stated in his concurrence:
[T]he African . . . was regarded and owned in every State in the Union as
property merely, and as such was not and could not be a party or an actor,
much less a peer in any compact or form of government established by the
States or the United States .... [S]o far as rights and immunities appertaining
to citizens have been defined and secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, the African race is not and never was recognised [sic] either by
the language or purposes of the former .... 122

Justice Daniel argued that only the sovereignty, or the entire people,
could subsequently admit Africans to membership in the political
community as citizens. Emancipation was not sufficient to confer
citizenship.
Under Pufendorf's theory, upon formation of the state, certain rights
were obtained by all of the members of the society, flowing from the
social compact binding each. Like Locke's theory, Pufendorf's theory
posited that members of society are restricted in their natural liberty.
Among the natural rights Pufendorf recognized as powers of the citizen
are some of the fundamental rights protected under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pufendorf
mentioned that the power of alienation is a natural right flowing from
proprietorship 123 as well as the right to pass property by inheritance.124 With respect to these rights there is an equality that "has its
origin in the fact that an obligation to cultivate a social life is equally
binding upon all men, since it is an integral part of human nature as
such ...." 125 Individuals in a state of nature are possessed of an
"equality ofpower or of liberty." According to Pufendorf, "[b]y this all
men are recognized to be naturally equal, in so far as no one, apart from
an antecedent deed or agreement of man, has any power over another,
but every man is the governor of his acts or power." 126
However, individuals are not "equal" in all things. For example, the
establishment of government may create an inequality among the
members of society in terms of those responsible for governing and
those who are governed. 127 Furthermore, other inequalities existing
anterior to the formation of government also may exist among citizens,

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 481-82 (1856).
See PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 606.
See id. at 615.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-45.
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such as that arising from "the status of head of a family rJiaterfamilias],
which preceded the formation of a state, and the power, which, under
this institution, they secured over their wives, children, and slaves, the
heads of families brought over into states." 128 Pufendorf argued,
however, that "[t]his inequality ... owes none of its origin to states, but
is much older than they are, and so the institution of head of a family
was not given by states, but was carried over into them ...." 129
Thus, inequalities conceptualized as existing anterior to the formation of
the state may remain to a certain extent after formation of the state.
This explains the Republicans' view that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not abolish civil disabilities imposed upon married
women and children. However, Pufendorf also recognized that after.
formation of the state, inequalities in the primordial power of the citizens
might be imposed by the "supreme authority" of the state through
conferral of special privileges. "[W]hatever inequality between citizens
arises after the formation of states, owes its origin either to the public
administration, whereby the supreme authority delegates .to certain
citizens the exercise of some special authority over the rest, or to some
special privilege granted by the supreme authority." 130 This was the
sort of inequality at which Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
struck.
Finally, Pufendorf made a critical distinction between the social
compact and the compact upon which government is based. According
to Pufendorf:
There are . . . two pacts which combine in the establishment of society, and
primarily of civil society. One is the pact of individuals with individuals, to the
effect that they desire to have their affairs which are mutually intertwined,
administered by common counsel; the other is the one which is made with those
to whom the care of the common safety is entrusted. 131
·

This distinction is essential in understanding the belief on the part of the
Republicans that the state governments had no power to abridge the

128. Id. at 344.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 345.
131. PUFENDORF, supra note 102; at 102. Pufendorf stated that the first pact is
based upon "the consent of each and all." An individual who does not signify consent
to this pact "is not regarded as a member of the society." Id. However, under the
subsequent pact establishing the form of government, only the consent of the majority
is required.
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privileges and immunities of citizens prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. These were powers or civil capacities of
citizens, some inherent in all persons (absolute rights) and some flowing
from the social compact (relative rights). The government possessed no
power to abridge these rights because both of these forms of civil power
existed anterior to the establishment of government and because such
power was not delegated to the government. This distinction is
important not only in understanding the lack of power in the state
governments, but also in understanding the distinction between civil and
political rights recognized by the Republicans. This dichotomy between
civil and political rights was based on the distinction made between the
social compact and the establishment of government. Privileges and
immunities of citizens are those privileges and immunities that are
inherent in persons or which flow from the social compact and arose
prior to the establishment of government, whereas political privileges, or
rights of participation in the government, exist only after such an
establishment.

3.

Jean Jacques Burlamaqui

Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, another influential natural law theorist from
continental Europe, argued like Pufendorf and Locke that one could
deduce principles of natural reason from the "nature of man." According to Burlamaqui:
If we should be ... asked, what principles ought reason to make use of, in
order to judge of what relates to the law of nature, and to deduce and unfold
it? Our answer is in general, that we have only to attend to the nature of man,
and to his states or relations; and, as these relations are different, there ma12 be
likewise different principles, that lead us to the knowledge of our duties. 1 2

Like Locke and Pufendorf, Burlamaqui posited that humans existed
originally in a primitive state of nature. From this original state of
nature, society arose naturally. If one studied the nature of human
beings, one would find, as did Pufendorf, that they are by their nature
social animals and, thus, the formation of society is dictated by human

132. 1 JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC
107 (photo. reprint 1972) (Nugent trans., 5th ed. 1807). Elsewhere, Burlamaqui
stated:
The only way to attain to the knowledge of natural law is to consider
attentively the nature and constitution of man, the relations he has to the
beings, that surround him, and the states thence resulting. In fact the very
term natural law, and the notion we have given of it, show, that the principles
of this science must be taken from the very nature and constitutions of man.
Id. at 109.
LAW
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nature. 133 Like the other social compact theorists, Burlamaqui identified the state as a "body politic." 134 However, Burlamaqui also termed
the social compact among the members of society a "union of wills:"
All societies are formed by the concurrence or union of the wills of several
persons, with a view of acquiring some advantage. Hence it is that societies are
considered as bodies, and receive the appellation of moral persons; by reason
that those bodies are in effect animated with one sole will, which regulates all
their movements. This agrees particularly with the body politic or state. 135

Like Locke, Burlamaqui believed that private property resulted from a
covenant among the members of society. In the state of nature there
was no such institution--all property could only be held in common. 136
Individuals consented to give up some portion of their natural liberty,
but retained that which was not necessary to cede to society. What
remained of an individual's natural liberty, Burlamaqui termed "civil
liberty. " 137 According to Burlamaqui, civil liberty

133. As Burlamaqui stated, "[s]uch in effect is the nature and constitution of man,
that out of society he could neither preserve his life, nor display and perfect his faculties
and talents, nor attain any real and solid happiness." Id. at 114.
134. Burlamaqui stated:
Among the various establishments of man, the most considerable without
doubt is that of civil society, or the body politic, which is justly esteemed the
most perfect of societies, and has obtained the name of State by way of
preference.
Id. at 134.
135. Id. at 135.
136. According to Burlamaqui, private property was an "adventitious" rather than
a "primitive" state since it depended upon the consent of those individuals in society to
respect individual ownership of goods:
The property of goods is another very important establishment, which
produces a new adventitious state. It modifies the right which all men had
originally to earthly goods; and, distinguishing carefully what belongs to
individuals, ensures the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of what they possess;
by which means it contributes to the maintenance of peace and harmony
among mankind. But, since all men had originally a right to a common use
of whatever the earth produces for their several wants, it is evident that, if this
natural power is actually restrained and limited in divers respects, this must
necessarily arise from some human act; and consequently the state of property,
which is the cause of those limitations, ought to be ranked among the
adventitious states.
Id. at 29.
137. According to Burlamaqui, laws guided man's liberty rather than restricted it.
We should . . . take care not to imagine, that laws are properly made in
order to bring men under a yoke. So idle an end would be quite unworthy of
a sovereign, whose goodness ought to be equal to his power and wisdom, and
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is natural liberty itself, divested of that part, which constituted the independence
of individuals, by the authority, which it confers upon sovereigns, and attended
with a right of insisting on his making a good use of his authority, and with a
moral security, that this right will have its effect. 138

Like Pufendorf, Burlamaqui also distinguished between the social
compact, which served as the foundation of society, and the establishment of the government, which was instituted to protect and regulate the
rights of the people. According to Burlamaqui, two things were
necessary in creating a state:
1. It was necessary to unite forever the wills of all the members of society
in such a manner, that from that time forward they should never desire but one
and the same thing, in whatever relates to the end and purpose of society. 2.
It was requisite afterwards to establish a supreme power, supported by the
strength of the whole body (by which means they might over awe those, who
should be inclinable to disturb the peace) and to inflict a present and sensible
evil on such, as should attempt to act contrary to the public good. 139

Burlamaqui also made a distinction between primary and adventitious
rights, analogous to Chancellor Kent's distinction between absolute and
relative rights. Both forms of rights were natural rights, :flowing from
principles of natural law-the one existing originally in man's primitive
state of isolation from other men, the other arising upon the formation
of societies and the creation of relations among men. 140 According to

who should always act up to these perfections. Let us say rather, that laws are
made to oblige the subject to pursue his real interest, and to choose the surest
and best way to attain the end he is designed for, which is happiness.
Id. at 70. Elsewhere, Burlamaqui stated:
Government is so far from subverting this first order, that it has been rather
established with a view to give it a new degree of force and consistency. It
was intended to enable us the better to discharge the duties prescribed by
natural laws, and to attain more certainly the end, for which we were created.
Id. at 135.
138. 2 Id. at 21.
139. Id. at 23-24.
140. Burlamaqui described the process by which adventitious states arose from an
original primitive state as follows:
[A]s man himself may make divers modifications in his primitive state, and
enter into several adventitious ones; the consideration of those new states fall
likewise within the object of the law of nature, taken in its full extent; and the
principles, we have laid down, ought to serve likewise for a rule in the states,
in which man engages by his own act and deed.
Hence occasion has been taken to distinguish two species of natural law; the
one primary, [and] the other secondary.
The primary or primitive natural law is that, which immediately arises from
the primitive constitution of man, as God himself has established it, independent of any human act.
Secondary natural law is that, which supposes some human act or establishment; as a civil state, property of goods, &c.
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Burlamaqui:
[T]here is this difference between primitive and adventitious states, that the
former being annexed as it were, to the nature and constitution of man, such as
he has received them from God, are for this very reason, common to all
mankind. The same cannot be said of the adventitious states; which, supposing
an human act or agreement, cannot of themselves be indifferently suitable to all
men, but to those only, who contrived and procured them. 141

Thus, the primitive natural rights exist even in the state of nature prior
to the formation of the social compact, while adventitious rights are
dependent upon some action of human beings and, therefore, only arise
after individuals aggregate through the mechanism of the social compact.
As a result, all individuals are entitled to the primitive (or absolute)
natural rights, whereas only those who are parties to the social compact
are entitled to the adventitious (or relative) rights.
Finally, like Pufendorf, Burlamaqui seems also to have made a
distinction between natural and civil laws, or natural rights and the
modes in which these rights are allowed to be exercised in society.
Burlamaqui concludes:
[W]e may very properly distinguish two sorts of civil laws. Some are such with
respect to their authority only, and others with regard to their original. To the
former class we refer all the natural laws, which serve as rules in civil courts,
and which are also confirmed by a new sanction of the sovereign. Such are all
laws, which determine the crimes, that are to be punished by the civil justice;
and the obligations, upon which an action may commence in the civil court, &c.
As to the civil laws, so called because of their original, these are arbitrary
decrees, which, for their foundation, have only the will of the sovereign, and
suppose certain human establishments; or which regulate things relating to the
particular advantage of the state, though indifferent in themselves and
undetermined by the law of nature. Such are the laws, which prescribe the
necessary forms in contracts and testaments, the manner of proceeding in courts
of justice, &c. But it must be observed, that all those regulations should tend
to the good of the state, as well as of individuals; so that they are properly
appendages to the law of nature. 142

Thus, the state may pass regulations that are binding through principles
of natural law because of the authority of the state as sovereign, to
which all members of society have consented. However, these
regulations must be for the public good, or for the "particular advantage
of the state."
1 Id. at 125.
141. Id. at 31.
142. 2 Id. at 112.
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4.

Emmerich de Vattel

Emmerich de Vattel, an eighteenth century political philosopher who
wrote a widely-known treatise on natural law and the law of nations,
reiterated the concept of citizenship as membership in a political
community and described the methods of obtaining citizenship in The
Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law. 143 In 1780, this
work was a textbook in the universities. Chancellor Kent, who was the
author of the first work on international law in the United States,
extensively quoted Vattel.
Furthermore, Vattel's writings likely
represented an important influence upon the Framers of the Constitution.
According to Benjamin Franklin, "'[i]t came to us in good season, when
the circumstances of a rising State make it necessary frequently to
consult the Law of Nations. "'144 Most importantly, Vattel was cited
by Justice Daniel in Dred Scott v. Sandford as an authority in discussing
the ways in which citizenship might be obtained in a state. 145 Therefore, the views of Vattel are relevant in determining what was meant by
the term "citizen" in nineteenth century America.
According to Vattel, "[t]he members of a civil society are its citizens.
Bound to that society by certain duties and subject to its authority, they
share equally in the advantages it offers." 146 Vattel recognized two
methods of obtaining this status: through naturalization and by birth. 147
Of naturalization, Vattel stated, "[a] Nation, or the sovereign who
represents it, may confer citizenship upon an alien and admit him into
the body politic. This act is called naturalization."148 Therefore,
Vattel recognized the two means of attaining citizenship embodied in the
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.

143. VATTEL, supra note 35, at xxxvii.
144. Id. at XXX (quoting 2 WHARTON'S THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE 64).
145. See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
146. VATTEL, supra note 35, at 87.
147. Vattel defined the "natives" of a state as "those who are born in the country
of parents who are citizens." According to Vattel, the children of citizens "naturally take
on the status of their fathers and enter upon all the latter's rights . . . . each citizen,
upon entering into the society, reserves to his children the right to be members of it."
Vattel stated that the citizenship of children born of citizens is based on "tacit consent."
Id. As Attorney General Bates observed in his opinion concerning citizenship in 1868,
"[t]he Constitution itself does not make the citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It only
intends and recognizes such of them as are natural-home-born; and provides for the
naturalization of such of them as were alien--foreign-born; making the latter, as far as
nature will allow, like the former." Bates, supra note 23, at 389.
148. VATTEL, supra note 35, at 87.
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Vattel's theory of civil government is extremely similar to that of
Locke. Furthermore, there is evidence that Vattel's theory was at least
as influential as Locke's. For example, Justice Story cited Vattel
extensively in his discussion of the theory of society as being based on
a compact. Story seems to have followed Vattel's distinction (analogous
to that of Pufendorf and Burlamaqui) between the social compact and the
form of government. It is to that distinction that we now tum.
5.

The Social Compact and the Establishment of Government

As already noted with Pufendorf and Burlamaqui, many of the natural
law theorists recognized a distinction between the social compact upon
which society was based and the agreement between the people and the
government dictating the form of government. 149 Justice Story, in his
Commentaries cited Vattel as an authority in defining the term "state"
and recognized Vattel's distinction between the social compact and the
form of government: "[a] state [is] . . . a body politic, or society of
men, united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety
and advantage by their combined strength." 150 According to Justice
Story:
[I]t is wholly immaterial what is the form of the government, or by whose
hands this absolute authority is exercised. It may be exercised by the people
at large, as in a pure democracy; or by a select few, as in an absolute
aristocracy; or by a single person, as in an absolute monarchy. 151

Therefore, Justice Story recognized the dichotomy between the civil
and the political sphere as well as Vattel's distinction between the state,
or the "body politic," 152 and the form of government established by the
149. See supra note 131 and accompanying text, discussing Pufendorf' s distinction
between the social compact and the pact establishing the government. Locke may also
have recognized this distinction, for Locke cautioned that one must "distinguish between
the Dissolution ofthe Society, and the Dissolution of Government." See KETTNER, supra
note 14, at 53 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 151 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1960)).
150. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 144 (citing VATTEL, supra note 35, at bk.I, ch. 1,
§ 1; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,455 (1793) (Wilson, J.)). See also id.
at 145.
151. Id. at 145 (citing VATTEL, supra note 35, at bk.1, ch. 1, §§ 2, 3).
152. Id. at 145-46. Story elaborated upon this notion of the state as a political
community. Quoting James Wilson, Story stated in his Commentaries that
the word "state" is used in various senses. In its most enlarged sense it means
the people composing a particular nation or community. In this sense the state
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state. 153 The civil sphere encompassed the terms of the social compact, whereas the political sphere encompassed the government and its
form. 154 This is the basis for the distinction recognized in nineteenth
century American between civil rights and political rights. 155

means the whole people, united into one body politic; and the state and the
people of the state are equivalent expressions . . . . Mr. Justice Wilson, in his
Law Lectures, uses the word "state" in its broadest sense. "In free states,"
says he, "the people form an artificial person, or body politic, the highest and
noblest that can be known. They form that moral person, which in one ofmy
former lectures I described as a complete body of free, natural persons, united
together for their common benefit; as having an understanding and a will; as
deliberating, and resolving, and acting; as possessed of interests which it ought
to manage; as enjoying rights which it ought to maintain; and as lying under
obligations which it ought to perform. To this moral person we assign, by
way of eminence, the dignified appelation of STATE."
Id.

153. One important difference between the social compact and the establishment of
the form of government is the degree of consent required in each case. In Justice
Story's opinion, the explicit consent of the majority is not needed in practice in order
for a compact to be created, establishing the government. Pufendorf seemed to indicate
that the consent of the majority was required to establish the form of government. See
supra note 131. However, according to Justice Story:
Even our most solemn instruments of government, framed and adopted as the
constitutions of our State governments, are not only not founded upon the
assent of all the people within the territorial jurisdiction, but that assent is
expressly excluded by the very manner in which the ratification is required to
be made. That ratification is restricted to those who are qualified voters; and
who are or shall be qualified voters is decided by the majority in the
convention or other body which submits the constitution to the people.
1 STORY, supra note 3, at 228. Story specifically mentioned that the "assent of minors,
of women, and of unqualified' voters has never been asked or allowed ...." Id.
Instead, only a majority of the qualified voters was required "upon the general principle
that the majority has at all times a right to govern the minority, and to bind the latter to
obedience to the will of the former." Id. at 229.
154. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment often made a distinction between
civil and political rights. They intended to extend certain civil privileges and immunities
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but did not
intend to convey any political privileges such as the elective franchise. See supra note
26.
155. For example, Representative James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, stated that civil rights were "those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1117 (1866). The court in Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822), in construing the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, stated that only civil rights
were inherent in citizenship. According to the court, the· mistake that had often been
made in defining the term "citizen"
must arise from not attending to a sensible distinction between political and
civil rights. The latter constitutes the citizen, while the former are not
necessary ingredients. A state may deny all her political rights to an
individual, and yet he may be a citizen. The rights of office and suffrage are
political purely, and are denied by some or all the states, to part of their
population, who are still citizens. A citizen, then, is one who owes to
government, allegiance, service, and money by way of taxation, and to whom
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Justice Story argued that the social compact upon which the federal
government was founded existed, in a sense, prior to ratification of the
Constitution. According to Justice Story, the view that the Constitution
itself was a social compact and was not preceded by the actual social
compact had been expressed by some individuals, among them Chief
Justice Jay156 and Tucker in his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries
on the Laws of England. 157 Justice Story endorsed this position in
part. However, he argued that the social compact forming the union of
the people in the United States was embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and that it existed before the Constitution was ratified.
According to him, the Constitution "is . . . to a certain extent, a social
compact, ... [but] a contract of this nature actually existed in a visible
form between the citizens of each State in their several constitutions."158 Justice Story cited a speech by Mr. Adams supporting his
claim that the "Declaration of Independence was a social compact"
among all of the people of the United States, which existed prior to the
establishment of the federal government under the United States

the government in tum, grants and guarantees liberty of person and of
conscience, the right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and the
social relations, of suit and defence, and security in person, estate and
reputation. These, with some others which might be enumerated, being
guaranteed and secured by government, constitute a citizen.
Id. at 342.
156. Justice Story quoted Chief Justice Jay's·opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia:
"every State constitution is a compact, made by and between the citizens of
the State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the
United States is likewise a compact, made by the people of the United States
to govern themselves, as to general objects, in a certain manner." The context
abundantly shows that he considered it a fundamental law of government, and
that its powers did not rest on mere treaty, but were supreme and were to be
construed by the judicial department; and that the States were bound to obey.
1 STORY, supra note 3, at 243 n.l (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 215. Justice Story stated that Tucker believed that the
Constitution of the United States is an original, written, federal, and social
compact, freely, voluntarily, and solemnly entered into by the several States,
and ratified by the people thereof, respectively; whereby the several States and
the people thereof respectively have bound themselves to each other and to the
Federal government of the United States, and by which the Federal government is bound to the several States and to every citizen of the United States.
Id. (citing l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND App.
n.D, 140 et seq.). According to Story, Tucker distinguished the constitutional compact
from a charter or grant because the Constitution was founded by equals "whether
considered as States in their political capacity and character, or as individuals ...." Id.
158. Id. at 217.
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Constitution. 159 In arguing that the political community and social
compact existed prior to ratification of the Constitution, Justice Story's
concern was that states' -rights advocates might use the theory of the
Constitution as a compact based on consent to erode the powers of the
national government. 160 According to Justice Story, when the Constitution is called a "compact," it means that "it is a voluntary and solemn
consent of the people to adopt it, as a form of government ...." 161
Therefore, he recognized the establishment of government as being based
upon consent, but declined to describe such an establishment as a
"compact."
Justice Story's arguments concerning the existence of a social compact
anterior to the establishment of the form of government are consistent
with the social compact theory most clearly stated by Pufendorf, who
argued that there were in reality two compacts involved in the creation
of society: (1) a social compact among the members of the state; and

159. Justice Story recounted Adams's speech as follows:·
"The body politic of the United States was formed by a voluntary association
of the people of the united colonies. The Declaration of Independence was a
social compact, by which the whole people covenanted with each citizen of the
united colonies, and each citizen with the whole people, that the united
colonies were, and of right ought to be, free and independent States. To this
compact, union was as vital as freedom and independence . . . . Again, our
Declaration oflndependence, our Confederation, our Constitution of the United
States, and all our State constitutions, without a single exception, have been
voluntary compacts, deriving all their authority from the free consent of the
parties to them." And he proceeds to state that the modem doctrine of
nullification of the laws of the Union, by a single State, is a solecism of
language, and imports self-contradiction, and goes to the destruction of the
government and the Union. It is plain, from the whole reasoning of Mr.
Adams, that when he speaks of the Constitution as a compact, he means no
more than that it is a voluntary and solemn consent of the people to adopt it,
as a form of government; and not a treaty obligation to be abrogated at will
by a single State.
Id. at 237 n.3. If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also viewed the Declaration
of Independence as a "social compact" among the people of the United States, this
would explain their references to the Fourteenth Amendment as embodying the principles
of the Declaration. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make freed blacks
parties to this social compact among the people of the United States and to ensure that
their status as citizens was constitutionally protected.
160. Justice Story's concerns are evidenced in his remarks on the statements made
by Chief Justice Jay and Mr. Adams. See supra notes 156-59. Justice Story argued that
theories of the Constitution as a compact "seem mainly urged with a view to draw
conclusions which are at war with the known powers and reasonable objects of the
Constitution; and which, if successful, would reduce the government to a mere
confederation." I STORY, supra note 3, at 260. Story argued that these views were "not
justified by the language of the Constitution," had "a tendency to impair, and indeed to
destroy, its express powers and objects" and involved "consequences which, at the will
of a single State, may overthrow the Constitution itself." Id. at 260-61.
161. Id. at 237 n.3.
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(2) a compact between the members of the state and the government,
through which the government was established. Pufendorf described this
process as follows:
·
After the decree upon the form of government, a new pact will be necessary
when the individual or body is constituted that receives the government of the
group, by which pact the rulers bind themselves to the care of the common
security and safety, and the rest to render them obedience, and in which there
is that subjection and union of wills, by reason of which a state is looked upon
as a single person. From this pact there finally comes a finished state. 162

Justice Story identified the Declaration of Independence with the social
compact and described the Constitution, not as a compact, but rather as
a ":fundamental law." Because the Republicans in Congress responsible
for approving the Fourteenth Amendment often stated that the privileges
and immunities referred to in Section 1 of the Amendment were those
that were ":fundamental," it is necessary to gain an understanding of
what was meant by "fundamental" law in nineteenth century America.

6.

Fundamental Law

According to Justice Story, instruments such as the Constitution
formed part of the "fundamental law," being outside the power of the
government, which is established after formation of the Constitution, to
alter or change. This view is consistent with the theory that the
government is not delegated the power to alter any law existing anterior
to its establishment. Essentially, this is what is meant by a "fundamental
law." 163 Such a law may not be altered by the government and may
PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 975.
Michael Kent Curtis has noted that the term "fundamental" was often used as
a synonym for the term "constitutional." CURTIS, supra note 12, at 112-13. Furthermore, the first court to decide a case under the newly-ratified Fourteenth Amendment
stated that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States referred to in
the Amendment were "those which may be denominated fundamental; which belong of
right to . . . the citizens of the several states which compose this union from the time of
their becoming free, independent and sovereign." United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79,
81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). Similarly, Locke termed certain of the principles
of natural law "fundamental" laws:
For no man or society of men having power to deliver up their preservation,
or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of
another, whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish
condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a
power to part with, and rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental,
sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation for which they entered into

162.
163.
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be said to regulate the government itself. 164 In discussing the nature
of constitutions, Justice Story summarized his position concerning the
status of the Constitution:
A constitution is in fact a fundamental law or basis of government, and falls
strictly within the definition of law as given by Mr. Justice Blackstone. It is a
rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in a state, regulating the rights
and duties of the whole community. It is a rule, as contradistinguished from
a temporary or sudden order; permanent, uniform, and universal. It is also
called a rule, to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact (he
adds) is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The
language of a compact is, I will or will not do this; that of a law is, Thou shalt
or shalt not do it. "In compacts we.ourselves determine and promise what shall
be done before we are obliged to do it. In laws we are obliged to act without
ourselves determining or promising anything at all." It is a rule prescribed; that
is, it is laid down, promulgated, and established. It is prescribed by the
supreme power in a state, that is, among us, by the people, or a majority of
them in their original sovereign capacity. Like the ordinary municipal laws, it
may be founded upon our consent or that of our representatives; but it derives
its ultimate obligatory force as a law, and not as a compact. 165

Thus, Justice Story seems to have adopted Pufendorf's view that the
social compact existed anterior to the establishment of the government.

society.
LOCKE, supra note 65, at 82-83 (emphasis added).
164. For example, Vattel stated:
[W]hen the sovereign power is limited or regulated by the fundamental laws
of the State, these laws define the extent and the bounds of his power and the
manner in which he must exercise it. A prince is, therefore, strictly bound not
only to respect them, but also to uphold them.
VATIEL, supra note 35, at 22.
165. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 235. To support his view that a constitution is a
"fundamental law," Justice Story referred to James Wilson's opinion on the nature of
constitutions. "By a constitution is to be understood (says Mr. Justice Wilson) a
supreme law, made and ratified by those in whom the sovereign power of the state
resides, which prescribes the manner in which that sovereign power wills that the
government should be instituted and administered." Id. at 340, n.2. Story also stated:
In general the import is, that the people "ordain and establish," that is, in their
sovereign capacity, meet and declare what shall be the fundamental LAW for
the government of themselves and their posterity. Even in the constitution of
Massachusetts, which, more than any other, wears the air of contract, the
compact is declared to be a mere "constitution of civil government," and the
people "do agree on, ordain, and establish the following declaration of rights
and frame of government as the constitution of government." In this very bill
of rights the people are declared "to have the sole and exclusive right of
governing themselves, as a free, sovereign, and independent State"; and that
"they have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute
government, and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it." It is, and accordingly
has always been, treated as a fundamental law, and not as a mere contract of
government, during the good pleasure of all the persons who were originally
bound by it or assented to it.
Id. at 235-36.
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In the United States, the Constitution establishing the government is a
fundamental law issued by the people exercising their law-making
capacity as the ultimate sovereigns.
This notion of fundamental law consisting of the dictates of the social
compact along with whatever laws were established regulating the form
of government formed by the people was not unique to Pufendorf.
Burlamaqui also discussed the nature of the "fundamental laws of a
state." According to Burlamaqui, there were two bodies of laws that
comprised the set of fundamental laws:
The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not only the
decrees, by which the entire body of the nation determine the form of
government, and the manner of succeeding to the crown; but are likewise the
covenants betwixt the people and the person, on whom they confer the
sovereignty, which regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme
authority is limited.
. . . These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the
basis, as it were, and foundation of the state, on which the structure of the
government is raised, and because the people look upon those regulations as
their principal strength and support.
. . . The name of laws however has been given to these regulations in an
improper and figurative sense; for, properly speaking, they are real covenants.
But, as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting parties, they
have the force of laws themselves. 166

Thus, like Justice Story, Burlamaqui understood the fundamental laws
of society to be binding upon the government, although he preferred to
term them "real covenants," rather than laws. As a result, Burlamaqui
concluded that the government could not act in an "arbitrary" manner
since it was restrained by this body of fundamental law.
What we have said of the nature of civil laws sufficiently shows, that though
the legislative be a supreme, yet it is not an arbitrary power; but, on the
contrary, it is limited in several respects. ·
1. And as the sovereign holds the legislative power originally of the will
of each member of the society, it is evident, that no man can confer on
another a right, which he has not himself; and consequently the legislative
power cannot be extended beyond this limit. The sovereign therefore can
neither command nor forbid any other actions, than such as are either
voluntary or possible.
2. Besides, the natural laws dispose of human actions antecedently to the
civil laws, and men cannot recede from the authority of the former.
Therefore, as those primitive laws limit the power of the sovereign, he can

166.

2 BURLAMAQUI, supra note 132, pt. I, ch. 7, §§ 36, 37, 38, at 46.
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determine nothing so as to bind the subject, contrary to what they either
expressly command or forbid. 167

Thus, both the natural law theorists and Justice Story acknowledged a
body of fundamental laws that existed anterior to the formation of the
government, which were comprised of principles of the social compact
as well as the compact establishing the government. These fundamental
laws restrained the legislative power and prevented it from being
exercised in an arbitrary fashion. Thus, a guarantee of fundamental
privileges and immunities, such as exists in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, would be an expression in the form of positive law of the
principle that government was restrained from abridging the absolute and
relative rights of citizens, which existed anterior to the establishment of
government. 168

7.

The Distinction Between Citizens and Aliens

Under these social compact theories, individuals who do not have the
status of citizens might be left to enjoy certain privileges and immunities
of citizens even though they have no natural right to them. Locke
acknowledged this principle and observed a distinction between the
rights of aliens and citizens with respect to property. According to
Locke:
[S]ubmitting to the laws of any country, living quietly and enjoying privileges
and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society ... [;]
foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the
privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to

167. Id. pt. III, ch. 1, § 10, at 113.
168. Michael McConnell has noted three characteristics of fundamental privileges
and immunities that are explained by the theory presented in this Article. According to
McConnell:
The three most common criteria seemed to be that such rights were uniform,
not varying from state to. state; that they were a permanent and stable part of
the American legal legacy, not subject to the vicissitudes of legislative policy;
and that they were legally enforceable as a matter of right, as opposed to being
privileges allocated among the citizens by government officials at their
discretion.
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 1028 (1995). Although it is true that the fundamental privileges and immunities
of citizens were to be uniform among the several states, as being requisite capacities of
the citizens of all free governments, the regulation of these fundamental privileges and
immunities might vary from state to state. For example, two states might enact different
statutes of limitations for contract actions, even though it was a fundamental privilege
or immunity of citizenship to be able to contract and to enforce one's contracts in the
courts.
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submit to its administration as far forth as any denizen, yet do not thereby come
to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. 169

In other words, only those with the title of "citizens" are truly members
of society and are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship
flowing from the compact among the members of society. There may
be certain inalienable rights of persons (absolute rights) to which they
would be entitled, but they would not be entitled to those rights flowing
from the social compact among the members of society (relative rights).
This explains the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
guarantees the privileges and immunities of citizenship only to "citizens"
while it guarantees equal protection and due process to the broader
category of"persons." In fact, Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman
of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment observed such a distinction
between privileges and immunities of "citizens of the Republic" and the
"inborn rights of every person." 170 In a speech discussing the proposed Section 1, Bingham stated:
The necessity for the first section [is that] ... [t]here was a want hitherto
... in the ... United States, by express authority of the Constitution to do that
by congressional enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do,
and had never even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State. 171

169. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 68-69 (emphasis added). A similar distinction
between aliens and citizens existed in the Roman law. A man could not be a citizen of
independent sovereign states. Aliens did not share in the civil rights of citizenship under
Roman law and "were devoid of the proprietary and family rights as limited and
protected by the civil law (commercium and connubium), though they enjoyed
corresponding rights under the jus gentium." GAIUS, supra note 26, at 45-46. The Court
in Dred Scott v. Sandford acknowledged distinctions in status among slaves, freedmen,
and citizens that had their origin in the Roman law. See infra Part II.B.3. The Roman
law recognized a number of separate legal categories of persons having different legal
rights under distinct bodies of law. Under the Roman law, only citizens were entitled
to exercise certain powers or capacities inherent in status as a citizen, privileges and
'- immunities of citizenship.
170. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
171. Id. Similarly, Howard stated:
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,
whoever he may be, oflife, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, or
from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This
abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another ....
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These privileges and immunities of citizenship are based upon the terms
of the social compact, and aliens, not being parties to the social compact,
have no natural law right to the privileges and immunities recognized by
it.172
Through principles of comity, or voluntary respect for the rights of
aliens and the laws of foreign states, however, aliens may retain certain
rights while visiting in foreign states at the discretion of the government.
Vattel argued that such respect is founded upon principles of natural
reason. According to Vattel:
[A] State, being obliged to respect the rights of other Nations and of men in
general, irrespective of their nationality, can not claim any rights over the
person of a foreigner who by his mere entrance into its territory does not
become its subject. The foreigner can not claim the privilege of living in the
country without obeying its laws; if he violates them he is punishable as a
disturber of the public peace and an offender against the State; but he is not
subject, as the citizens are, to all the commands of the sovereign, and if certain
things are demanded of him which he does not wish to do, he may leave the
country. 173

Therefore, an alien traveling through a foreign state neither attains the
status of citizen nor owes any allegiance to the government. The Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment mirror these principles of international comity. Foreign
subjects are not entitled to any of the privileges and immunities of
citizens because they are not parties to the social compact, but may
enjoy the protection of the government and due process of law. 174

... I look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth, as very
important. It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them
from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges
which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may
happen to be within their jurisdiction.
Id. at 2766.
172. Vattel stated a similar principle with respect to residents. According to Vattel:
Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take
up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason
of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there,
and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all
the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or
custom, gives them.
VATIEL, supra note 35, at 87.
173. Id. at 146.
174. This principle seems to have been recognized by the court in Amy v. Smith, 11
Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822), in construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2. The court distinguished between the "ordinary rights of personal security
and property" and other rights and privileges conferred by the institutions of the state.
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Furthermore, they might be permitted to enjoy certain privileges and
immunities associated with citizenship. However, their continued
exercise of these rights is subject to the government's discretion, and
they have no constitutional entitlement to exercise these rights. 175

When the term ["citizen"] came to be applied to the inhabitants of a state,
it necessarily carried with it the same signification, with reference to the
privileges of the state, which had been implied by it with reference to the
privileges of a city, when it was applied to the inhabitants of the city; and it
is in this sense, that the term, citizen, is believed to be generally, if not
universally understood in the United States. This, indeed, evidently appears
to be the sense in which the term is used in the clause of the constitution
which is under consideration; for the terms, "privileges and immunities,"
which are expressive of the object intended to be secured to the citizens of
each state, in every other, plainly import, according to the best usages of our
language, something more than those ordinary rights of personal security and
property, which, by the courtesy of all civilized nations, are extended to the
citizens or subjects of other countries, while they reside among them.
No one can, therefore, in the correct sense of the term, be a citizen of a
state, who is not entitled, upon the terms prescribed by the institutions of the
state, to all the rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the
highest class of society. It is true, that females and infants do not personally
possess those rights and privileges, in any state in the Union; but they are
generally dependent upon adult males through whom they enjoy the benefits
of those rights and privileges; ... Nor do we mean to say, that it is necessary,
even for an adult male to be a citizen, that he should be in the actual
enjoyment of all those rights and privileges which belong to citizen [sic]. He
may not only not be in the actual enjoyment of those rights and privileges, but
he may even not possess those qualifications, of property, of age, or of
residence, which most of the states prescribe as requisites to the enjoyment of
some of their highest privileges and immunities, and yet be a citizen; but, to
be a citizen, it is necessary that he should be entitled to the enjoyment of those
privileges and immunities, upon the same terms upon which they are conferred
upon other citizen; and unless he is so entitled, he can not, in the proper sense
of the term, be a citizen.
Id. at 333-34 (emphasis added).
175. This difference between the rights of citizens and those of aliens was
recognized in the case law in the United States during the period between ratification of
the Constitution and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in New
York Dry Dock v. Hicks, in examining the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, § 2 and the rights of citizenship referred to therein, the court stated:
Foreigners, in some of the states, may hold lands, but they do not descend to
their heirs unless by statutory provision. But they stand in a different relation
from citizens of the United States. Each citizen of a state may claim, under
the constitution, "all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states."
New York Dry Dock v. Hicks, 18 F. Cas. 151, 152-53 (C.C.D. Mich. 1850) (No.
10,204).
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The social compact theories of political philosophers such as· Locke,
Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel provide the background and
terminology necessary to determine the original meaning of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. From the foregoing discussion it is evident
that (1) citizens were conceived of as members of a political community
(2) that was founded upon a social compact (3) distinct from the form
of government (4) from which certain fundamental powers or capacities
flowed that could not be abridged by the government established after
consummation of the social compact. A distinction was recognized
between those who were parties to this compact (citizens) and those who
were not (aliens and perhaps other classes of persons such as slaves).
A distinction was also recognized between fundamental privileges and
immunities (both absolute rights inherent in persons and relative rights
based on compact) existing anterior to the establishment of government
and special rights and privileges conveyed by the government after its
establishment. A corollary of this distinction is that political privileges,
rights of participation in the government, are not fundamental privileges,
whereas civil privileges and immunities inherent in one's status as a
member of the body politic and party to the social compact-privileges
and immunities of citizens guaranteed in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-are fundamental.

B.

Citizenship and Roman Law

The concept of republican citizenship upon which the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was based may be
traced to the Roman model of citizenship. Members of Congress
responsible for approving the Fourteenth Amendment, members of the
Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 176 and antislavery writ-

176. Other courts also recognized the importance of the Roman model of citizenship
in defining the privileges and immunities accorded citizens in the United States.
Significantly, the court in Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822), a case construing
the status of blacks under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2, also recognized that citizenship in the United States was analogous to the status of
citizens under the Roman law. Although the court stated that "[t]he American colonies
brought with them the common, and not the civil law," id. at 337-38 (Mills, J.,
dissenting), it also stated:
It is, in fact, not the place of a man's birth, but the rights and privileges he
may be entitled to enjoy, which make him a citizen. The term, citizen, is
derived from the Latin word civis, and in its primary sense signifies one who
is vested with the freedom and privileges of a city. At any early period after
the subversion of the Roman empire, when civilization had again begun to
progress, the cities in every part of Europe, either by usurpation or concession
from their sovereigns, obtained extraordinary privileges, in addition to those
which were common to the other subjects of their respective countries; and one
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ers 177 all recognized the importance of this model of citizenship. For
example, Senator Nye of Nevada stated that the "gist" of the Civil
Rights Bill "was that it clothed these heretofore downtrodden slaves with
the vesture of American citizenship .... If the cry 'I am a Roman
citizen' protected the Roman in his mongrel republic, with what
redoubled forces does the cry that I am an American citizen protect
me." 178 Congressman Woodbridge, in a speech before the Vermont
legislature concerning the proposed Amendment, stated:
The question to be considered by the people was, are these amendments
republican in form? Are they general in their application? Are they just to the
whole country? And will they answer the desired ends? They wish to cement
the Union, that any of us can go into any State in the Union with the
declaration "I am an American citizen" with the same consciousness of
protection as of old it was sufficient for any citizen of the Roman empire to say
"I am a Roman citizen." 179

Finally, Justice Daniel, in his Dred Scott concurrence, engaged in an
extensive discussion of the Roman system with its distinctions among
slaves, freedmen, and citizens. 180 He argued, in essence, that freed

who was invested with these extraordinary privileges, whether he was an
inhabitant of the city or not, or whether he was born in it or not, was deemed
a citizen ....
If we go back to Rome, whence the term, citizen, has its origin, we shall
find, in the illustrious period of her republic, that citizens were the highest
class of subjects to whom the }us civitatis belonged, and that the }us civitatis
conferred upon those who were in possession of it, all rights and privileges,
civil, political, and religious.
Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
177. For example, Joel Tiffany, who wrote the Treatise on the Unconstitutionality
of American Slavery in 1849, stated that to be a citizen of the United States
is to be invested with a title to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and
to be protected in the enjoyment thereof, by the guaranty of twenty millions
of people. It is, or should be, a panoply of defense equal, at least, to the
ancient cry, "I am a Roman Citizen." And when understood, and respected in
the true spirit of the immortal founders of our government it will prove a
perfect bulwark against all oppression.
CURTIS, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 56 (1849) (emphasis omitted)).
178. Id. at 142 (quoting DAILY TERRITORIAL ENTERPRISE, Sept. 13, 1866, at 1, col.
2).
179. Id. at 143 (quoting BRATTLEBORO (VT.) RECORD AND FARMER, Nov. 3, 1866,
at 1).
180. See infra section 11.B.3. Other antebellum courts also made the analogy
between American and ancient Roman citizenship. For example, as the court in
Crandall v. State stated in construing the rights of a citizen under the Privileges and
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blacks possessed the intermediate status of "freedman" rather than that
of "citizen" and were therefore not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens, including the privilege of suing in the courts of
the United States.

1.

Natural Law and Roman Law

The influence of the Roman law on the natural law writers was extensive.181 The Roman law provided, at a minimum, certain of the
concepts or terminology upon which the writings of later natural law
theorists were based, particularly those of natural law theorists from
continental Europe, such as Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui. 182
Like the common law, which may have been influenced by the Roman
law, 183 the Roman law represented a coherent body of law that exhibit-

Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, "He may present the shield of the
constitution, and, as Paul claimed the immunity of a Roman citizen, he may claim the
immunity of an American citizen." Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 353 (1834).
181. Edward Re makes the following observation:
Most scholars would probably readily concede the existence of this
contribution [of the Roman law] since it is not difficult to see that many of the
beautiful phrases of natural law philosophers embodied the eternal principles
of justice of the corpus juris of Rome. The role of the Roman law as a
universal law embodying principles of natural law applicable for all time is
also generally admitted.
Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 447,
452 (1961). Re also notes that Great Britain was "an imperial province of the first
order" when occupied by the Roman Empire, and thus, quite possibly the law of England
was influenced at this time by the Roman law. Id. at 455.
182. M.H. Hoeflich has asserted that "Roman law and Roman legal terminology
provided the basis for natural law discourse, if not its substance." M.H. Hoeflich, John
Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil
Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36, 40 (1985); see also Re, supra
note 181, at 451 n.14, 452,453 (citing Sherman, The Romanization of English Law, 23
YALE L.J. 318, 328 (1914)), 470-71, 493. Similarly, Edward Corwin concluded that
"[t]he notion of popular sovereignty, of a social contract, and of a contract between
governors and governed are all foreshadowed by Cicero with greater or less distinctness." Corwin, supra note 39, at 162 (footnotes omitted).
183. See W. Hamilton Bryson, The Use of Roman Law in Virginia Courts, 28 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 135, 136 (1984); Hoeflich, supra note 182, at 36 (asserting that "[i]t is
undeniable that Roman law exercised influence upon the common law during its
formative years," and pointing to Bracton's On the Laws and Customs of England as
evidence of this influence); M.H. Hoeflich, Roman Law in American Legal Culture, 66
TuL. L. REV. 1723, 1733 (1992). See also Re, supra note 181. Edward Re noted that
the words "common law" themselves "represent a borrowing since they are a translation
of the ius commune of the canon and Roman law." Id. at 470.
Lord Bryce noted that the whole system of English equity jurisprudence was based
upon the Roman body of law termed the }us gentium, or law of nations. According to
Bryce:
Our system of Equity, built up by the Chancellors, the earlier among the
ecclesiastics, takes not only its name but its guiding and formative principles,
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ed general principles thought to be founded in reason. For example,
Pufendorf viewed the Roman law as containing much of the natural law
along with some provisions that were merely positive laws. According
to Pufendorf:
[E]very one knows that most of the material in the books of the Roman Law
concerns the subject of the Law of Nature and Nations, that is, the law which
obligates all men and nations; but there is interspersed with it much that is
positive, and of application to the special nature of the Roman state. 184

Pufendorf urged that it would
be well worth while to make a concise index to the books of the Roman Law,
which would determine what matters therein concern natural law, and what
positive law, and whether the bounds are drawn carefully enough between
Natural, or universal8 Law, and Roman Law properly so called, or that peculiar
to the Roman state. 1 5

Many of the natural law theorists were influenced by the Roman law,
and many of their theories seem to be an attempt to explain the positive
law of ancient Rome as flowing from "natural reason." Their natural
law theories are analytical frameworks that predict that certain positive
laws will be enacted if the law-makers are following the dictates of
reason. Therefore, the Roman law is important not only because it was
studied extensively and cited as authority in nineteenth and eighteenth
century America, but also because the natural law theories that
influenced the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were very much
influenced by this body of law.

and many of its positive rules, from the Roman aequitas, which was in
substance identical with the Law of Nature and the ius gentium. For obvious
reasons the Chancellors and Masters of the Rolls did not talk much about
Nature, and still less would they have talked about ius gentium. They referred
rather to the law of God and to Reason. But the ideas were Roman, drawn
either from the Cannon Law, or directly from the Digest and the Institutes, and
they were applied to English facts in a manner not dissimilar from that of the
Roman jurists.
Id. at 481 (quoting 2 JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 599-600
(1901)). Furthermore, Max Radin has noted that the phrase "natural equity" is an
Anglicization of naturalis aequitas, a phrase common in Roman texts. Max Radin, The
Rivalry of Common-Law and Civil Law Ideas in the American Colonies, in 2 LAW A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 404, 429 n.21 (1937).
184. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at iii.
185. Id.
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2.

Roman Law in the United States

Roman law significantly influenced legal education, in particular, from
the colonial period to the time of the Dred Scott decision. 186 During
the colonial period, preparation for a legal career included study of
works on natural law and the law of nations, containing many references
to the civil law. The standard treatises on these subjects included
Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis, Pufendorf's De iure naturae et gentium,
Heineccius's Elementa iuris naturae et gentium, and Burlamaqui's
Principes du droit nature!. 187
The extent of the influence of the Roman law on certain areas of law
in both England and America was recognized during the nineteenth
century as well. 188 Caleb Cushing, who was later Attorney General of
the United States, 189 discussed the influence of the civil law on topics
relating to personal rights such as the distinction between aliens and
citizens, the status of corporate bodies, and the rules on involuntary
servitude. According to Cushing:
The common, civil, and customary law of Europe have each precisely the
same force with us in this branch; that is, our courts study them all, and adopt
from them whatever is most applicable to our situation, and whatever is on the
whole just and expedient, without considering either of course obligatory. If
Mansfield, Scott, or Ellenborough, is cited with deference or praise, so likewise
are Bynkershoek, Valen, Cleirac, Pothier, and Emerigon. The authority of a
decision or opinion, emanating from either of these sources, is rested on exactly
the same foundation, viz. its intrinsic excellence. 190

186. See M.H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in American Legal Education and
Research Prior to 1930: A Preliminary Survey, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 719; Peter Stein,
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403
(1966); see also PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965); ROSCOE
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938). Hoeflich has noted the
widespread availability of books on the Roman and civil law in American libraries
during the nineteenth century. See Hoeflich, supra note 183, at 1738-39 (stating that
"the holdings of a number of American libraries in this field were extensive").
187. Stein, supra note 186, at 404. See also Lewis C. Cassidy, The Teaching and
Study of Roman Law in the United States, 19 GEO. L.J. 297 (1930-31); Roscoe Pound,
The Influence of the Civil Law in America, l LA. L. REV. 1 (1938-39); MILLER, supra
note 186, at 164-71; Radin, supra note 183, at 420 (noting the wide use of books on
civil law and natural law by colonial lawyers).
188. See Hoeflich, supra note 186, at 727-28 (claiming that "[i]n the early part of
the nineteenth century, the course of legal instruction in the leading law schools, and the
leading textbooks and treatises, included a healthy dose of Roman and civil law ....").
189. Stein, supra note 186, at 432.
190. PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW:
HISTORICAL ESSAYS 429 ( 1988) (quoting Cushing, On the Study of the Civil Law, 11
NORTH AM. REV. 407, 412 (1820)).
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David Hoffman, a professor of law at the University of Maryland from
1816 to 1836, argued that knowledge of the civil law was necessary for
a proper understanding of the common law. In his treatise, A Course of
Legal Study, he stated:
[I]t is unquestionable that there are large departments of our jurisprudence, in
which, (in the absence of more authoritative law,) we may, and ought to resort
to the Civil Law for light, for instruction and for authority . . . . [H]aving
sprung from the Roman code, we are bound 'in casibus omissis,' (and so we
have done by long usage) to resort for illustration and authority, to the pages
of the Digest and Code, in the same manner, and with the same view, as we at
present resort to the modem British authorities on innumerable other subjects.191
·
.

Both Chancellor Kent and Justice Story were learned in the principles of
the civil law and regarded Hoffman as their forerunner. 192 Their works
on American law were some of the most influential during the nineteenth
century in the United States.
Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries on American Law, borrowed
heavily from the Roman law writers as well as the modem civilians. In
describing the civil law Kent stated:
In every thing which concerns civil and political liberty, it cannot be compared
with the free spirit of the English and American common law .... But upon
subjects relating to private rights and personal contracts, and the duties which
flow from them, there is no system of law in which principles are investigated
with more good sense, or declared and enforced with more accurate and
impartial justice. 193

Kent recognized the extensive influence of the Roman law upon the
development of the common law in England beginning with Henry de
Bracton, an ecclesiastic and royal judge, who for two years was Chief
Justiciar of England under Henry 111. 194 Both the common law and the
Roman Code represented bodies of law that had grown over time

191. Id. at 432 (quoting 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 508 (2d
ed. 1836)).
192. Id. at 435; see also Hoeflich, supra note 183, at 1732.
193. 1 KENT, supra note 47, at 547-48.
194. According to Edward Re, Bracton was "[t]he person who gave the greatest
impetus to the early development of the common law of England." Re, supra note 181,
at 471. Similarly, Edward Corwin concluded that the "outstanding importance of'
Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus consisted in "the fact that for the first time it
brought the rising common law into direct contact with Roman and medieval Continental
ideas of a higher law." Corwin, supra note 39, at 172.
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through the efforts of a series of learned individuals and that were likely
to embody general principles upon which all just law was founded.
Furthermore, Kent acknowledged the existence of an American common
law, which he analogized to both the English common law and the
Roman Code.
Justice Story, who was also influenced by the writings of civil law
theorists, 195 summed up the importance of the Roman law and its
influence upon the common law and law in America as follows:
Where shall we find such ample general principles to guide us in new and
difficult cases, as in that venerable deposite of the learning and labors of the
jurists of the ancient world, the Institutes and Pandects of Justinian. The whole
continental jurisprudence rests upon this broad foundation of Roman wisdom;
and the English common law, churlish and harsh as was its feudal education,
has condescended sligl}tly to borrow many of its best principles from this
enlightened code . . . .196

Thus, the Roman law affected those American legal scholars who were
in turn the most influential in nineteenth century America.
Not only was the Roman law important in general, but also the Roman
model of slavery and citizenship was recognized as being analogous to
the system in the United States. For example, Chancellor Kent
analogized the institution of slavery in the United States to that of
ancient Rome. Kent explicitly rejected the English model of villeinage
as a model for slavery in the United States. 197 According to Kent, the
condition of slaves in the United States was "more analogous to that of
the slaves of the ancients, than to that of the villeins of feudal times,
both in respect to the degradation of the slaves and the full dominion
and power of the master." 198 Kent stated that slaves in the United
States were under certain disabilities analogous to those imposed by the
Roman Code. According to Kent, slaves

195. See Hoeflich, supra note 182, at 58, 64-71 (asserting that "Story had more than
a passing acquaintance with civilian scholarship"); Hoeflich, supra note 186, at 725
(claiming that "Story was extraordinarily knowledgeable about Roman and civil law");
F.H. Lawson, Roman Law as an Organizing Instrument, 46 B.U. L. REV. 181, 198
(1966); see also POUND, supra note 186, at 21-22; Roscoe Pound, The Place of Judge
Story in the Making ofAmerican Law, 1 MASS. L.Q. 121 (1915-16) [hereinafter Pound,
Place of Judge Story]; Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in the Formation of American
Common Law, in 1 ACTORUM ACADEMIAE UNIVERSALIS IURISPRUDENTIAE
COMPARATIVAE 183-97 (1928) [hereinafter Pound, Comparative Law].
196. STEIN, supra note 190, at 425-36 (quoting Joseph Story, Address to the Suffolk
Bar, 1 AMERICAN JURIST 1, 13-14 (1829)).
197. In reality, the difference between the English and Roman models may have
been mitigated by Roman influence on the development of European legal ideas
concerning slavery. See Hoeflich, supra note 182, at 36-37.
198. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *253.
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cannot take property by descent or purchase, and all they find, and all they
hold, belongs to the master. They cannot make lawful contracts, and they are
deprived of civil rights. They are assets in the hands of executors, for the
payment of debts, and cannot be emancipated by will or otherwise, to the
prejudice of creditors. 199

Furthermore, Chancellor Kent indicated that the slave codes of the South
were modeled on the Roman law.
The statute regulations follow the principles of the civil law in relation to
slaves, and are extremely severe, but the master has no power over life or limb;
slaves are still regarded as human beings under moral responsibility as to crimes
and the severe letter of the law is softened and corrected by the humanity of the
age and the spirit of Christianity. 200

Kent also discussed the status of free blacks prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, stating that, although they could properly be
termed citizens, they were placed in a lower caste in society. According
to Kent, "[t]he African race, even when free, are essentially a degraded
caste, of inferior rank and condition in society ...." 201 Kent pointed
to the antimiscegenation laws of the states as evidence of their degraded
status.202 According to Kent:
Such connections, in France and Germany, constitute the degraded state of
concubinage, which was known in the civil law as licita consuetudo
semimatrimonium; but they are not legal marriages, because the parties want
that equality of status or condition which is essential to the contract. 203

199. Id. (footnote omitted).
200. Id. (footnote omitted).
201. Id. at *258 n.(a). Kent noted that such laws existed in North Carolina, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Virginia. Id. at *258-59 n.(a). This was also the opinion of the
court in Amy v. Smith, which stated that "[f]ree negroes and mulattoes are, almost
everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people; insomuch so, that,
under the constitution and laws of the United States, they cannot become citizens of the
United States." 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 334 (1822).
202. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *258-59 n.(a). Similarly, the court in Amy v. Smith,
pointed to the naturalization laws of the United States that "do not now authorize any
but a white person to become a citizen ...." 11 Ky. (l Litt.) at 334. The court also
noted that free blacks
are incapable of holding the lowest office in the government; they do not
enjoy the right of suffrage, and can not even be a witness in a civil case. In
short, they possess not one of the privileges which are peculiarly characteristic
of a citizen, and not even all those which are by courtesy allowed to aliens and
strangers, while residing in the state.
Id. at 334-35.
203. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *258-59 n.(a).
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Therefore, the fact that intermarriage was not permitted between blacks
and whites was evidence of their different status, in analogy to the
structure of the civil law. Kent discussed other restrictive laws existing
in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Connecticut concerning the
capacity of free blacks to act as witnesses in civil cases,204 education,205 and the ability of free blacks to reside in a state.206 Prior to
the Dred Scott case, Kent recognized the controversy concerning whether
free blacks were "citizens."207 He concluded that slaves were "natural
born subjects" rather than citizens. However, he argued that free blacks
were citizens and could exercise civil privileges, although they might be
placed under certain disabilities such as not possessing the political
privilege of voting. This was because "[t]he privilege of voting, and the
legal capacity for office, are not essential to the character of a citizen,
for women are citizens without either ...." 208 One of the civil
privileges Kent thought free people of color could exercise was the
ability to "acquire, and hold, and devise, and transmit, by hereditary
descent, real and personal estates."209 Kent concluded:
Citizens, under our constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants, born within the
United states, or naturalized under the law of Congress. If a slave, born in the
United States, be manumitted, or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage,
or if a black man be born within the United States, and born free, he becomes
thenceforward a citizen, but under such disabilities as the laws of the states
respectively may deem it expedient to prescribe to free persons of color. 210

204. Kent stated that in Ohio and Indiana "a negro, mulatto, or Indian, is not a
competent witness in civil cases . . . ." Id.
205. According to Kent, "[i]n the act of Ohio of 1829, for the support and better
regulation of common schools, the instruction in them is declared to be for the 'white
youth of every class and grade, without distinction."' Id.
206. Id.
207. Among the authorities concerning the status of free blacks, Kent listed the
opinion of Chief Justice Dagget in Crandall, and John F. Denny's An Inquiry into the
Political Grade of the Free Colored Population Under the Constitution of the United
States as stating that free blacks were not citizens, while he listed William Jay's An
Inquiry into the Character and Tendency of the American Colonization and American
Antislavery Societies as well as the "Constitution and statute law of New York" as
indicating that free blacks were considered citizens. Id. Kent concluded that "the
question depends more on a verbal than on an essential distinction." Id. Kent argued:
[I]f, at common law, all human beings born within the legiance of the king,
and under the king's obedience, were natural born subjects, and not aliens, I
do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to the United States, in all
cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the
contrary.
Id.
208. Id. at *259 n.(a).
209. Id.
210. Id. Kent cited a Pennsylvania case for the proposition that a "negro or mulatto
was not entitled to exercise the right of suffrage." Id. (citing Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts
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Therefore, although Kent acknowledged that, as citizens, free blacks
were entitled to certain privileges "essential to the character of a citizen,"
he also acknowledged that they could be placed under certain disabilities
that "the states respectively may deem it expedient to prescribe to free
persons of color."211

3.

Dred Scott v. Sandford: The Institution of Slavery in America

The Roman model of citizenship was not only important in terms of
natural law theory and the understanding of citizenship in the legal
culture of the United States, but it also played a substantial role in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 212 In his concurrence, Justice Daniel analogized the institution of slavery in the United
States to that which existed in ancient Rome, illustrating the influence
of the Roman law on the civil institutions of the United States. Like
Chancellor Kent, he rejected the comparison of slavery in the United
States to the English system of villeinage and, instead, pointed to the

553). He cited a Tennessee case for the proposition that free blacks were not citizens
for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Id. (citing
State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331). Finally, he cited an opinion of the Attorney
General of the United States for the proposition that "free persons of color in Virginia
were not citizens within the intent and meaning of the act of Congress regulating the
foreign and coasting trade." Id. (citing Op. Att'y Gen. i. 382.).
211. Id.
212. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Evidently, the practice of citing Roman law
as authority for determining the status of individuals in the United States was
widespread. Attorney General Bates argued that one of the sources of "artificial
difficulties" that marked the debate over national citizenship was
[t]he common habit of many of our best and most learned men, (the wise
aptitude of which I have not been able to perceive,) of testing the political
status and governmental relation of our people by standards drawn from the
laws and history of ancient Greece and Rome, without, as I think, taking
sufficient account of the organic differences between their government and
ours.
Bates, supra note 23, at 390-91. As Attorney General Bates observed:
The Constitution itself does not make citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It
only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural-home-born; and
provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien-foreign-born;
making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former.
Id. at 389.
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Roman model as analogous to the institution of slavery in the United
States. 213 According to Justice Daniel:
The institution of slavery, as it exists and has existed from the period of its
introduction into the United States, though more humane and mitigated in
character than was the same institution, either under the republic or the empire
of Rome, bears, both in its tenure and in the simplicity incident to the mode of
its exercise, a closer resemblance to Roman slavery than it does to the condition
of villanage, as it formerly existed in England. Connected with the latter, there
were peculiarities, from custom or positive regulation, which varied it materially
from the slavery of the Romans, or from slavery at any period within the United
States. 214

Justice Daniel argued that under the Roman Code emancipation alone
was not sufficient to confer citizenship upon a slave, but rather resulted
in the slave's obtaining the status of freedman. 215 "[W]ith regard to
slavery amongst the Romans, it is by no means true that emancipation,
either during the republic or the empire, conferred, by the act itself, or
implied, the status or the rights of citizenship."216 Therefore, by
analogy, emancipation of slaves in the United States would not
automatically result in the conferral of citizenship. According to Justice
Daniel, this result, distinguishing between citizenship and "lower grades
of native domestic residents," was desirable in order to prevent
"degradation of the free."
The proud title of Roman citizen, with the immunities and rights incident
thereto, and as contradistinguished alike from the condition of conquered
subjects or of the lower grades of native domestic residents, was maintained
throughout the duration of the republic, and until a late period of the eastern
empire, and at last was in effect destroyed less by an elevation of the inferior
classes than by the degradation of the free, and the previous possessors of rights
and immunities civil and political, to the indiscriminate abasement incident to
absolute and simple despotism. 217

213. As James H. Kettner has noted, "[f]ree Negroes appeared to occupy a middle
ground in terms of the rights they were allowed to claim in practice, a status that could
not be described in the traditional language of slave, alien, or citizen." KETTNER, supra
note 14, at 319. Kettner is correct in asserting that the status of free blacks could not
be described according to the traditional common-law terminology. However, it could
be very adequately described in terms of the traditional Roman law terminology.
214. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 477-78.
215. Under the English system, there were various ranks and levels of persons, such
as natural-born subjects, naturalized subjects, and denizens, with varying rights and
privileges. See KETTNER, supra note 14, at 4-5. These distinctions were "blurred" after
1700 when the status of denizen disappeared as a separate order of membership in the
colonies. Id. at 126. Furthermore, both Kent and Justice Daniel rejected the English
model as being less analogous to the American system. See supra notes 198, 214 and
accompanying text.
216. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 478.
217. Id. Justice Daniel argued that "'[t]he first Caesars had scrupulously guarded
the distinction of ingenuous and servile birth, which was decided by the condition of the
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Justice Daniel cited Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire as authority in his discussion of the status of slaves in ancient
Rome. 218 He argued that historically the extension of citizenship in
ancient Rome had resulted in a destruction of the equality of citizens and
had led to despotism. 219
[I]n the eye of the law all Roman citizens were equal, and all subjects of the
empire were citizens of Rome. That inestimable character was degraded to an
obsolete and empty name. The voice of a Roman could no longer enact his
laws, or create the annual ministers of his powers; his constitutional rights
might have checked the arbitrary will of a master; and the bold adventurer from
Germany or Arabia was admitted with equal favor to the civil and military
command which the citizen alone had been once entitled to assume over the
conquests of his fathers. 220

mother. The slaves who were liberated by a generous master immediately entered into
the middle class of Ubertini or freedmen .... "' Id. However, under Justinian, the
"badge of disgrace" was removed '"from the two inferior orders of freedmen; whoever
ceased to be a slave, obtained without reserve or delay the station of a citizen; and at
length the dignity of an ingenuous birth was created or supposed by the omnipotence of
the emperor."' Id. at 479 (citing 3 EDWARD GIBBON, DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 183 (London 1825)).
218. Gibbon's forty-fourth chapter presented a well-known discussion of the Roman
law. See 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE,
reprinted in 41 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 71-96 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins ed., 1952). According to Gibbon, "[t]he slaves who were liberated by a
generous master immediately entered into the middle class of libertines or freedmen .
. . ." Id. at 82.
219. Chancellor Kent had made this observation concerning the effect of granting
citizenship to all persons in his Commentaries. According to Kent:
The Romans were noted for their peculiar jealousy of the }us civitatis, or rights
of a citizen. It was, at first, limited to the Pomoeria of Rome, and then
gradually extended to the bounds of Latium. In the time of Augustus, as we
were informed by Suetonius, De Aug. sec. 40, the same anxiety was
discovered to keep the Roman people pure and untainted of foreign blood; and
he gave the freedom of the city with a sparing hand. But when Caracalla, for
the purpose of a more extended taxation, levelled all distinctions, and
communicated the freedom of the city to the whole Roman world, the national
spirit was lost among the people, and the pride of country was no longer felt,
nor its honor observed.
2 KENT, supra note 47, at *66 n.(a) (citing 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL
OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 268). Roman citizenship was highly prized and was only
extended to the whole Empire in 212 A.D. Peter J. Riga, The Influence of Roman Law
on State Theory in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: A Study ofthe Roman Glossators
and Their Influence on Modern State Theory, 35 AM. J. JURIS. 171 (1990).
220. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 478 (1856).
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Justice Daniel also cited Justinian's Institutes as authority for the
proposition that slaves, upon emancipation, did not automatically possess
the status of citizen but acceded to the status of "libertini or freedmen."
Thus, book I st, title 3d, it is said: "The first general division of persons in
respect to their rights is into freemen and slaves." The same title, sec. 4th:
"Slaves are born such, or become so. They are born such of bondwomen; they
become so either by the law of nations, as by capture, or by the civil law."
Section 5th: "In the condition of slaves there is no diversity; but among free
persons there are many. Thus some are ingenui or freemen, others Ubertini or
freedmen." 221

Therefore, Justice Daniel argued that the emancipation of slaves did not
automatically make citizens of freed blacks, conferring all of the
privileges and immunities of citizenship upon them. Rather, they were
possessed of an intermediate status, that of "freedman."
The distinctions among persons found in the Roman law were also on
the minds of the dissenters in Dred Scott v. Sandford. For example,
Justice Curtis declared that "[w]hatever distinctions may have existed in
the Roman laws between citizens and free inhabitants, they are unknown
to our institutions."222 The basis of the dissenters' argument was that
once emancipated, freed blacks automatically received the privileges and
immunities of citizenship because no third caste or status of "freedman"
existed in the United States.223 This position was subsequently

221.

Id. at 479. Justice Daniel continued:
Tit. 4th. DE INGENUIS.-"A freeman is one who is born free by being born
in matrimony, of parents who both are free, or both freed; or of parents one
free and the other freed. But one born of a free mother, although the father
be a slave or unknown, is free."
Tit. 5th. DE LIBERTINIS.- "Freedmen are those who have been manumitted
from just servitude."
Section third of the same title states that "freedmen were formerly
distinguished by a threefold division." But the emperor proceeds to say: "'Our
piety leading us to reduce all things into a better state, we have amended our
laws, and reestablished the ancient usage; for anciently liberty was simple and
undivided--that is, was conferred upon the slave as his manumittor possessed
it, admitting this single difference, that the person manumitted became only a
freed man, although his manumittor was afree man." And he further declares:
"We have made all freed men in general become citizens of Rome, regarding
neither the age of the manumitted, nor the manumittor, nor the ancient forms
of manumission. We have also introduced many new methods by which
slaves may become Roman citizens."

Id.

222. Id. at 573 .
. 223. This was also the conclusion reached by Attorney General Bates after the Dred
Scott decision. Bates stated that he was "not aware of any provision in our laws to
warrant us in presuming the existence in this country of a class of persons intermediate
between citizens and aliens. In England there is such a class clearly defined by law, and
called denizens." As Attorney General Bates observed:
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adopted by some Republicans in Congress in debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, others recognized that Dred Scott was still good
law, not having been overruled, and, therefore, it was necessary to confer
the status of citizen upon all those born or naturalized in the United
States in order to avoid imposition of a system of caste similar to that
of the Roman law. 224

4.

Privileges and Immunities of Roman Citizenship

The purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to ensure that all citizens were afforded the same
fundamental civil capacities inherent in the concept of citizenship in the
United States, analogous to those that had existed from the time of the
Roman law, as well as all of the natural law rights of persons found in
the English common law. Citizens were entitled under the Roman law
to certain privileges of the civil law unavailable to other individuals.225
Edward Poste's 1875 edition of Gaius's Elements of the Roman Law
translates the title of Book I, De Personis, as "STATUS OR UNEQUAL
RIGHTS."226 Under this heading, the Roman civil law classified
persons into different or "unequal" categories having different capacities

The Constitution itself does not make citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It
only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural---home-born; and
provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien--foreign-born;
making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former.
Bates, supra note 23, at 389.
224. See infra Part IV.
225. Attorney General Bates, in discussing the applicability of the Roman law to
the citizenship question, noted that "the ruling power at Rome, whether republican or
imperial, granted, from time to time, to communities and to individuals in the conquered
east, the title of Roman and the rights of Roman citizens." As Attorney General Bates
observed, "[t]he Constitution itself does not make citizens; it is, in fact, made by them.
It only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural---home-bom; and provides for
the naturalization of such of them as were alien--foreign-bom; making the latter, as far
as nature will allow, like the former." Bates, supra note 23, at 389. Bates also
discussed the biblical case of the apostle Paul, which he termed
a leading case in Roman jurisprudence in the matter of the ''jus Romanum."
And in so far as there is any analogy between Roman and American
citizenship, it is strictly applicable to us . . . . It establishes the great
protective rights of the citizen, but, like our own national Constitution, it is
silent about his powers. It protected Paul against oppression and outrage, but
said nothing about his right of suffrage or his eligibility to office.
Id. at 393-94.
226. GAIDS, supra note 26, at xiii.
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or rights with respect to person and property. These nine classes were
the Freeborn, the Freedman, the Slave, the Citizen, the Latin, the Alien,
the Father of the household, the Son of the household, and the Bondsman. However, the greatest difference in respect to civil capacity
existed between slaves and freedmen. It is stated in Justinian's
Institutes: "Certainly, the great divide in the law of persons is this: all
men are either free men or slaves."227 Freedom was defined as the
"natural power of doing what one pleases, save insofar as it is ruled out
either by coercion or by law," while slavery was the state of being
subject to the ownership of another. 228 Masters exercised the power
of life and death over their slaves, and owned all of the acquisitions of
their slaves.229 This definition of freedom parallels that of Locke who
defined slavery as a state of war where there is no fundamental right of
preservation and no property in one's life, liberty, or estate.230 Slaves
were property, under the dominion or control of their masters, whereas
the status of citizen involved being free of the dominion of others.
The second Book of Gaius's Elements of the Roman Law, De Rebus,
was translated as "EQUAL RIGHTS."231 These were the equal rights
and civil capacities shared by Roman citizens. The purpose of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was to guarantee to all individuals born
or naturalized the "equal rights" of citizenship in the United States.
Under the Roman law, non-citizens were entitled to neither the
commercium nor the connubium. Therefore, they could not enjoy the
commercial rights of Roman citizens or the right to contract a civil law
marriage. Neither their rights of property nor their domestic rights, such
as the right to claim adultery or claim dominion over one's children,
were recognized under the Roman civil law.
The Fourteenth Amendment was an attempt to guarantee an equality
of civil capacity and to abolish the distinction that had previously existed
between slaves and freedmen in the Qnited States. The Taney Court in
Dred Scott v. Sandford had argued that mere emancipation alone was not
enough to confer the status of "citizen" and the accompanying privileges
and immunities of citizenship. 232 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that neither the states nor the federal government had the power to
confer the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to

227.
1985).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
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bk. 1, ch. 5, § 3 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds.,

Id. bk. I, ch. 5, § 4.
Id. bk. I, ch. 6, § I.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
GAIUS, supra note 26, at xiv.
See infra Part III.B.
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non-aliens-privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states as
well as peculiarly national privileges and immunities conferred by the
national compact.233
The "equal rights" of Roman citizens were the embodiment of the
privileges and immunities of citizenship in the Roman civil code. It was
common to refer to the status of Roman citizens as "privileged."
According to Edward Poste, a translator of Gaius' Institutes, "[t]he law
of Persons, in other words, the law of Status, classifies men as slaves
and free, as citizens (privileged) and aliens (unprivileged), as paterfamilias (superior) and filiusfamilias (dependent)."234 In 1841, Thomas
Cooper, a translator of Justinian's Institutes, also spoke of the "privileges
of freemen" and "privileges of Roman citizens."235 In 1880, James
Muirhead translated Gaius as referring to the "privileges of Roman
citizenship."236 Therefore, a connection may be established between
the privileges and immunities of citizens and those civil capacities
exercised by citizens under the Roman law.
Under the Roman law, slaves had no civil existence. In Justinian's
Institutes it is stated that "[a]s far as concerns the civil law[,] slaves are
regarded as not existing, not, however, in the natural law; because as far
as concerns the natural law all men are equal."237 Although slaves had
no civil status, and thus had no civil existence, the laws of nature still
governed slaves. As Ulpian stated, "[b]efore the Civil law a slave is
nothing, but not before the Natural law; for in the eye of Natural law all
men are equal."238 According to Poste, "[t]he absolute privation of all
rights was sometimes ex~ressed by saying that a slave has no persona,
caput, or status ...."2 9 Unfortunately for the slave, the Roman
natural law was relatively undeveloped and afforded relatively little in
the way of rights. The hard, cold truth was concisely stated in
Justinian's Institutes: "We compare slavery closely with death."240

233. See infra Part III.B.
234. GAIUS, supra note 26, at 40.
235. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH NOTES 413 (Thomas Cooper trans., 2d
ed. 1841).
236. THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN 10 (James Muirhead trans.,
1880).
237. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 50, ch. 17, § 32.
238. GAIUS, supra note 26, at 63-64 (quoting THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 50, ch.
17, § 32).
239. Id. at 64.
240. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 50, ch. 17, § 209.
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This concept of slavery as absence of civil existence was the foundation
of the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Although slaves could be
emancipated, and thereby enjoy freedom, the Court relegated them to the
level of "freedman," a status lower than that of "citizen."
The following excerpt from Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law
describes the condition of slaves under the Roman law:
Slaves were held pro nullis . . .. They had no head in the state, no name, title,
or register: they were not capable of being injured: nor could they take by
purchase or descent: they had no heirs, and therefore could make no will:
exclusive of what was called their peculium, whatever they acquired was their
master's: they could not plead nor be pleaded for, but were excluded from all
civil concerns whatever: they could not claim the indulgence of absence
reipublicae causa: they were not entitled to the rights and considerations of
matrimony, and therefore had no relief in case of adultery: nor were they proper
objects of cognation or affinity, but of quasi-cognation only: they could be sold,
transferred or pawned, as goods or personal estate; for goods they were, and as
such they were esteemed: they might be tortured for evidence: punished at the
discretion of their lord, or even put to death by his authority: to~ether with
many other civil incapacities which I have not room to enumerate. 41

Slaves could not alienate property, incur obligations, enter into bilateral
contracts, make wills, or inherit.242 "A slave cannot really owe or be
owed anything ...."243 Slaves also suffered disabilities in regard to
testifying in court and suing. "A slave's answer can be relied on when
there is no other means of discovering the truth."244 These disabilities
were a result of the slave's being within the power of another. The
slave was under the private dominion or propriety of his owner.
"Someone is not regarded as being willing if he obeys the command of
a father or master."245
Roman citizenship was a prerequisite for a variety of private rights and
capacities.246 According to Frederick Tomkins and William George
Lemon, translators of Gaius writing in 1869:
The man must be a civis to have a civil personality. It was not enough that he
be free. He must own himself in Quiritarian ownership in order to be a persona
in the eye of the Roman law. When a man was free but not a civis Romanus,
he was entitled to every benefit to be derived from the jus gentium, but he had
no right to the privileges arising from the jus civile. 247

INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 235, at 408-09 (quoting DR. TAYLOR'S
429).
242. GAITJS, supra note 26, at 154.
243. 1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 15, ch. 1, § 41, at 434.
244. 2 Id. bk. 22, ch. 5, § 7.
245. 4 Id. bk. 50, ch. 17, § 4.
246. INSTITUTES OF GAITJS AND RULES OF ULPIAN, supra note 236, at 471-73.
247. THE COMMENTARIES OF GAITJS ON THE ROMAN LAW 164 (Frederick Tomkins
& William George Lemon trans., 1869).
241.

ELEMENTS
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Only Roman citizens could contract a civil law marriage with other
Roman citizens. This capacity was termed connubium, and where it was
present, the issue of the marriage followed the condition of the father
and were also citizens. Only a citizen could have patria potestas over
his children. Only citizens could have or be agnates. Quiritarian
ownership was confined to citizens (dominium ex Jure Quritium). Only
citizens could make certain kinds of contracts. Only citizens could make
testaments. Many judicial remedies were available only to and against
citizens. Only citizens could act as witnesses in certain contexts. Lastly,
only citizens possessed commercium, "the capacity for reciprocally
acquiring and alienating [according to the forms of the ius ciuile]."248
Therefore, it was only the class of citizens that possessed certain civil
capacities with respect to person and property in Roman society under
the civil law.
Slaves were not parties to the social compact and, thus, were not
members of society. The same may be said of other classes of
individuals who were aliens to Rome such as freedmen or peregrines.
These individuals did possess certain rights under the }us gentium, a
separate body of law, but these rights were clearly inferior to those
possessed by citizens of Rome under the }us civile. For example,
according to Tomkins and Lemon, "[t]here was a period at Rome when
non cives were held to be devoid of that capacity which could alone
entitle them to the protection of the courts of justice."249 However,
gradually the rights available under the }us gentium were enlarged
by treaties with foreign States, and by the incorporation of other cities or
political associations into the Roman family, without, however, their attaining
to the full privileges conferred by the civitas. In this way non cives, if they
were free, came to be regarded as fit for the enjoyment of certain legal rights.
Still there was a wide ~If between the Roman citizen and those new members
of the commonwealth. 50

Individuals who were not citizens
lacked not merely full political rights, but also the privileges of the jus civile
which were kept from them as "proprium jus civium Romanorum" . . . . The
correct idea to attach to the peregrinus is, that he was simply a non civis, that

248.
249.
250.

INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN, supra note 236, at 396-97.
THE COMMENTARIES OF GAilJS ON THE ROMAN LAW, supra note 247, at 651.
Id.
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he was neither entitled to the advantages of the commercium, nor enjoyed those
of the connubium. 251

The Roman model is analogous to the system of Black Codes put into
place in the Southern states after the Civil War. These were separate
bodies of law applicable to freed blacks, which denied them the exercise
of certain civil capacities inherent in citizenship. 252 It is not surprising
that the Black Codes resembled institutions found in the Roman law,
since the slave codes of the South were heavily influenced by the Roman
law. 253 The status of free blacks in the South under the Black Codes
was merely one step up from that of slaves. They possessed freedom,
but were denied the civil authority accompanying the status of citizen.
a.

Privileges

Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Amar have asserted that the terms
"rights," "liberties," "privileges," and "immunities" were used interchangeably prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 254
However, in reality there was probably a subtle distinction between the
terms "right" and "privilege." A privilege was a power, faculty, or
capacity possessed by an individual, while a right was a moral quality,
which was bestowed through positive law upon an individual. In
English parlance, the term "privilege" was often used as a synonym for
"liberty" or "franchise."255 In a sense, all of the civil capacities that
existed for Roman citizens under the law conferred a type of private
law-making power (privilegium). For example, a citizen could make a
contract that was binding under the law just as if a legislature had passed
a law commanding the performance of certain actions or forbearance
from certain actions. A citizen could leave his property through
inheritance, and those named in the will would have a right under the
law to the property just as if the legislature had commanded the transfer.
In Rome, only citizens enjoyed these capacities or privileges under the
civil law. This translation is supported by the historical understanding
of the term "privilege."256 The notion that property involves a power
of dominion over a thing, a private law-making power with respect to a

251. Id. (citation omitted).
252. For a description of the Black Codes, see THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK
CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965).
253. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
· 254. See CURTIS, supra note 12, at 64-65; Amar, supra note 2, at 1220 (stating that
the terms rights, freedoms, privileges, and immunities are "virtually synonymous").
255. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *37; 13 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL
ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 508 (2d ed. 1791).
256. See INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 235, at 404.
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thing, is repeated by the natural law writers, and its origin may be traced
to the Roman law.
Several of the natural law writers seem to have also differentiated
between powers and rights. 257 For example, Pufendorf noted the
ambiguous nature of the term "right":
The word "right" (ius) is highly ambiguous. For in addition to the meanings
where it is used for law, and for a body or system of homogeneous laws, as
well as for the decision rendered by a judge, it very frequently happens that it
is taken as the moral quality by which we legally either command persons, or
possess things, or by virtue of which something is owed us. 258

Pufendorf distinguished the terms "power" and "right," stating that the
difference between the two is that
the former tends more to introduce into things or persons the actual presence
of the quality mentioned, and less expressly connotes the mode by which one
has secured it. Right, however, directly and clearly indicates that a thing has
been lawfully acquired and is lawfully now retained. Because, however, most
kinds of power have a distinguishing name, which that quality, whereby
something is understood to be owed us, lacks, it is convenient to designate this
quality in a special way by the word "right", although we have not seen fit to
avoid the other meanings of this word, because of customary usage. 259

Therefore, powers are, in a sense, divorced from their embodiment in the
municipal law, which gives rise to civil rights-the modes by which

257. For example, Burlamaqui distinguished between power and right, referring to
Pufendorf's theory in the process. According to Burlamaqui:
We must not ... confound simple power with right. A simple power is a
physical quality; it is a power of acting in the full extent of our natural
strength and liberty; but the idea of right is more confined. This includes a
relation of aggreeableness to a rule, which modifies the physical power, and
directs its operations in a manner proper to conduct man to a certain end. It
is for this reason we say that right is a moral quality .... The main point is
to distinguish between physical and moral; and it seems that the word right,
as Pufendorf himself insinuates, is fitter of itself than power, to express the
moral idea. In short, the use of our faculties becomes a right only so far, as
it is approved by reason, and is found agreeable to this primitive rule of
human actions.
1 BURLAMAQUI, supra note 132, pt. I, ch. 7, § 3, at 48-49 (citation omitted). However,
Burlamaqui also acknowledged that at times the term "right" was used to denote a power
or faculty: "Right is frequently taken from a personal quality, for a power of acting or
faculty. It is thus we say, that every man has a right to attend to his own preservation;
that a parent has a right to bring up his children; that a sovereign has a right to levy
troops for the defence of the state, &c." Id. § 2, at 48.
258. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 19.
259. Id. (emphasis added).
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certain powers may be exercised. Pufendorf described the right of
citizenship as a "complex arising from power and right," which involved
the "faculty to exersize [sic] ... the acts pertaining to members of the
commonwealth. " 260 According to Pufendorf:
Many things commonly pass under the head of rights, which, if we cared to
speak accurately, are a kind of complex arising from power and right, used each
in its proper sense, and at the same time involve or suppose some obligation,
or honour, or something similar. Thus citizenship, or the right of citizenship,
embraces the faculty to exercise, to their fullest effects, the acts pertaining to
the members of that commonwealth, and the right to enjoy the benefits proper
to it, supposing likewise an obligation toward the commonwealth. 261

Therefore, a plausible understanding of the term "privilege" is that it
denotes powers or "faculties" that pertain "to the members of the
commonwealth"---capacities inherent in the concept of citizenship. Civil
rights, on the other hand, represent merely the modes by which these
powers may be exercised. They are embodied in positive municipal
regulations passed by legislatures.

b.

Immunities

The etymological roots of the term "immunity" suggest a freedom
from a public service (munera), which under the Roman law certain
individuals were required to perform on behalf of their community. In
the United States, the term was used as a synonym for "exemption."262
However, the origin of the term may be traced to the Roman Code. In
Justinian's Institutes it is stated:
Properly speaking, a "munus" is what we are forced to undertake by law or
custom or the command of someone who has the right to command . . . .
"Munus publicum" is the duty of a private individual as a result of which an
extraordinary benefit is conferred on his fellow citizens, individual1x or as a
whole, and on their commonwealth at the command of a magistrate. 63

Under the Roman law, some of these public services were personal
while others involved burdens on property, including payment of
taxes. 264 These public burdens were described in detail in Justinian's
Institutes and included "collect[ing] the regular taxes," the "defense of
one's community," the "appointment as advocate," the "supervision of
the corn supply," the "supervision of the water supply," and other sundry

260.
261.
262.

Id. at 20.
Id.

264.

1 Id. at xxii.

GILES JACOB, LAW DICTIONARY (1810); NATHANIEL LINDLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE§§ 30-32, app. note § 31 (1855).
263. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 50, ch. 16, §§ 214, 239.
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duties such as "camel management."265 Justinian's Institutes indicated
that the enumeration was not exclusive and that
other duties also can be grasped under the laws of each community by analogy
with those which we have listed, because of established custom . . . . In general,
something is to be regarded as a personal munus if it regularly arises from
bodily activity together with the conscientious exercise of the mental faculties;
as a patrimonial munus if it particularly involves expense.266

The Institutes divided these duties, or civil munera, into three
categories: personal; patrimonial, and mixed. According to the
Institutes, "[t]he personal ones are those which are carried out by mental
application and by the deployment of bodily effort without any loss to
the man undertaking them, like tutelage or care, also the care of the
account book."267 Among the personal munera were "upkeep of public
roads," "heating for baths," and "supervision of the water supply," as
well as various offices involving carrying out public duties. 268 Patrimonial munera were analogous to taxes----munera "carried out at the
expense of the patrimony and at a loss for the person undertaking
them."269 Mixed munera involved aspects of both personal service and
personal expense.
These civic duties were seen as being burdensome rather than
beneficial. Although there were many offices that were of value to the
officeholder in ancient Rome, those required to be undertaken for the
munera involved personal expense and were therefore burdensome to the
officeholder. Freedom from these burdensome civic duties could be
obtained under certain circumstances. For example, if others were
available to perform the services in one's place, freedom from these
duties could be obtained. In Justinian's Institutes it is stated that "the
appropriate reward of immunity is thus given to fathers on account of
their sons because they themselves will undertake the munera."270
Such exemptions were termed the right· of immunity (iure immunitatis).271 Therefore, under the Roman law an immunity was a right to

265.
266.
· 267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

4 Id. bk. 50, ch. 4, § 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. bk. 50, ch. 4, § 3.
Id. bk. 50, ch. 6, § 1.
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be free from having to fulfill some burdensome public duty, including
payment of taxes.

5.

Peonage

Status was not necessarily permanent under Roman law and could be
changed in a variety of ways. 272 For example, one's status could be
reduced to that of a slave through punishment for a crime. In Justinian's
Institutes we find that "those ordered to execution or who are given to
the beasts forthwith become servi poenae."273 "Those condemned to
the extreme penalty immediately lose their citizenship and their freedom.
This fate therefore anticipates their death."274 All property is lost upon
such a condemnation by law: "On [a man's] condemnation to lose life
or citizenship or to be reduced to slavery, [his] property is confiscated."21s
This loss of property is analogous to the effects of the Black Codes in
the South, which were characterized as putting blacks in the condition
of slaves through a system of peonage. For example, Senator Henry
Wilson commented to the effect that Virginia used its vagrant laws to
make slaves of men declared free. 276 Similarly, Senator Stewart stated
that the Civil Rights Bill was an attempt to prevent the Southern states
from "reduc[ing] the negro to a system of peonage."277 The Black
Codes placed certain civil disabilities upon free blacks, which were

272. Justinian's Institutes stated:
Status is a position of unimpaired standfog, which is established by law and
custom and under the authority of the laws may be reduced or removed by our
delict . . . . Status is reduced if we are assigned a penalty which affects our
standing, although liberty remains, as, for instance, if someone is banished or
removed from the ordo or debarred from holding public office or if a plebeian
is beaten with rods or assigned to forced labor or if anyone falls under any
heading which is listed in the perpetual edict as bringing infamy . . . . Status
is removed if magna capitis minutia occurs, that is, if deprivation of liberty
occurs, as, for instance, if someone is forbidden fire and water, which occurs
when he is deported or if a plebeian is assigned to mine work or to a mine; for
it makes no difference, nor is there any distinction between a public work and
a mine, except that those who escape from a public work are punished not by
. death, but by assignment to a mine.
Id. bk. 50, ch. 13, § 5.
273. Id. bk. 48, ch. 19, § 12.
274. Id. bk. 48, ch. 19, § 29.
275. Id. bk. 48, ch. 20, § 1.
276. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 138.
Elsewhere, Wilson stated in discussing the Freedmen's Bureau Bill that the black codes
of South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and other states were "codes of laws that
practically make the freedman a peon or a serf." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
340 (1866).
277. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 204.
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inconsistent with the status of"citizen." According to Senator Trumbull,
the Black Code of Mississippi provided "that no negro shall own or hire
lands . . . that he shall not sue or testify against a white man; that he
must be employed by a master before the second Monday in January or
he will be bound out-in other words sold into slavery."278 The Black
Codes essentially prevented free blacks from exercising the inherent
powers of citizens. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was designed,
according to Senator William Stewart, to "remove the disabilities
existing by laws tending to reduce the negro to a system of peonage. It
strikes at that; nothing else."279
Much of the terminology used by members of Congress in the debates
over Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment finds its origin in the
terminology of the Roman law. Legal terms such as "citizen,"
"privileges," "immunities," and "peonage" may be traced to the Roman
law. This body of law influenced both the natural law writers and the
legal system in the United States. In particular, the Roman model of
citizenship and the Roman law distinctions among various grades of
status were influential in the United States and were discussed by certain
members of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Having discussed both
the Roman law and social compact theories that served as a background
to the decision, a detailed examination of the opinions in that case is
useful in determining the nature of the problems that the Republicans
sought to address with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III.

DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: SOCIAL COMPACT THEORY AND THE
ROMAN MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP

In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that freed blacks were not citizens within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States.280 The Court concluded, therefore,
that they were not entitled to the privilege of suing in the courts of the
United States under Article III of the United States Constitution. Chief
Justice Taney framed the question addressed by the Court as follows:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as
slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into

278.
279.
280.

Id. at 135.
Id. at 204.
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied [sic] by that
instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a
court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution. 281

Justice Taney's statement of the question before the Court as whether
freed blacks were members of the political community of the United
States, indicates the relevance of social compact theory to the decision
of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford. The question was whether free
blacks could be parties to the social compact among citizens of the
United States.
Justice Daniel, in his concurring opinion, framed the issue before the
Court in a similar manner, but emphasized state citizenship:
And it now becomes the province of this court to determine whether the
plaintiff below, (and in error here,) admitted to be a negro of African descent,
whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country
and sold as negro slaves---such being his status, and such the circumstances
surrounding his position--whether he can, by correct legal induction from that
status and those circumstances, be clothed with the character and capacities of
a citizen of the State of Missouri? 282

Justice Daniel, citing the "theories of writers on Government," emphasized the Lockean notion that status as a slave-as property-was
wholly inconsistent with membership in the political community and
distinguished between the relation of the individual to the state based on
the social compact and the relation of the citizen to the government.
According to Justice Daniel:
It may be assumed as a postulate, that to a slave, as such, there appertains and
can appertain no relation, civil or political, with the State or the Government.
He is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency to the interests, the
convenience, or the will, of his owner . . . .283

Justice Daniel therefore concluded:
[A] slave, the peculium or property of a master, and possessing within himself
no civil nor political rights or capacities, cannot be a CITIZEN. For who, it
may be asked, is a citizen? What do the character and status of citizen import?
Without fear of contradiction, it does not import the condition of being private
property, the subject of individual power and ownership. Upon a principle of
etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from civitas, conveys the ideas of
connection or identification with the State or Government, and a participation
of its functions. But beyond this, there is not, it is believed, to be found, in the
theories of writers on Government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried,
an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as conferring

281.
282.
283.
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Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 475-76.
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the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right' of acfillisition and
enjoyment, of an entire equality of privileges, civil and political. 2

This statement by Justice Daniel perfectly echoes the social compact
theory of Locke as well as the distinctions in status recognized under the
Roman law. Status as a slave, or property, was recognized by Justice
Daniel to be fundamentally inconsistent with status as a citizen. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Daniel discussed social compact theory as
expressed by Vattel in order to argue that free blacks were not citizens
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.285 Slaves were under
disabilities due to their status as property. They were under the
dominion of others, and because of this status, they could not exercise
the sovereignty necessary to enter into the social compact. Justice
Daniel quoted Vattel as stating that '"[t]he citizens are the members of
the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to
its authority; they equally participate in its advantages. "'286 Justice
Daniel then concluded:
From the views here expressed, and they seem to be unexceptionable, it must
follow, that with the slave, with one devoid of rights or capacities, civil or
political, there could be no pact; that one thus situated could be no party to, or
actor in, the association of those possessing free will, power, discretion. He
could form no part of the design, no constituent ingredient or portion of a
society based upon common, that is, upon equal interests and powers. He could
not at the same time be the sovereign and the slave. 287

Therefore, Justice Daniel explicitly recognized the theory of society as
being based upon a compact and deduced from this that slaves could not
have been counted among citizens at the time of ratification of the
Constitution.
The Lockean notion that citizenship is defined as being part of a
political community, a party to the social compact, is clearly stated in
Chief Justice Taney's and Justice Daniel's statement of the question

284.
285.

Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
According to Justice Daniel:
Vattel, in the preliminary chapter of his Treatise on the Law of Nations, says:
"Nations or States are bodies politic; societies of men united together for the
purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage, by the joint efforts
of their mutual strength."

Id.

286.

Id. at 476 (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS bk. 1, cap. 19, at

101).

287.

Id. at 477.

759

before the Court. Both Taney and Daniel concluded that, under this
definition, free blacks were not citizens. According to Chief Justice
Taney, free blacks certainly were not citizens at the time of the framing
of the Constitution:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the
power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us
is; whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a
portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We
think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures
to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as
those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them. 288

The "republican institutions" mentioned by Justice Taney were based
upon the sovereignty of the people wherein they entered into a compact
among themselves and subsequently established the government,
retaining certain pre-existing privileges or capacities. Individuals who
were under the dominion of others were incapable of contracting, a
notion familiar under the Roman law, 289 and were therefore incapable
of undertaking the obligations inherent in the social compact. 290

288. Id. at 404-05. As Professor Maltz has noted, both Taney and McLean tended
to take extreme positions on the issue of whether slaves or free blacks were citizens
under the Constitution:
In Dred Scott itself, both Taney and McLean took extreme positions. The
Chief Justice argued that the framers of the Constitution did not consider free
blacks to be citizens of the United States and that the descendants of slaves
could never become citizens. McLean, by contrast, embraced the radical
Republican position, arguing that all free men should be considered citizens
of the United States.
Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the
Constitutional Law of Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 2008 (1995).
289. See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
290. In order to support his argument that individuals who have been under the
dominion of others cannot achieve the status of citizens, Chief Justice Taney contrasted
the situation oflndians with that of blacks brought to the United States as slaves. Taney
concluded that "[t]he situation of this population [blacks] was altogether unlike that of
the Indian race" because the "Indian race" was "a free and independent people,
associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws." Dred Scott,
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403.
These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments,
as much so as if an ocean had separated the red man from the white; and their
freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from the time of the first
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According to the reasoning of Chief Justice Taney, slaves, because of
their state of servitude at the time of formation of the social compact and
the establishment of the federal government, could not have been
counted as being among the parties to these compacts.
The Court was not unanimous, however, in its opinion that Dred Scott
was not a citizen and therefore not entitled to sue in the courts of the
United States. Justice McLean, in his dissent, argued that Dred Scott
might have been a citizen of Missouri and that state citizenship was
enough to exercise the frivilege of suing in the courts of the United
States under Article III.2 1
Furthermore, Justice Curtis reached in his dissent the conclusion that
free blacks were indeed considered to be citizens of the United States at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution based upon his own
historical inquiry into the status of blacks and his examination of the
constitutional text. Justice Curtis could
find nothing in the Constitution which, proprio vigore, deprives of their
citizenship any class of persons who were citizens of the United States at the
time of its adoption, or who should be native-born citizens of any State after its
adoption; nor any power enabling Congress to disfranchise persons born on the
soil of anv State, and entitled to citizenship of such State by its Constitution
and laws.2'92

Justice Curtis argued that "under the Constitution of the United States,
every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that

emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by the different
Governments which succeeded each other.
Id. at 404. Taney pointed to the fact that treaties were negotiated with the Indian tribes
and the fact that the Indians were sought as allies in times of war as evidence that they
were considered sovereign peoples. Therefore, the position oflndians differed from that
of free blacks in that they were not subject to the dominion of others as property. They
were capable of becoming citizens since they possessed the capacity of a free people to
be bound and undertake an obligation with the government through compact. Therefore,
they were more nearly like aliens who may become citizens through action of the
government's power of naturalization.
291. According to Justice McLean:
There is no averment in this plea which shows or conduces to show an
inability in the plaintiff to sue in the Circuit Court. It does not allege that the
plaintiff had his domicil in any other State, nor that he is not a free man in
Missouri. He is averred to have had a negro ancestry, but this does not show
that he is not a citizen of Missouri, within the meaning of the act of Congress
authorizing him to sue in the Circuit Court.
Id. at 531.
292. Id. at 576.
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State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United
States."293 Arguably, Justice Curtis was appealing to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article Iv, Section 2, which confers upon
"Citizens" the privileges and immunities of "Citizens in the several
States." Thus, citizens of a state might achieve United States citizenship-citizenship in the several states-----derivatively through the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
However, the Taney Court denied that after ratification of the
Constitution non-aliens could be made citizens of the United States and
be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all of the
states. In effect, the Taney Court construed the Clause as reading: The
Citizens of the United States of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States in the several
States. The importance of this outcome in terms of interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that this was the construction of the Clause
adopted by Senator Bingham, the principle draftsman of Section 1 of the
Amendment, who had pointed to the decision of the Taney Court in
arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed certain
rights of citizens of the United States against abridgement by the
states.294 Arguably, by guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of
"citizens of the United States" in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham sought to constitutionalize this view of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 espoused by Taney.
Subpart III.A discusses the historical debate concerning the status of
free blacks at the time of ratification of the Constitution. Were free
blacks considered citizens upon ratification, they would indeed be
members of the political community entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens flowing from the social compact. However, the
majority concluded that the term "citizen" as used in the Constitution did
not originally encompass free blacks.
Having determined that historically free blacks were not considered
citizens, the Court next addressed potential mechanisms through which
they might achieve this status. Subpart III.B discusses the positions of
the majority and the dissenters concerning the ability of free blacks to
become citizens. The majority concluded that, in effect, short of

293. Id.
294. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). Professor Maltz has also
noted that Taney's opinion in Dred Scott indicates that he believed the Comity Clause
protected certain rights inherent in citizenship of the United States. See Maltz, supra
note 22, at 344 (noting that "the concept that the comity clause protected a national
citizenship which was independent of state citizenship formed the basis for Chief Justice
Taney's argument on the citizenship issue in Dred Scott.").
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constitutional amendment, free blacks could not become citizens. In
contrast, Justice Curtis argued that any residual power to confer
citizenship was left with the states. This aspect of the Court's decision
necessitated that the American people ratify the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment in order to confer the status of citizen of the
United States upon free blacks.
Subpart 111.C addresses the interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause given by the majority and dissent. Both the majority
and dissent indicated that the Clause conferred a "general citizenship."
However, language in Chief Justice Taney's opinion seems to indicate
that he thought the Clause mandated (or at least assumed) uniformity in
the privileges and immunities of citizens among the states, whereas
Justice Curtis's opinion indicates that he thought that (the people of)
each state remained free to determine the privileges and immunities of
citizenship within the state, and that the Clause afforded merely
antidiscrimination protection.
A.

The Historical Evidence Concerning the Status of Free Blacks

During the course of his opinion, Chief Justice Taney examined the
historical evidence concerning the status of free blacks in the United
States before and after ratification of the Constitution in an attempt to
buttress his argument that free blacks were not considered citizens at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. In Lockean terms, they were
not original parties to the social compact. The fact that the majority
placed free blacks in an intermediate status between citizenship and
slavery is an indication of the Court's reliance upon the Roman model
of citizenship. 295 Chief Justice Taney first appealed to the wording of
the Declaration of Independence, which declared that "all men are
created equal," and contrasted these words with the condition of slaves
as being in a state of servitude. According to Chief Justice Taney, the
language of the Declaration of Independence concerning the equality of

295. Some prior decisions had rejected the existence of any such intennediate status.
See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 122, 127-29 (1838) (concluding
that free blacks were indeed citizens although their rights were reduced); State v.
Edmund, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 290 (1833) (holding that a free black was qualified as a
citizen for purposes of a state law protecting citizens' right to hold property in slaves).
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all men was inconsistent with inclusion of slaves within the category of
"the People."296 Taney argued:
The general words [of the Declaration] above quoted would seem to embrace
the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this
day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people
who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in
that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who
framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly
inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of
mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and
.received universal rebuke and reprobation. 297

Therefore, the existence of the Declaration stating that all citizens were
equal, while blacks were not in practice enjoying equality, indicated that
free blacks were not members of the "body politic" constituting the
citizenry.
Chief Justice Taney observed that there was no definition of the term
"citizen" in the Constitution, but argued that the term as used in the
Constitution was "so well understood, that no further description or
definition was necessary. "298 Echoing a common theme found in
Locke, among others, that status as property and status as a citizen are
incompatible,299 Chief Justice Taney also appealed to the language of
the Constitution as recognizing the status of slaves as property rather
than citizens. According to Chief Justice Taney, the "negro race" were
not a "portion of the people." Taney pointed to the Slave Importation
Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause as evidence that the "negro race"
formed a "separate class of persons." According to Taney:
[T]hese two clauses were not intended to confer on them or their posterity the
blessings of liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the
citizen . . . . It is obvious that they were not even in the minds of the framers
of the Constitution when they were conferring special rights and privileges
upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union. Indeed, when we
look to the condition of this race in the several States at the time, it is

296. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 411.
299. Justice Daniel, in his concurrence, also expressed this idea that slavery and
property were inconsistent, engaging in an extensive discussion of slavery over the ages
in civilized society and concluding that Africans had
been by all the nations of Europe regarded as subjects of capture or purchase;
as subjects of commerce or traffic; and that the introduction of that race into
every section of this country was not as members of civil or political society,
but as slaves, as property in the strictest sense of the term.
Id. at 475.

764

[VOL. 34: 681, 1997]

Citizenship
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were intended to be
extended to them. 300

To further support his position, Chief Justice Taney discussed congressional legislation that he argued indicated that blacks were not considered citizens at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, including
the naturalization law of 1790 that confined "the right of becoming
citizens 'to aliens, being free white persons,"' and the militia law of
1792 that applied to "every 'free able-bodied white male citizen. "'301
From his historical inquiry into congressional practice, Chief Justice
Taney concluded that free blacks as well as slaves were not considered
citizens, did not enter into a social compact with the people, and
therefore were not entitled to the "personal rights" or "special rights and
privileges" of citizens.
Chief Justice Taney examined not only evidence pertaining to national
citizenship, but also evidence pertaining to state citizenship. 302 He
built his case that a race subject to the dominion of others was incapable
of citizenship by looking to the practice of the states with respect to free
blacks after ratification of the Constitution. Citing Chancellor Kent's
Commentaries, Chief Justice Taney argued that "in no part of the
country except Maine, did the African race, in point of fact, participate
equally with the whites in the exercise of civil and political rights."303
Therefore, free blacks not only lacked the status of "citizen" of the
United States, but in most of the states, they did not even possess the
status of "citizen" of the state.

300. Id. at 411-12 (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 419-20.
302. Id. at 414-15. Chief Justice Taney examined the status of blacks in some of
the more "liberal" states and determined that even in these states, blacks did not possess
the status of "citizen." For example, Chief Justice Taney cited Chief Justice Dagget's
opinion in Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 340 (1834), concerning a Connecticut law
which made it penal to set up or establish any school in that State for the
instruction of persons of the African race not inhabitants of the State, or to
instruct or teach in any such school or institution, or board or harbor for that
purpose, any such person, without the previous consent in writing of the civil
authority of the town in which such school or institution might be.
Id. In this case, the court held "that persons . . . [of the African race] were not citizens
of a State, within the meaning of the word citizen in the Constitution of the United
States, and were not therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in
other States." Id. at 415.
303. Id. at 416.
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Taney also discussed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Articles of Confederation as preserving the primary nature of state
citizenship. The states were free to choose who was to be a member of
their own political communities, and citizenship of the United States was
dependent upon pre-existing citizenship of a particular state at the time
of adoption of the Articles of Confederation. According to Taney,
"members of the African race" were not considered to be "free
inhabitants" under the Clause and were therefore not entitled to the
privileges and immunities of citizens under the Articles. 304 Furthermore, Taney argued that the change in language from "free inhabitants"
in the Articles of Confederation to "citizens" in the Constitution was
intended to make it clear that "an emancipated slave" would not be
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. 305 An aspect of protecting the sovereignty of
the individual states was that no individual could be forced upon them
within their own jurisdiction, possessing the status of a citizen, without
their consent. The states consented to recognize the citizens of the
United States, parties to the national compact at the time of ratification
of the Constitution, as possessing the same status in all of the states as

304. Id. at 416-19. Chief Justice Taney argued:
[U]nder this Confederation, each State had the right to decide for itself, and
in its own tribunals, whom it would acknowledge as a free inhabitant of
another State. But no example, we think, can be found of his admission to all
the privileges of citizenship in any State of the Union after these Articles were
formed, and while they continued in force. And, notwithstanding the
generality of the words "free inhabitants," it is very clear that, according to
their accepted meaning in that day, they did not include the African race,
whether free or not . . . .
Id. at 418. Taney concluded:
Words could hardly have been used which more strongly mark the line of
distinction between the citizen and the subject; the free and the subjugated
races . . . . [I]t cannot for a moment be supposed, that a class of persons thus
separated and rejected from those who formed the sovereignty of the States,
were yet intended to be included under the words "free inhabitants," in the
preceding article, to whom privileges and immunities were so carefully secured
in every State.
Id. at 418-19.
305. Id. at 416-19. Chief Justice Taney noted that in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Constitution "the comprehensive word inhabitant, which might be
construed to include an emancipated slave, is omitted; and the privilege is confined to
citizens of the State." Id. at 419. Note that Chief Justice Taney referred to the right to
be recognized as a citizen in all of the states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
as a "privilege." Therefore, since the right is embodied in the United States Constitution, one can only conclude that it is among the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States. Thus, contrary to the decision of the Court in the Slaughter-House
Cases, it would seem that enjoyment of privileges and immunities traditionally within
the regulatory control of the state governments was considered a privilege of citizens of
the United States.
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native citizens through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2. However, membership in this political community
composing the union was to be restricted to those individuals possessing
the status of citizens of the United States at the time of ratification, their
heirs, and those aliens naturalized by Congress. This argument is fully
consistent with the social compact theory previously expounded by the
majority.
Justice Curtis, in his dissent, also appealed to a historical approach in
order to determine whether free blacks were considered citizens at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. However, his conclusion
concerning the status of free blacks at the time of ratification of the
original Constitution contradicted that of the Taney majority. According
to Justice Curtis:
substantial facts evinced by the written Constitutions of States, and . . . the
notorious practice under them.... [showed] in a manner which no argument
can obscure, that in some of the original thirteen States, free colored persons,
before and at the time of the formation of the Constitution, were citizens of
those States. 306

Curtis argued that possessing the status of citizen of a particular state
prior to ratification of the Constitution was evidence of entitlement to
citizenship of the United States and all of the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states under Article IV, Section 2.
Disagreeing with the conclusion of the Taney majority, Justice Curtis
also contended that free blacks might have been recognized as citizens
under the Articles of Confederation. According to Justice Curtis, free
blacks fell within the phrase "free inhabitants" used in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation. Curtis further
argued that the change from "free inhabitants" in the Articles to
"citizens" in the Constitution did not show an intent to exclude
emancipated slaves because the phrases had substantially the same
meaning at the time--"the words 'free inhabitants,' as then used, were
synonymous with citizens."307

306. Id. at 575.
307. Justice Curtis noted that "the Constitutions and State papers of that period"
used the terms "the inhabitants or people of these colonies, or the inhabitants of this _
State, or Commonwealth, employed to designate those whom we should now denominate
citizens." Id. at 585. See also Maltz, supra note 288, at 2008 (noting that Curtis
thought that "[u]nder the Articles of Confederation, these [free] blacks would have been
entitled to the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. Thus, for Curtis, the
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The arguments of the dissenters in the Dred Scott decision more
accurately reflect the historical truth concerning the status of free blacks
in the United States at the time of ratification of the Constitution. 308
Paul Finkelman has contended that "[w]hile Taney was correct that most
blacks in 1787 were slaves, he was clearly wrong about black citizenship."309 At least one court still considered free blacks to be "citizens"
soon after the Dred Scott decision. 310 Furthermore, according to

question was whether the Constitution had deprived free blacks of their right to
citizenship") (citation ommitted).
308. This is the conclusion reached by James H. Kettner. See KETTNER, supra note
14, at 326-28. However, Kettner focuses on the fact that free blacks were considered
citizens of various states and not on whether they were considered citizens of the United
States. He contends that Taney's distinction between state and national citizenship
"countered a long popular and judicial tradition of considering the two as inseparable
dimensions of the same status." Id. at 328.
309. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND
COMITY 279-80 (1981). Finkelman notes the argument of Justice Curtis that:
"At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free nativeborn inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were
not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary
qualifications possessed the franchise of electors on equal terms with other
citizens."
Id. at 280 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407-08, 572-73). However, it was
necessary not only that they be considered citizens of the individual state in which they
resided but also citizens of the United States, equal parties in the social compact that
formed the basis of the union. Finkelman also cites a number of cases involving acts
of southern states which restricted free black seamen venturing within their states as
showing that there had been controversy concerning whether free blacks qualified as
citizens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Among
the cases cited by Finkelman are Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (1823), The
Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102 (1844), Calder v. Deliesseline, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 186 (1824),
and State v. Shaw, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 480 (1828). Id. at 280 n.118. See also
WIECEK, supra note 74, at 132-40; 1 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 576-86 (1872); A.E. Keir Nash, Negro Rights,
Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary
Chief Justice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C. L. REV. 141, 146-48 (1969) [hereinafter
Nash, Negro Rights]; A.E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial
Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 7 (1979) [hereinafter Nash, Reason
of Slavery].
310. In Anderson v. Millikin, involving an individual who had one-eighth African
blood but was otherwise qualified to vote and who was denied the right to vote for
electors of president and vice-president of the United States in the election of 1856, the
Supreme Court of Ohio argued that blacks were not precluded from being citizens of the
United States. 9 Ohio St. 568, 577 (1859). The court reasoned:
We think it entirely clear, that the phrase "citizen of the United States" was
inserted in our constitution with a view to the exclusion of aliens until they
should be naturalized, and thus become citizens of the United States. We are
confident that the phrase was used with no reference to color, and can not
believe that the idea was then entertained that, independent of the word
"white," the phrase "citizen of the United States" would operate to exclude any
person, on account of color, from the exercise of the elective franchise.
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Justice Story in his Commentaries, prior to the Dred Scott decision,
Missouri was admitted as a state on the condition that it could not deny
any privileges and immunities to blacks, indicating that members of
Congress believed that free blacks might be citizens. 311
This was certainly the position adopted by Senator Bingham, the
principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, who
expressed his opinion concerning this matter during the debate over the
admission of Oregon as a state soon after the Supreme Court's Dred
Scott decision. 312 Senator Bingham adopted the view of the dissenters
in the Dred Scott decision, that the constitutional text and the historical
record indicated that free blacks did possess the status of citizens and
were included within the definition of the term as used in the Constitu-

Id. In support of its position, the court examined the historical origins of the term in the
Constitution of the United States. According to the court:
It so happens, that we are not left merely to presumption that the phrase
"citizen of the United States" was used by the framers of the constitution in
a general sense. A motion was made in the convention, to strike out from the
section under consideration the words "United States," and insert "this state;"
and, singularly enough, the danger of using an expression, the meaning of
which might be altered or controlled by an authority independent of the state,
suggested itself to a member, and was expressed. But in answer, it was said:
"Who shall be considered citizens of this Union? I take the broad but tenable
ground, that all should be regarded as citizens of the United States who owe
allegiance to the government of the Union, whether they are vested with the
elective franchise or not." ... [Said by another,] "American citizenship is a
generic and comprehensive term, and much more so than the term 'subject,'
under a monarchical form of government. The term 'a citizen of the United
States,' therefore, includes men, women, and childrell-every one, in short,
who can demand the official protection of the federal government, or may be
amenable for the crime of treason."
Id. at 578 (citations omitted). In general, citizenship was not necessarily tied to an
individual's color. Any individual might be a party to the social coinpact among the
members of society and therefore entitled to the rights of members of the political
community. In fact, there were free blacks in the United States while slavery existed
as an institution who enjoyed some of the privileges of citizenship under the various
state governments. However, as the Taney Court argued in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
freedom alone did not necessarily imply that there was a constitutional right to the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. See Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
311. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 637 n.1.
312. It may have been the view among Republicans in general that free blacks were
intended to be included among citizens of the United States at the time of ratification
of the Constitution, as Michael Kent Curtis has argued. See CURTIS, supra note 12, at
46 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (Trumbull), 1115 (Wilson), 1832
(Lawrence) (1866)).
·
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tion. Bingham engaged in a lengthy discussion concerning the status of
free blacks and their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2, reiterating some of the very same arguments
that the Dred Scott dissenters had made. Bingham pointed to the
constitutional text and the text of the Articles of Confederation, stating
that the Constitution of the United States included
all free persons born and domiciled within the United States-not all free white
persons, but all free persons. You will search in vain, in the Constitution of the
United States, for that word white; it is not there. You will look in vain for it
in that first form of national govemment--the Articles of Confederation; it is
not there. 313

Bingham termed the word "white" a "phrase of caste" and stated that its
omission "from our national charter, was not accidental, but intentional."
According to Bingham, the rejection of this language "was a clear and
direct avowal that all free inhabitants, white and black, except 'paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice,' (which were expressly excepted,)
were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States ...." 314 Bingham examined the practices of the states,
noting that in five states "the elective franchise was exercised by free
inhabitants, black and white; and therefore, in five of the States, black
men cooperated with white men in the elections, and in the formation of
the Constitution of the United States."315 He returned to the constitutional text, stating:
Inasmuch as black men helped to make the Constitution, as well as to achieve
the independence of the country by the terrible trial by battle, it is not
surprising that the Constitution of the United States does not exclude them from
the body politic, and the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. That great instrument included in the new body politic, by the name of
"the people of the United States," all the then free inhabitants or citizens of the
United States, whether white or black, not even excepting, as did the Articles
of Confederation, paupers, vagabonds, or fugitives fromjustice. Thenceforward
all these classes, being free inhabitants, irrespective of age, or sex, or
complexion, and their descendants, were citizens of the United States. No
distinctions were made against the . . . free-born blacks and in favor of the
whites. 316
·

Finally, Bingham made a distinction between "natural" and "conventional" rights similar to Kent's distinction between absolute and relative

313. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
314. Id.; see also CURTIS, supra note 12, at 59-62 (discussing Bingham's statements
concerning the admission of Oregon into the Union).
315. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859); see also CURTIS, supra note
12, at 59-62.
316. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984-85 (1859); see also CURTIS, supra
note 12, at 59-62.
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rights, stating that "[t]his Government rests upon the absolute equality
of natural rights amongst men. There is not, and cannot be, any equality
in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights, because that is
impossible."317 Therefore, the Taney Court's opinion that free blacks
were not counted among the members of the political community
comprising the United States---citizens of the United States---at the time
of ratification of the Constitution is of dubious historical validity.
Having determined that free blacks were not citizens of the United
States, the Court next turned to the question of whether and by what
means, if any, they could achieve this status.
B.

The Power to Confer Citizenship: Implications of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2

The most important aspect of the Dred Scott decision handed down by
the Taney Court was not that freed blacks lacked citizenship of the
United States, but rather that they could not become citizens of the
United States under the existing constitutional regime. According to the
Court, there was no constitutionally-provided-for mechanism to confer
citizenship of the United States upon this class of individuals. The
importance of this aspect of the decision was recognized by the Miller
majority in the Slaughter-House Cases. Justice Miller stated that the
Dred Scott decision held that "a man of African descent, whether a slave
or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United
States."318 However, modern commentators have not fully recognized
the implications of this aspect of the Court's decision.
Chief Justice Taney acknowledged the distinction between state
citizenship and United States citizenship upon which the Miller majority
rested its opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases. According to Chief
Justice Taney, a state and the United States were two separate political
communities founded upon two separate social compacts. The constituents to the state compacts were citizens of the state while the constituents to the federal compact included not only citizens of the United
States but also, perhaps, the states conceived of as artificial persons.
Chief Justice Taney stated:

317. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859); see also CURTIS, supra note
12, at 59-62.
318. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873) (emphasis added).
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[W]e must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer
within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union.
It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of
a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may
have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and ret not be
entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. 31

Therefore, the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States
included the "rights and privileges of a citizen in any other state." This
is an indication that, at a minimum, being a citizen of the United States
entailed entitlement to privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states under Article IV, Section 2. However, this status entailed
entitlement to certain privileges and immunities that were peculiarly
national as well. 32 Chief Justice Taney thought that the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States included the privileges and
immunities traditionally within the control of state governments. Taney
argued that this implied that the states could not unilaterally confer
citizenship of the United States.

°

[P]revious to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State
had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of
citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character of course was
confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in
other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity
of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring these
rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States. Each
State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon
any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense
in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled
to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a
citizen in the other States. The rights which he would acquire would be
restricted to the State which gave them. The Constitution has conferred on
Congress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right
is evidently exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so.
Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by
naturalizing an alien invest in him with the rights and privileges secured to a
citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although, so far as the State
alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a

319. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,405 (1856).
320. In fact, the privilege of exercising the privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states is essentially itself a "peculiarly national" privilege, forming the "basis
of the Union." Another peculiarly national privilege would be the right to sue in the
courts of the United States under Article III, which was at issue in Dred Scott. The right
of access to federal tribunals was held to be a privilege beyond the power of the states
in several cases prior to Dred Scott. See, e.g., Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co., 5 F. Cas. 291,
296 (N.Y. 1826) (No. 2,517); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67, 74 (1840);
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326 (1853); Union
Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503, 507 (1855).
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citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution
and laws of the State attached to that character. 321

Therefore, in Justice Taney's opinion, the states had no power to confer
national citizenship, "citizenship of the United States," either directly or
indirectly through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 upon individuals whose ancestors were not citizens at the time
of ratification of the Constitution. This would be an infringement of the
sovereignty of the other states in the Union since they had not consented
to recognize such individuals as citizens within their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the above passage indicates that, besides the privileges and
immunities of citizenship in the several states, citizenship of the United
States entitled one to exercise peculiarly "national" privileges including
the right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article Ill.
If one keeps in mind the social compact theory of Locke, the meaning
of Chief Justice Taney's argument becomes clear. The political
community is founded upon a compact. In order to enter into this
community, it is necessary to have the acquiescence or consent of the
other parties to the compact. Unilateral conferral of national citizenship
on the part of a single state violates this principle. As Chief Justice
Taney argued:
It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own,

passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the
political community created by the Constitution of the United States. It cannot
make him a member of this community by making him a member of its own.
And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or description of
persons, who were not intended to be embraced in this new political family,
which the Constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded
from it. 322

Chief Justice Taney then addressed the question of whether the states
could indirectly, via the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2, confer "citizenship of the United States." He concluded that
they could not. 323

321. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405-06.
322. Id. at 406.
323. Chief Justice Taney concluded:
Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him [a member of the
African race] whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and
raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the
privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?
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It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised [sic] as citizens in the
several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other;
it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else.
And the personal rights and privileges guarantied [sic] to citizens of this new
sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the
several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise
become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the
principles on which it was founded. It was the union of those who were. at that
time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political
family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the
whole territory of the United States. And it gave to each citizen rights and
privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him
in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of
person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States. 324

Chief Justice Taney argued that there had been no consent for allowing
free blacks into the national political community and that, furthermore,
there had been no consent to a mechanism for accomplishing this end.
According to Taney, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 provided no such mechanism. Therefore, only through the
consent of the whole political community of the United States----through
amendment of the Constitution---could free blacks become citizens of the
United States. Otherwise, the most that free blacks could hope to enjoy
would be the privileges and immunities that the states were willing to
grant them within their individual jurisdictions as citizens of a particular
state.

The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained.
And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of
Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and,
consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts.

Id.
324. Id. at 406-07 (emphasis added). This passage was quoted by Senator Bingham
in his speech against the admission of Oregon as a state in order to show the equivalence
of the phrases "citizens of the several states" and "citizens of the United States." CONG.
GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). See also supra notes 312-316 and accompanying text.
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Justice Daniel agreed with Chief Justice Taney that the states had no
power to confer citizenship in the other states. 325 As Justice Daniel
stated:
It is evident that, after the formation of the Federal Government by the adoption
of the Constitution, the highest exertion of State power would be incompetent
to bestow a character or status created by the Constitution, or conferred in
virtue of its authority only. Upon those, therefore, who were not originally
parties to the Federal compact, or who are not admitted and adopted as parties
thereto, in the mode prescribed by its paramount authority, no State could have
power to bestow the character or the rights and privileges exclusively reserved
by the States for the action of the Federal Government by that compact.326

325. Justice Daniel also argued that emancipation alone did not confer any
privileges or immunities of citizenship. Emancipation merely granted to blacks their
freedom, but did not necessarily make them members of the political community entitled
to the privileges and immunities of citizenship. This argument was based, in part, upon
his understanding of the Roman Code. Justice Daniel asked:
Can it be pretended that an individual in any State, by his single act, though
voluntarily or designedly performed, yet without the co-operation or warrant
of the Government, perhaps in opposition to its policy or its guaranties, can
create a citizen of that State? . . . The argument thus urged must lead to these
extraordinary conclusions. It is regarded at once as wholly untenable, and as
unsustained by the direct authority or by the analogies of history.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 477. According to Justice Daniel, just as a state could
not make an individual a member of the national political community, so a master by
freeing his slave could not make him a member of the political community of the state.
Historically, "citizenship was not conferred by the simple fact of emancipation." Id. at
479-80. This would establish "one equal and universal slavery." Id. at 480. Justice
Daniel urged that the argument, if valid, would have "revolting consequences." An
individual might
emancipate his negro slave, by which process he first transforms that slave into
a citizen of his own State; he may next, under color of article fourth, section
second, of the Constitution of the United States, obtrude him, and on terms of
civil and political equality, upon any and every State in this Union, in defiance
of all regulations of necessity or policy, ordained by those States for their
internal happiness or safety. Nay, more: this manumitted slave may, by a
proceeding springing from the will or act of his master alone, be mixed up
with the institutions of the Federal Government, to which he is not a party, and
in opposition to the laws of that Government which, in authorizing the
extension by naturalization of the rights and immunities of citizens of the
United States to those not originally parties to the Federal compact, have
restricted that boon to free white aliens alone.
Id. at 480-81. Therefore, under Justice Daniel's argument, only the political community
itself may confer membership upon an individual. It is only through consent that the
social compact is entered into among the members of society.
326. Id. at 482.
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However, in Justice Daniel's op1mon, the states could grant certain
special privileges and immunities within their own jurisdictions.
The States, in the exercise of their political power, might, with reference to
their peculiar Government and jurisdiction, guaranty the rights of person and
property, and the enjoyment of civil and political privileges, to those whom they
should be disposed to make the objects of their bounty; but they could not
reclaim or exert the powers which they had vested exclusively in the Government of the United States. They could not add to or change in any respect the
class of persons to whom alone the character of citizen of the United States
appertained at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. They could
not create citizens of the United States by any direct or indirect proceeding. 327

This conclusion is important because it meant that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States in the several states and not the privileges and
immunities of citizens of each state in the several states. The Taney
Court's construction of the Clause was adopted by Senator Bingham,
who cited the above passage in Chief Justice Tanets opinion in his
speech against the admission of Oregon as a state. 32 The implication
is that Article IV, Section 2 guarantees the privileges and immunities
traditionally within the control of the states to citizens of the United
States. Thus, even if one concludes, as the majority in the SlaughterHouse Cases did, that "citizens of the United States" as used in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
equivalent to "citizens in the several states/' as used in the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, one could argue that one
of the privileges of citizens of the United States is to be guaranteed the
privileges and immunities traditionally under the regulatory control of
the states under Article IV, Section 2.
Justice Daniel and Justice Taney's conclusion that the states had no
power to confer citizenship upon individuals might not have held under
the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution granted Congress the
exclusive enumerated power to make aliens citizens, whereas under the
Articles of Confederation this power had remained with the states.
According to Justice Story in his Commentaries, one of the defects of
the Articles of Confederation was that any state might make an
individual a citizen of all the other states under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Articles by conferring citizenship upon that
individual within the state. 329 Justice Story termed this "a power as

327.
328.
329.
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Id. (emphasis added).
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 {1859).
According to Justice Story, because under the Articles of Confederation
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mischievous in its nature as it was indiscreet in its actual exercise."
However, under the United States Constitution, the federal government
was vested with the exclusive power of naturalization, and according to
Justice Story, by implication this meant that the states could not make
individuals citizens of the United States.330 William Rawle, in The
Constitution of the United States of America, also recognized this
problem. According to Rawle, because of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause,
if each state retained the power of naturalization, it might impose on all the
other states, such citizens as it might think proper . . . . The evil could not be
better remedied than by vesting the exclusive power in Congress. It cannot
escape notice that no definition of the nature and rights of citizens appears in
the Constitution. The descriptive term is used, with a plain indication that its
meaning is understood by all ... ,331
·

The issue that divided the majority and the dissent, other than whether
free blacks were citizens at the time of ratification of the original
the free inhabitants of each State were entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in all the other States, it followed that a single State
possessed the power of forcing into every other State, with the enjoyment of
every immunity and privilege, any alien whom it might choose to incorporate
into its own society, however repugnant such admission might be to their
polity, conveniences, and even prejudices.
2 STORY, supra note 3, at 41.
330. Chief Justice Taney analogized the power of naturalization to the power of
.conferring citizenship upon non-aliens:
No State was willing to permit another State to determine who should or
should not be admitted as one of its citizens, and entitled to demand equal
rights and privileges with their own people, within their own territories. The
right of naturalization was therefore, with one accord, surrendered by the
States, and confided to the Federal Government. And this power granted to
Congress to establish an uniform rule of naturalization is, by the wellunderstood meaning of the word, confined to persons born in a foreign
country, under a foreign Government. It is not a power to raise to the rank of
a citizen any one born in the United States, who, from birth or parentage, by
the laws of the country, belongs to an inferior and subordinate class .... The
Constitution upon its adoption obviously took from the States all power by any
subsequent legislation to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the
United States any one, no matter where he was born, or what might be his
character or condition; and it gave to Congress the power to confer this
character upon those only who were born outside of the dominions of the
United States. And no law of a State, therefore, passed since the Constitution
was adopted, can give any right of citizenship outside of its own territory.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417-18.
331. WILLIAM RAWLE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
79 (1st ed. 1825).
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Constitution, was what governmental body, if any, had the constitutional
power to make free blacks citizens.
Chief Justice Taney also made a more pragmatic argument concerning
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2. Taney argued that free blacks could not have been intended
to be citizens under the Clause because of the consequences that this
would have had in the Southern states, consequences that would have
been intolerable for Southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention:
It cannot be supposed that they [State sovereignties] intended to secure to them

[blacks] rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout
the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own
dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding
States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented
to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character
from another State. 332

Taney enumerated several specific rights to which free blacks would
have been entitled under the Clause were they citizens of the United
States, indicating that he may have envisioned the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as guaranteeing a uniform set of privileges and
immunities in all of the states. 333
If they [free blacks] were so received, and entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special
laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for
their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were
recognised [sic] as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter
every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass
or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased,
to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation,
unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be
punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in
private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold
public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever
they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the
same color, both free and slaves, and· inevitably producing discontent and

332. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416.
333. It is not necessarily the case that Taney thought the Clause mandated a
uniformity of privileges and immunities traditionally within the control of the states.
Taney may have thought that there would be certain privileges and immunities of
citizens that would be uniform among the several states, although not constitutionally
mandated. However, in his dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, Chief Justice
Taney had previously argued that the right to pass from state to state was a right
possessed by all citizens of the United States. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,
482 (1849). Taney reasoned, "[w]e are all citizens of the United States; and, as
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States." Id. at 492.
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insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the
State. 334

Among the privileges and immunities of citizens that black citizens
would have enjoyed under Article IV, Section 2, Taney listed not only
the right to enter a state and remain there and the right to be free from
molestation, but also "full liberty of speech," the right to hold "public
meetings on political affairs," and the right to "keep and carry arms."
The fact that Chief Justice Taney thought that these rights were among
those included in the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens"
militates against Raoul Berger's conclusion that the rights covered by the
phrase, "privileges or immunities of citizens," as used in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, were intended to be limited to certain rights of
"trade and commerce."335 Furthermore, this usage either presupposes
the existence of such rights in the Southern states or indicates that Taney
thought that Article IV, Section 2 mandated uniformity in certain
fundamental privileges and immunities among the states.
Chief Justice Taney stated explicitly that, were free blacks citizens of
a state and of the United States, they would be entitled to the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states. The fact that free blacks
were not citizens of the United States implied that they were not entitled
to the privileges and immunities of citizenship under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Chief Justice Taney's
remarks on this point deserve quotation at length:
[T]he provision in the Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other
States, does not apply to them. [free negroes and mulattoes]
[S]o far as mere rights of person are concerned, the provision in question is
confined to citizens of a State who are temporarily in another State without
taking up their residence there. It gives them no political rights in the State, as
to voting or holding office, or in any other respect. For a citizen of one State
has no right to participate in the government of another. But if he ranks as a
citizen in the State to which he belongs, within the meaning of the Constitution
of the United States, then, whenever he goes into another State, the Constitution
clothes him, as to the rights of person, with all the privileges and immunities
which belong to citizens of the State. And if persons of the African race are

334. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17.
335. Raoul Berger, Fantasizing About the Fourteenth Amendment: A Review Essay,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1043, 1058 (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENlH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)); See also
Berger, Wishing Well, supra note 20, at 18-20, 27-28; Berger, Reply to Curtis, supra
note 20, at 7-8; Berger, Response to Zuckert, supra note 20, at 24-25.
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citizens of a State, and of the United States, they would be entitled to all of
these privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict
them; for they would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount
authority of the Federal Government, and its courts would be bound to maintain
and enforce them, the Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary
notwithstanding. And if the States could limit or restrict them, or place the
party in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning,
and could have no operation; and would give no rights to the citizen when in
another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose to allow
him. This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in
question. It guaranties [sic] rights to the citizen, and the State cannot withhold
them. And these rights are of a character and would lead to consequences
which make it absolutely certain that the African race were not included under
the name of citizens of a State, and were not in the contemplation of the
framers ofthe Constitution when these privileges and immunities were provided
for the protection of the citizen in other States. 336

Chief Justice Taney's argument was that if free blacks were considered
citizens of the United States, they would be entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizenship in the several states under Article Iv, Section
2. His enumeration of certain rights that such individuals would be free
to exercise,337 and his statement that the states would not be free to
withhold these rights, indicate the existence of a general conception of
citizenship and the privileges and immunities that were a necessary
consequence of this status in a free government prior to ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 338
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment exactly parallels the
language of Chief Justice Taney's opinion. 339 By declaring individuals
naturalized or born in the United States citizens of both the state in
which they reside and of the United States, these individuals become
entitled through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 to the privileges and immunities of citizenship in all foreign

336. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422-23 (emphasis added).
337. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
338. Other cases also acknowledged such fundamental privileges and immunities
and seemed to indicate that they must be uniform among the states. For example, in
1795 the Supreme Court affirmed that "the right of acquiring and possessing property,
and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man."
Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). Other state and federal courts
counted this among the privileges and immunities of citizens. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51
(1815). Furthermore, Justice Story stated in Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627,
657 (1829), that the "fundamental maxims of free government seem to require, that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred."
339. Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri quoted from the above passage of the
Court's decision during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, indicating
that this reasoning was in the minds of congressional republicans responsible for drafting
the Amendment and that the parallel in language was intentional. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3032 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson).

780

Citizenship

[VOL. 34: 681, 1997]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

states. This principle was restated in the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, not only purely "national"
rights of citizens of the United States, but also rights of state citizenship
would be guaranteed if freed blacks were to qualify as citizens of the
United States. This exact argument was made by Justice Field in his
Slaughter-House dissent. In order to support his argument, Justice Field
quoted John C. Calhoun, a noted states' -rights advocate, as stating:
[E]very citizen is a citizen of some State or Territory, and as such, under an
express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States; and it is in this and no other sense that we are
citizens of the United States. 340

Thus, Justice Field argued that the phrase "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" was equivalent to "privileges or immunities
of citizens of the several States."
The Dred Scott dissenters, in contrast to the majority, argued that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause entitled blacks who were citizens of
one state to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all of the other
states without the added requirement of United States citizenship.
Justice McLean and Justice Curtis recognized that the power of
naturalization was vested in Congress, but argued that that did not mean
the states had no power to confer citizenship to non-aHens. Alternatively, they argued that the text of Article III seemed to indicate that
citizenship conferred by a state would be sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Therefore, Dred Scott, even if he were
not a citizen of the United States, would be entitled to sue in the courts
of the United States if he were merely a citizen of any state. 341
Justice Curtis argued that the power of conferring citizenship granted
to Congress only extended to conferring citizenship upon aliens through
naturalization and that, contrary to the conclusion of the Taney majority,
any other power of conferring citizenship remained with the states or the
people under the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the states might retain the
right to confer citizenship upon freed blacks, although the power to
confer citizenship upon aliens was delegated to the federal government
under the Constitution. Justice Curtis agreed that the power of

340.
341.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94 (1873).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 532-33.
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naturalizing aliens was granted exclusively to Congress. 342 However,
he argued that the residual power of conferring citizenship of the United
States upon non-aliens was retained by the states. 343 In response to
Justice Curtis's argument, one might contend, as did the majority, that
the power of conferring national citizenship to freed blacks remained
with the people-all of the people of the United States-and not just the
people of each individual state. 344 Therefore, a constitutional amendment would be necessary in order to delegate this power to the national
government or to confer citizenship upon non-aliens.
Justice Curtis responded that the Constitution implicitly recognizes the
principle espoused by numerous writers on the law of nations that
individuals born upon the soil of a given country automatically become
citizens of that country. If the state governments recognized individuals
born within their jurisdictions as citizens of the state, then these same
individuals must automatically be recognized as citizens of the United
States. 345 However, he pointed to no explicit textual provision in order

342. Id. at 578-79. Justice Curtis argued that "the only power expressly granted to
Congress to legislate concerning citizenship, is confined to the removal of the disabilities
of foreign birth." Id. at 578. Appealing to the "principle of public law, recognised [sic]
by the Constitution, itself, that birth on the soil of a country both creates the duties and
confers the rights of citizenship," Justice Curtis argued:
Among the powers unquestionably possessed by the several States, was that
of determining what persons should and what persons should not be citizens.
It was practicable to confer on the Government of the Union this entire power.
It embraced what may, well enough for the purpose now in view, be divided
into three parts. First: The power to remove the disabilities of alienage, either
by special acts in reference to each individual case, or by establishing a rule
of naturalization to be administered and applied by the courts. Second:
Determining what persons should enjoy the privileges of citizenship, in respect
to the internal affairs of the several States. Third: What native-born persons
should be citizens of the United States.
The first-named power, that of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization,
was granted; and here the grant, according to its terms, stopped.
Id. at 579. The "principle of public law" recognized by the Constitution was also
recognized by Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Coriflict of Laws. According
to Story, "persons who are born in a country, are generally deemed to be citizens and
subjects of that country." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
43 (Edmund H. Bennett ed., 7th ed. 1872) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *366, *369 (photo. reprint 1986) (1883)) (footnote
omitted).
343. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 578-79.
344. See supra notes 327.
345. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 581-82. Justice Curtis argued:
[W]e find that the Constitution has recognised [sic] the general principle of
public law, that allegiance and citizenship depend on the place of birth; ...
when we tum to the Constitution for an answer to the question, what free
persons, born within the several States, are citizens of the United States, the
only answer we can receive from any of its express provisions is, the citizens
of the several States are to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens in
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to support his claim. According to Justice Curtis, this power to
determine the status of individuals born within a state was retained by
the states:
The Constitution has left to the States the determination what persons, born
within their respective limits, shall acquire by birth citizenship of the United
States; it has not left to them any power to prescribe any rule for the removal
of the disabilities of alienage. This power is exclusively in Congress. 346

Justice Curtis reasoned that freed blacks would therefore be entitled to
all of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
However, he acknowledged that the rights conferred did not include
political rights such as the right to vote. 347 Once individuals were
recognized as citizens of a state, they were automatically citizens of the
United States and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship
in the several states through Article IV, Section 2. If they were not born
citizens of any state then arguably they remained non-citizens. In this
way, state citizenship was "primary" while national citizenship was
"secondary." An individual must first be born a citizen of a particular
state before he could enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizenship

every State, and their franchise as electors under the Constitution depends on
their citizenship in the several States. Add to this, that the Constitution was
ordained by the citizens of the several States; that they were "the people of the
United States," for whom and whose posterity the Government was declared
in the preamble of the Constitution to be made; that each of them was "a
citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,"
within the meaning of those words in that instrument; they by them the
Government was to be and was in fact organized; and that no power is
conferred on the Government of the Union to discriminate between them, or
to disfranchise any of them--the necessary conclusion is, that those persons
born within the several States, who, by force of their respective Constitutions
and laws, are citizens of the State, are thereby citizens of the United States.
Id.
346.
347.

Id. at 582.
Id. at 582-83. Justice Curtis stated:
It has been further objected, that if free colored persons, born within a
particular State, and made citizens of that State by its Constitution and laws,
are thereby made citizens of the United States, then, under the second section
of the fourth article of the Constitution, such persons would be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and if so, then
colored persons could vote, and be eligible to not only Federal offices, but
offices even in those States whose Constitution and laws disqualify colored
persons from voting or being elected to office.
Id. (emphasis added).
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in the several states. According to Justice Curtis, the Constitution made
individuals who were born possessing state citizenship, citizens of the
United States.
As has already been said, it [the Constitution] recognises [sic] the great
principle of public law, that allegiance and citizenship spring from the place of
birth. It leaves to the States the application of that principle to individual cases.
It secured to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens
in every other State. But it does not allow to the States the power to make
aliens citizens, or permit one State to take persons born on the soil of another
State, and, contrary to the laws and policy of the State where they were born,
make them its citizens, and so citizens of the United States. No such deviation
from the great rule of public law was contemplated by the Constitution; and
when any such attempt shall be actually made, it is to be met by applying to it
those rules of law and those principles of good faith which will be sufficient to
decide it, and not, in my judgment, by denying that all the free native-born
inhabitants of a State, who are its citizens under its Constitution and laws, are
also citizens of the United States. 348

Therefore, in Justice Curtis's opinion, the only limitation upon the states
in conferring citizenship was in conferring citizenship upon individuals
not born within their own jurisdiction. Under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, any individuals born within
a state and recognized by the state as citizens would be entitled to all of
the privileges and immunities of citizenship in the several states outside
the jurisdiction of the state in which they were born.
Justice Curtis argued that this was the accepted understanding of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause was the mechanism by which
individuals recognized as citizens in one state were recognized as
citizens in all of the states-"citizens of the United States." According
to Justice Curtis, the congressional understanding was that "free negroes"
qualified as citizens in some of the states and were therefore "entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens in all the states."349 Thus,
348. Id. at 586. Professor Maltz has noted that Justice Curtis's opinion was based
on basic notions of interstate comity and mirrored law that had been developed with
respect to the status of fugitive slaves:
Curtis's argument was nothing more than the flip-side of his analysis in
Commonwealth v. Aves. Just as basic notions of comity required that free
states recognize slave states' determinations of domiciliary status, the same
principles mandated that slave states accept the principle that free states had
the authority to emancipate slaves whose masters had voluntarily allowed them
to become domiciliaries of free states. Thus, once again, Curtis's analysis was
based more on general theories of interstate relations than opposition to slavery
per se.
Maltz, supra note 288, at 2014 (footnote omitted).
349. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 588. In order to show that this was the
congressional understanding of the Clause, Justice Curtis pointed to the controversy over
the admission of Missouri as a state and the state's proposed constitutional provision that

784

Citizenship

[VOL. 34: 681, 1997]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Justice Curtis concluded that United States citizenship was automatically
conferred through operation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 once an individual was born a citizen of some
state. 350
Despite Justice Curtis's protestations, after Dred Scott, the states had
no power either directly or indirectly to confer citizenship of the United
States upon any individuals, whether aliens351 or free blacks. Congress
possessed the power to confer citizenship upon aliens. However,
according to the Taney majority, Congress had no power to confer
citizenship of the United States upon non-aliens, such as free blacks.
Arguably, this part of the Court's decision was dicta since the majority
concluded that free blacks, including Dred Scott, historically were not
citizens. Nevertheless, under the majority's opinion, there was no way
in which free blacks could become citizens of the United States other
than by constitutional amendment.
C.

"General" Citizenship

Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Dred Scott illustrate a
common conception of citizenship as based upon a social compact
among the members of society, existing anterior to the establishment of

would mandate that the legislature make laws to prevent free blacks from entering the
state. According to Justice Curtis:
One ground of objection to the admission of the State under this Constitution
was, that it would require the Legislature to exclude free persons of color, who
would be entitled, under the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution, not only to come within the State, but to enjoy there the
privileges and immunities of citizens.
Id. This illustration of the congressional understanding of the status of free blacks was
also noted by Justice Story. See supra note 311.
350. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 588-89. Professor Maltz has concluded that
Justice Curtis used state citizenship as the "benchmark for the determination that a
person was entitled to national protection for the rights appurtenant to that status."
Maltz, supra note 288, at 2009. Moreover, he has concluded that one implication of
Justice Curtis's theory was that if an individual were born in a state that did not consider
him a citizen, he could never achieve that status. Id. See also id. at 2011 ("From
Curtis's perspective, the Constitution in both cases assigned to a single state the authority
to make an initial determination regarding status; in the case of national citizenship, that
state was the individual's place of birth, and in the case of the master/slave relationship,
the relevant state was the owner's domicile.").
351. Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries on American Law noted that under the
Constitution of the United States the individual states could not pass naturalization laws.
1 KENT, supra note 47, at *423.
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government. Both sets of opinions expressed the view that Article IV,
Section 2 embodied a "general" citizenship--all citizens were entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. This
conception of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was certainly not
novel. 352 However, the Taney majority argued that citizenship of the
United States was a prerequisite for exercising the rights under the
Clause. In contrast, Justice Curtis argued in his dissent that only state
citizenship was a necessary prerequisite and that, even if there were a
distinct national citizenship of the United States, state citizens who did
not possess United States citizenship would still be entitled to the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
As we have seen, the Taney Court held that Dred Scott was neither a
citizen of Missouri nor a citizen of the United States. Chief Justice
Taney argued that under the law of Missouri, Dred Scott was not even
made a citizen of that state.
[W]hatever doubts or opinions may, at one time, have been entertained upon
this subject, we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of all cases decided
in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the
decisions of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their
return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the
defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction,
when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave, and not a citizen. 353

Thus, in a sense, the majority's opinion concerning Article IV, Section
2 and its inapplicability to individuals who were merely citizens of a
state and not citizens of the United States was merely dicta. However,
this opinion concerning the effect of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause had larger implications beyond the case. The Court's opinion
meant that neither the states nor Congress had the power to make free
blacks citizens of the United States. 354 Thus, slave states were saved
from the possibility of having to tolerate free black citizens within their
jurisdictions, a condition that might upset the institution of slavery, as
Chief Justice Taney had suggested.355

352. See, e.g., Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627 (1848). Judge William P. Chilton
stated that under the Clause, "the citizens of the different states are, as it respects the
privileges and immunities they enjoy in their respective states, brought into a general
citizenship...." Id. at 629.
353. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 453. The Taney majority came to the
conclusion that "the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which
that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for
that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it." Id. at
454.
354. Id. at 430.
355. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
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Justice Curtis indicated in his dissent that there was a conception of
"general citizenship" expressed in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution. He argued that some free blacks were recognized as possessing the
.status of citizen of the United States from the time of the Articles of
Confederation. According to Justice Curtis, under the "fourth of the
fundamental articles of the Confederation":
The fact that free persons of color were citizens of some of the several
States, and the consequence, that this fourth article of the Confederation would
have the effect to confer on such persons the privileges and immunities of
general citizenship, were not only known to those who framed and adopted
those articles, but the evidence is decisive, that the fourth article was intended
to have that effect, and that more restricted language, which would have
excluded such persons, was deliberately and purposely rejected. 356

Justice Curtis examined the historical evidence concerning the adoption
of the Clause and the rejection of adding the phrase "free white" before
the word "inhabitants" in order to exclude blacks from the privileges and
immunities guaranteed under the Clause. Justice Curtis concluded, "it
is clear, that under the Confederation, and at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, free colored persons of African descent might be, and,
by reason of their citizenship in certain States, were entitled to the
privileges and immunities of general citizenship of the United
States."357 Therefore, he initially equated citizenship of the United
States under the Articles of Confederation with "general citizenship."
Justice Curtis continued by discussing the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and the concept of
citizenship upon which it was based. This concept of citizenship
involved certain privileges and immunities that were guaranteed by the
social compact among the people of all of the states. In Justice Curtis's
opinion, the privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed under
Article IV, Section 2 were "national rights" of citizenship guaranteed to
the "Citizens of each State." The remarks of Justice Curtis deserve
quotation at length:
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States." Nowhere else in the Constitution
is there anything concerning a general citizenship; but here, privileges and
immunities to be enjoyed throughout the United States, under and by force of
the national compact, are granted and secured. In selecting those who are to

356.
357.

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 575.
Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added).

787

enjoy these national rights of citizenship, how are they described? As citizens
of each State. It is to [the citizens that] these national rights are secured. The
qualification for them is not to be looked for in any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States. They are to be citizens of the several States,
and, as such, the privileges and immunities of general citizenship, derived from
and guarantied by the Constitution, are to be enjoyed by them ....
And if it was intended to secure these rights only to citizens of the United
States, how has the Constitution here described such persons? Simply as
citizens of each State. 358

Therefore, Justice Curtis argued that the "general citizenship" conferred
upon the citizens of each state was identical to citizenship of the United
States. 359 There was no separate citizenship of the United States that
was necessary for exercising the rights under the Clause.
Justice Curtis made a detailed analysis concerning the effect of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. He :first
countered the argument that it conveyed political as well as civil rights,
observing that there were qualifications placed on political rights such
as holding the office of Senator, Representative, or President in the
Constitution itself, which prevented the exercise of these political rights
by certain citizens. 360 Justice Curtis even went so far as to suggest
that the Clause did not guarantee all civil rights. According to Curtis:
[C]itizenship, under the Constitution of the United States, is not dependent on
the possession of any particular political or even of all civil rights; and any
attempt so to define it must lead to error. To what citizens the elective
franchise shall be confided, is a question to be determined by each State, in
accordance with its own views of the necessities or expediencies of its
condition. What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its citizens, and whether all
shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or lost, are to be determined
. in the same way.
One may confine the right of suffrage to white male citizens; another may
extend it to colored persons and females; one may allow all persons above a
prescribed age to convey property and transact business; another may exclude

358. Id. at 580-81 (emphasis added). Justice Curtis also noted that political rights
such as the right to vote were not inherent rights of citizenship conferred under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Id.
359. Id. at 581.
360. Id. at 583. This is an important illustration that Justice Curtis thought that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause addressed both rights of state citizenship as well as
rights of national citizenship. Justice Curtis reasoned:
A naturalized citizen cannot be President of the United States, nor a Senator
till after the lapse of nine years, nor a Representative till after the lapse of
seven years, from his naturalization. Yet, as soon as naturalized, he is
certainly a citizen of the United States. Nor is any inhabitant of the District
of Columbia, or of either of the Territories, eligible to the office of Senator or
Representative in Congress, though they may be citizens of the United States.
So, in all the States, numerous persons, though citizens, cannot vote, or cannot
hold office, either on account of their age, or sex, or the want of the necessary
legal qualifications.
Id.
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married women. But whether native-born women, or persons under age, or
under guardianship because insane or spendthrifts, be excluded from voting or
holding office, or allowed to do so, I apprehend no one will deny that they are
citizens of the United States.361

Thus, the implication is that possession of the privileges and immunities
of citizens entitles one to exercise only a subset of civil rights, or that
it does not entitle one to a full equality of civil rights. This is consistent
with Pufendorf's distinction between power and right discussed
previously. 362 The privileges and immunities of citizenship were
certain civil capacities of citizens distinct from the municipal regulations
governing their exercise, which represented civil rights. Therefore, it
was not inconsistent to argue that all would be entitled to the privileges
and immunities of citizenship while there might remain certain
inequalities in regulation of these civil capacities (as long as the
regulations were consistent with the public good). Justice Curtis argued
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not confer any specific
privileges but only those that were inherent in the concept of citizenship
in each separate state, those for which citizenship alone was sufficient.363
[T]his clause of the Constitution does not confer on the citizens of one State,
in all other States, specific and enumerated privileges and immunities. They
are entitled to such as belong to citizenship, but not to such as belong to
particular citizens attended by other qualifications. Privileges and immunities

361. Id. (emphasis added).
362. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
363. This seems to have been one understanding of the Clause prior to the decision.
For example, Chancellor Kent stated that the Clause "means only that citizens of other
states shall have equal rights with our own citizens." Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns.
507, 577 (N.Y. 1812). Alabama's Chief Justice Henry W. Collier stated that the Clause
was meant to "communicate all the privileges and immunities, which the citizens of the
same State would be entitled to, under the like circumstances." Wiley v. Parmer, 14
Ala. 627, 632 (1848). Chancellor Nicholas Ridgely of Delaware also emphasized the
antidiscrimination directive of the Clause:
To what purpose are all privileges and immunities reserved to the citizens of
each State, if a State can discriminate between its own citizens and the citizens
of another State in the privileges of a citizen, and unless the same method to
protect their property is allowed to them. If we may cut and carve and limit
and restrain other citizens in the exercise of our privileges as citizens, it is
evident that they are not entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in this State.
Douglass v. Stephens, I Del. Ch. 465, 472-73 (1821).
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which belong to certain citizens of a State, by reason of the operation of causes
other than mere citizenship, are not conferred. 364

Justice Curtis continued:
It rests with the States themselves so to frame their Constitutions and laws as
not to attach a particular privilege or immunity to mere naked citizenship. If
one of the States will not deny to any of its own citizens a particular privilege
or immunity, if it confer it on all of them by reason of mere naked citizenship,
then it may be claimed by every citizen of each State by force of the
Constitution . . . .365

Thus, it would seem that, unlike Chief Justice Taney, Justice Curtis did
not envision a uniformity of privileges and immunities among the states
under the Clause. 366 Each state, being founded upon distinct social
compacts, might separately determine the terms of these compacts,
resulting in different outcomes with respect to the set of privileges and
immunities enjoyed by citizens in each state. There would still be a
uniform core of peculiarly "national" privileges and immunities, such as
the right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article III, but
no such uniformity need exist at the state level.
Finally, Justice Curtis argued that even if there were a "citizenship of
the United States" distinct from the "general citizenship" conferred under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause to citizens of each state, such
distinction did not prevent freed blacks who were citizens of a state from
being recognized as citizens in every other state.

364. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 583 (emphasis added).
365. Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
366. This may have been the position of Justice Bushrod Washington as well.
Justice Washington, in a famous passage from his opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, made
a lengthy enumeration of fundamental privileges and immunities that are guaranteed
antidiscrimination protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2. However, in another opinion, Justice Washington seemed to indicate that the
Clause gave citizens the rights of citizenship in all of the other states, but he did not say
whether these fundamental rights of citizenship were to be uniform. "With respect to
the inununities which the rights of citizenship can confer, the citizen of one state is to
be considered as a citizen of each, and every other state in the union." Butler v.
Farnsworth, 4 F. Cas. 902, 903 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 2,240). Based on a review of
the historical materials, Professor Maltz has asserted that "the prevailing view of the
comity clause in the early nineteenth century was that it was simply an
antidiscrimination provision." Maltz, supra note 22, at 336; See also id. at 339
(contending that "judicial support for the absolute rights theory of the comity clause was
equivocal at best"). However, Professors Kettner and Kaczorowski have come to the
opposite conclusion, determining that the comity clause was thought to guarantee certain
absolute rights to all citizens throughout the several states. See KETTNER, supra note 14,
at 258; Kaczorowski, supra note 40, at 886-87 (noting that Justice Taney's Dred Scott
opinion indicates that he may have interpreted the Comity Clause to provide substantive
guarantees of certain absolute rights).
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[I]t must be borne in mind, that the difficulties which attend the allowance of
the claims ofcolored persons to be citizens of the United States are not avoided
by saying that, though each State may make them its citizens, they are not
thereby made citizens of the United States, because the privileges of general
citizenship are secured to the citizens of each State. The language of the
Constitution is, "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States." If each State may make such
persons its citizens, they become, as such, entitled to the benefits of this article,
if there be a native-born citizenship of the United States distinct from a nativeborn citizenship of the several States. 367

Therefore, in Justice Curtis's opinion, there were certain rights inherent
in the concept of citizenship that were guaranteed under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to citizens of the United
States. These privileges and immunities of citizenship were to be
distinguished from political privileges, or rights of participation in the
government, and certain civil rights not essential to the concept of
citizenship. Privileges and immunities that were inherent in the concept
of citizenship or essential to citizenship were privileges and immunities
for which the only prerequisite was possessing the status of citizen.
Justice Curtis argued, however, that the states were free to determine
which privileges and immunities were inherent in the concept of
citizenship by making mere citizenship alone the only prerequisite for
enjoyment of these privileges and immunities. If this were the case,
there need be no uniformity in privileges and immunities among the
states under the Clause as long as within each state all citizens were
entitled to exercise these rights. However, the Taney majority enumerated certain rights, including the right to enter any state and remain, the
right to be free from molestation, full liberty of speech, the right to
"hold public meetings on political affairs," and the right to "keep and
carry arms," which free blacks would be entitled to exercise under the
Clause were they citizens. 368 The majority's enumeration indicates that
there was a conception of a set of rights (including some that were
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments) that
were inherent in the concept of citizenship in all free governments. 369

367. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 584 (emphasis added).
368. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
369. This was the language used by Justice Bushrod Washington in Co,jield v.
Coryell when discussing the fundamental privileges and immunities guaranteed under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. As James H. Kettner has
noted, the tension between the interpretation of the Clause as guaranteeing a uniformity
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Perhaps the most accurate understanding of the original meaning of the
Clause is that, although uniformity of all privileges and immunities
among the states was not constitutionally mandated, due to the meaning
of citizenship, there might be a core set of privileges and immunities of
citizens found in all free governments.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TANEY DECISION: A
CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED SYSTEM OF CASTE
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was, in large measure, a
response to the decision of the Dred Scott Court that free blacks were
not and could not become citizens of the United States absent constitutional amendment. However, there were two prior attempts made by
Congress to ensure that free blacks would be entitled to certain basic
rights. The first of these efforts was the Thirteenth Amendment.
However, this amendment was inadequate to prevent the development of
caste systems in the states along the lines of the Roman model since,
upon its face, it only prohibited the institution of slavery and no other
level of status intermediate between slaves and citizens. The second of
these efforts was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This act conferred the
status of citizen of the United States upon free blacks. However, under
the reasoning of the Taney majority in Dred Scott v. Sanford, mere

of fundamental privileges and immunities in all of the states through substantive
protection and the interpretation of the Clause as guaranteeing antidiscrimination
protection for whatever fundamental privileges and immunities were part of the social
compact of each state, thereby allowing for differences among the states, is illustrated
in the case of Douglass v. Stephens. See KETTNER, supra note 14, at 260-61. In that
case, Chancellor Ridgely, in a dissenting opinion, argued that "[t]he rights of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring and protecting reputation and property,-and,
in general, of attaining objects suitable to their condition, without injury to another, are
the rights of a citizen; and all men by nature have them." Douglass v. Stephens, I Del.
Ch. 465,470 (1821) (emphasis added). However, ChiefJustice Kensey Johns concluded
for the majority that no such uniformity was necessary:
The privileges and immunities to be secured to all citizens of the United
States are such only as belong to the citizens of the several States; which
includes the whole United States, and must be understood to mean, such
privileges as should be common, or the same in every State ....
The privileges and immunities, &c., are not enumerated or described; but
they are all privileges common in the Union,-which certainly excludes those
privileges which belong only to citizens of one or more States, and not to
those in every other State.
Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added). Both opinions at least assume, however, that there was
a notion of the privileges and immunities inherent in the concept of citizenship in the
United States. The former argued that these privileges and immunities were guaranteed
substantive constitutional protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, while
the latter disputed this conclusion.
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congressional legislation was not sufficient to confer citizenship, given
the social compact model of citizenship as membership in a political
community based upon consent. The consent of the whole people
through amendment of the Constitution was necessary in order to
accomplish this result.

A.

The Thirteenth Amendment

Raoul Berger is not completely accurate in his statement that the
"Thirteenth Amendment sheds little, if any, light on the meaning of the
Fourteenth."370 Some members of Congress evidently thought the
Thirteenth Amendment sufficient to preclude the establishment of caste
systems in the United States. As Senator Richard Yates stated, "by the
amendment to the Constitution . . . the freedman becomes a free man,
entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other citizen of the
United States."371 This interpretation of the Amendment is understandable if one equates the inability to exercise fundamental capacities of
citizenship with slavery, as did Locke.
However, one could argue that the Thirteenth Amendment did not
effectively prevent the states from developing caste systems because it
merely prohibited slavery-the status of civil nonexistence. It did not
prevent the states from developing an intermediate status between
slavery and full citizenship, similar to the status of freedman (mentioned
by Senator Yates) under the Roman law, which would deprive blacks of
the exercise of many of the civil capacities thought to be inherent in the
concept of citizenship. Thus, the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment was necessary to ensure that all individuals born or
naturalized in the United States would possess the status of "citizen"
with respect to both the state and federal governments. As Senator
Lyman Trumbull stated, the Fourteenth Amendment would "end that
very controversy, whether the negro is a citizen or not." 372 Similarly,
Senator Jacob Howard stated that the first sentence "settles the great

370. BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 20, at 22.
371. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1780 (1866). As Earl Maltz has noted,
there is "substantial evidence" to support the conclusion that the Thirteenth Amendment
was designed to give Congress the power to protect certain rights that were "essential
to the status of a freedman." Maltz, supra note 46, at 251. However, as Maltz notes,
"from the language of the amendment, the grant of such power is far from clear." Id.
372. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1285 (1866).
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question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or
are not citizens of the United States."373
The Fourteenth Amendment was widely viewed as an attempt to
enlarge upon the principles embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment. For
example, in the Slaughter-House Cases, counsel for the plaintiffs, John
A. Campbell, a former Justice of the Supreme Court who sat at the time
the Dred Scott case was decided, argued that the act in question violated
not only the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the Thirteenth Amendment. However, Justice Miller stated that the Louisiana act establishing
an exclusive slaughterhouse monopoly was "even more plainly in the
face of the fourteenth amendment. That amendment was a development
of the thirteenth, and is a more comprehensive exposition of the
principles which lie at the foundation of the thirteenth." 374 Therefore,
the interrelationship between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
as having a common theoretical basis was not disputed.
Several members of Congress indicated their belief that the Thirteenth
Amendment, like the Fourteenth, guaranteed certain fundamental rights,
which if violated would render men little more than slaves. 375 For
example, Congressman James Wilson stated that there were "many . . .
constitutional rights of the citizen which slavery had disregarded and

373. Id. at 2890.
374. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51 (1872).
375. For example, Senator Lot M. Morrill stated that the states could not deny equal
rights to their citizens and that the federal government "should protect its citizens against
State authority and State interpretations in [sic] their rights, privileges, and immunities
as citizens of the United States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1866).
Senator Henry Wilson stated that the goal of Reconstruction was "security of the
libertie·s of all men, and the security of equal, universal, and impartial liberty." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 111 (1865). Michael Kent Curtis has noted that some
Republicans thought that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to
guarantee free blacks the rights of citizenship. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 139. For
example, Curtis quotes Judge Noah Davis who stated:
By force of the amendment the former slaves were at once made freemen,
possessed of the rights that belong under the federal Constitution to persons
who are free. The right freely to buy and sell; to do lawful labor and have its
fruits; peaceably to assemble and petition against grievances; to keep and bear
arms; to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; to have liberty of
conscience; to migrate from one State to another, carrying with them these
constitutional rights; to "due process of law," in the protection of life, liberty
and property; to the care and custody of their own children and families--all
these with their necessary incidents became theirs as absolutely as they ever
were the rights of the proudest of their masters .... It is a badge of slavery
when a freeman, without conviction of a crime, is made subject, without his
consent, to laws depriving him of these rights, or unjustly restricting their
exercise, and especially to such laws as do not equally affect all other citizens
of the state.
Id. at 140 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE REPUBLICAN UNION STATE CONVENTION 35
(Sept. 5, 1866)).
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practically destroyed," including "freedom ofreligious opinion, freedom
of speech and press, and the right of assemblage for the purpose of
petition[.]"376 According to Senator Trumbull, under the Thirteenth
Amendment, a "law that does not allow a colored person to hold
property, does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is
certainly a law in violation of the rights of freeman, and being so may
properly be declared void." 377 Therefore, at least some members of
Congress understood the Thirteenth Amendment as not only abolishing
the lowest form of status, or slavery, but also intermediate forms of
status under which individuals were not entitled to enjoy the full
measure of rights inherent in citizenship in the United States. However,
the language of the Thirteenth Amendment does not explicitly seem to
prohibit such intermediate grades of status characterized by a deprivation
of certain powers of citizenship. Thus, clarification was needed in order
to preclude the development of systems of caste in the states. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was an attempt to provide such a clarification.

B.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866

The fact that under the Taney Court's decision there was no mechanism for conferring the status of citizen of the United States upon free
blacks meant that there was effectively a constitutionally-mandated
system of caste within the United States with respect to national
citizenship. The Thirteenth Amendment had merely outlawed the lowest
form of status, that of slavery. However, it remained unclear whether
an intermediate form of status was still constitutionally permissible.
There was no method of remedying this situation other than by
amending the United States Constitution.378 This fact was recognized
376. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). Wilson stated that these
rights, which he enumerated, belonged "to every American citizen, high or low, rich or
poor, wherever he may be within the jurisdiction of the United States. With these rights
no State may interfere." Id.
377. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
378. Justice Taney said as much in his opinion:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling,
in relation to this unfortunate race . . . should induce the court to give to the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they
were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an
argument would be altogether inadmissible .... If any of its provisions are
deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it
may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as
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during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was
designed to confer citizenship upon free blacks through congressional
legislation. 379 Some members of Congress thought that free blacks
already possessed the status of citizens and that the Taney Court was in
error in its Dred Scott decision. For example, Senator Trumbull believed
that the provision in the Civil Rights Act making individuals born in the
United States citizens was "declaratory of what in my judgment, the law
now is."380 Similarly, Senator Bingham stated originally that the
clause conferring citizenship in the Civil Rights Act was "simply
declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human
being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not
owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your
Constitution itself, a natural-born citizen."381 However, a need to
clarify the status of free blacks in light of the opinion was felt.

it was understood at the time of its adoption. [The Constitution] speaks not
only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it
spoke when it came from the hands of its framers . . . . Any other rule of
construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it
the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856).
379. See BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at 23 n.12. The
Civil Rights Bill declared that "all persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed" were "citizens of the United States."
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the Act then stated:
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
380. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1866). Trumbull reiterated this
position in 1871. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576-77 (1871). Trumbull
asserted that a
colored man in Massachusetts before the fourteenth amendment was adopted,
in my judgment, was a citizen of the United States as well as a citizen of
Massachusetts. That was my opinion about it then; and this amendment
carries out what I believed to be the law of the land at that time. However,
as I have already explained, others took a different view in consequence of the
existence of slavery which they held to be the normal condition of the colored
man .... This amendment simply carries out the provisions of the law, as I
understood it before, and makes it certain that all persons of whatever color
born in the United States are citizens.
Id. at 577.
381. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
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Some members of Congress thought that a constitutional amendment
was necessary in order to pass the Civil Rights Act. 382 In particular,
Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, eventually came to hold the belief that an amendment was
necessary to effect the goals of the Civil Rights Act. 383 By automatically conferring both state and national citizenship, the first sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment destroyed the constitutionally-mandated
system of caste with respect to citizenship of the United States and made
it unconstitutional for the states to employ a caste system with respect
to state citizenship. Thus, the first sentence struck at both the Dred
Scott decision as well as the Black Codes, which were widely recognized
as establishing caste systems in the Southern states. 384

V.

SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The foregoing discussion of citizenship illustrates the necessity of
declaring through constitutional amendment that free blacks were citizens
of both the United States and the state in which they resided, the origins
of the distinction between political and civil privileges and immunities
drawn in nineteenth century legal scholarship, and the nature of the
privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as being fundamental--existing anterior to the
establishment of the government, whether because they are inherent,
belonging to all persons as natural rights, or because they flow from the

382. During the debate over the proposed amendment, Representative Henry
Raymond of New York agreed that the bill would have been unconstitutional, but that
the amendment obviated any objections. Id. at 2502. Representative Thomas Eliot of
Massachusetts believed that the amendment ensured the constitutionality of the Bill. Id.
at 2511. Representative James Doolittle of Wisconsin stated that several Republicans,
including Senator Bingham "had doubts, at least, as to the constitutionality of the civil
rights bill that [the] proposition to amend the Constitution now appears to give ...
validity and force." Id. at 2896. See also id. at 2961 (Sen. Poland), 2498 (Rep.
Broomall). Justice Field also stated in the Slaughter-House Cases that the amendment
had been "adopted to obviate objections ... to the validity of the Civil Rights Act ...."
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93 (1872).
383. See BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 20, at 20; CURTIS, supra
note 12, at 107. See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1290-93, 1367 (1866)
(noting that Bingham voted against the Act).
384. The Black Codes deprived free blacks of certain of the rights that were
inherent in citizenship such as the right to move, to contract, to own property, to
assemble, to speak freely, and to bear arms. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 35; KENNETH M.
STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 80 (1965).
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social compact among the members of the political community, its
citizens. However, as the Taney and Curtis opinions in Dred Scott
indicate, the nature of the protection afforded under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, whether antidiscrimination
or substantive, was unclear prior to ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Although constitutionalizing conditions sufficient for the conferral of
state and national citizenship was one of the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a second purpose was nationalization of citizenship and a
federal guarantee of those rights embodied in the phrase "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States."385 The precursor of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 guaranteeing that the "Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."386
Justice Curtis, in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, discussed the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, stating "if it
was intended to secure these rights [privileges and immunities] only to
citizens of the United States, how has the Constitution here described
such persons? Simply as citizens of each State."387 As the foregoing
discussion has illustrated, Justice Curtis was arguing that state citizenship
was sufficient in order to possess citizenship of the United States. The
Taney majority disagreed with this position. However, the majority
agreed with Justice Curtis that citizenship of the United States entailed
being able to exercise the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States"-privileges and immunities traditionally within the
regulatory control of the state governments. In contrast, the SlaughterHouse majority later held that "Citizens in the several States" as used in
Article IV, Section 2 was not equivalent to "citizens of the United
States" as used in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed in Section 1 did not

385. For example, Senator Edmunds later said of Section 1 of the Amendment that
it had changed entirely "the description of the class of persons who are entitled to
protection . . . . [It] provides that the citizens of the United States, whether they are
citizens of any particular State or not, shall have universal citizenship in the United
States." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871).
386. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Professor Maltz has noted that a few state
constitutions, such as the constitutions of Ohio, Texas, and Virginia, also contained
privileges and immunities language prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, he has ·concluded that "the state constitutions were not the direct precursors
of section one [of the Fourteenth Amendment]." Maltz, supra note 22, at 334.
387. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 581 (1856).
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include those rights traditionally within the regulatory control of state
governments.

A.

The Primary Nature of United States Citizenship

As we have seen, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court
determined that a free black of the African race, whose ancestors were
brought to the United States and sold as slaves was not a citizen within
the meaning of the United States Constitution and could not achieve this
status. 388 According to the Court, when the Constitution was adopted,
free blacks were not regarded as members of the political community
that constituted the state in most of the states and, thus, were not
members of "the people," or citizens, within the meaning of the state
constitutions. Therefore, the "special rights and immunities" that
attached to citizens did not apply to free blacks. Furthermore, according
to the majority, free blacks certainly were not considered citizens of the
United States, parties to the national compact. Thus, they were not
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
including the privilege of suing in the courts of the United States under
the United States Constitution.
·
The Court dismissed the congressional power of naturalization
enumerated in the Constitution as a means of conferring United States
citizenship upon freed blacks. Freed blacks were not "aliens," and thus,
the power of naturalization could not be employed by Congress to confer
citizenship of the United States upon them. The Court also declared that
since the adoption of the United States Constitution, no state could make
an alien or any other person a citizen of the United States and entitle
him to the rights and privileges guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. The state could give the individual privileges and
immunities within the state, but could not confer the character of a
"citizen of the United States" upon the individual. Therefore, the state
could not give the individual the right to the privileges and immunities
of citizenship in the several states under Article IV, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution or the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship, such as the right to sue in courts of the United States,
conferred to citizens of the United States under other provisions of the
Constitution such as Article III. This result was based upon the
388.

See supra Part III.
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majority's view of the United States as founded upon a national compact
to which free blacks were not parties and could not become parties
absent the consent of "We the People" through constitutional amendment. Thus, the result of the Court's decision was that there existed in
the United States a constitutionally-mandated system of caste, with
respect to national citizenship where free blacks possessed lesser rights
based on the fact that they possessed a different civil status.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wished to make citizenship
of the United States "primary" and state citizenship "secondary,"
whereas prior to ratification of the Amendment, arguably, state
citizenship had been primary and national citizenship was secondary.
This point was recognized by Justice Bradley in his Slaughter-House
dissent. Justice Bradley stated, "[t]he question is now settled by the
fourteenth amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the
primary citizenship in this country; and that State citizenship is
secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United
States and the citizen's place of residence."389 As counsel for the
plaintiffs in the Slaughter-House Cases argued:
The doctrine of the "States-Rights party," led in modem times by Mr. Calhoun,
was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United States, except sub modo
and by the permission of the States. According to their theory the United States
had no integral existence except as an incomplete combination among several
integers. The fourteenth amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all such
doctrines. 390

389. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112 (1872). This point was
also made subsequently by Judge Woods in United States v. Hall:
By the original constitution citizenship in the United States was a consequence
of citizenship in a state. By this clause this order of things is reversed.
Citizenship in the United States is defined; it is made independent of
citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a state is a result of citizenship in the
United States. So that a person born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to its jurisdiction, is, without reference to state constitutions or laws,
entitled to all the privileges and immunities secured by the constitution of the
United States to citizens thereof.
26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
390. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 52. The plaintiffs continued,
arguing that
the confederate features of the government have been obliterated. The States
in their closest connection with the members of the State, have been placed
under the oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress. The
purpose is manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United
States ONE PEOPLE, and that every member of the empire shall understand
and appreciate the fact that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged
by State authority; that State laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty,
property from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all.
Id. at 53.
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Justice Field echoed these sentiments in his dissent, stating that "[t]he
fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as
a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the
United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any
State."391 In the :first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, individuals born or naturalized in the United States are declared citizens of the
United States and of the state in which they reside. Therefore, the
power of denying the status of "citizen" to any individual or group of
individuals is withdrawn from the states, eliminating the ability of the
states to erect caste systems with respect to state citizenship. Prior to
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, state citizenship was viewed
as the primary form of citizenship, with citizenship of the United States
following from the compact among the states embodied in the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and therefore being
derivative in nature. Section 1 made it clear that the privileges and
immunities inherent in the concept of citizenship flowed from the
national compact.
Citizens were guaranteed the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.
Therefore, it would seem that the most natural construction of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that there was to be a uniformity in the privileges and
immunities of citizens exercised by citizens in the several states. Among
these privileges and immunities were the inalienable rights of men as
well as certain capacities of citizens flowing from the national compact.
There might be distinctions in the mode in which these rights were
exercised in the different states--differences in the positive municipal
regulations governing the exercise of these civil capacities--differences
in civil rights. However, as Justice Bradley stated,392 in America
citizenship meant something--there were certain capacities inherent in
the concept of citizenship with which no government could interfere.

391.
392.

Id. at 95.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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B.

The Nature of the Protection Afforded Under Section 1:
Substantive or Antidiscrimination?

It might be contended that it is somewhat surprising that the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not employ the phrase, "citizens in the
several States," in Section 1 to indicate their intent to guarantee rights
traditionally within the regulatory control of the states since they
repeatedly stated that the privileges and immunities that they wished to
protect were identical to those of Article IV, Section 2. However, if
they had used this phrase, Section 1 might have been construed to
guarantee only those privileges and immunities of citizens that had
traditionally been solely within the control of the state governments. A
desire to guarantee the privileges and immunities of national citizenship,
such as the right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article
III, as well as those traditionally within the control of the states may
have led to this wording. 393 Furthermore, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have wished to make it clear that the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizenship were to be guaranteed
throughout the nation as flowing from an individual's status as a citizen
of the United States, a member of the national political community. 394
The states retained the right to regulate these privileges and immunities
of citizenship within their respective jurisdictions. However, the federal
government was given the power through Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ensure that the state governments did not abridge these
rights of citizens of the United States.
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford is overruled by granting automatic
393. As Senator Carpenter later stated concerning the privileges and immunities of
citizens:
There are certain privileges and immunities of American citizens that are
recognized in every State of the Union and by every American as being
peculiarly and especially the privileges of an American citizen, and that
Constitution means to protect those, or else it is mere idle talk and protects
nothing.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., !st Sess. 576 (1871).
394. In this connection, it is interesting to note that President Johnson proposed
substituting the language "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states" for the language "[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
· United States" found in § I of the Fourteenth Amendment. JOSEPH JAMES, THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 142-44 (1984). James suggests that
this change was an attempt to limit the role of the federal courts in determining the
federal rights of citizens. However, more broadly, it might also have been an attempt
to leave determination of the privileges and immunities of citizens with the state
governments.
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citizenship, both state (in the case of an individual residing in a state)
and national, to those naturalized or born in the United States. In the
congressional debate over the admission of Oregon as a state, prior to
the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, citing Justice
Story,395 William Rawle, 396 Chancellor Kent, 397 and the Dred Scott
Court,398 had expressed his view that the phrase "people of the several
States" was equivalent to the phrase "people of the United States" and
that "[a]ll free persons born and domiciled within the jurisdiction of the
United States, are citizens of the United States from birth; all aliens
become citizens of the United States only by act of naturalization, under

395. Bingham sought to justify his position by referring to a number of contemporary authorities. Citing Justice Story's Commentaries, Bingham appealed to the language
of the social compact theorists, stating:
The people here referred to [people of the several States] are the same
community, or body-politic, called, in the preamble of the Federal Constitution, "the people of the United States." They are the citizens of the United
States, and no other people whatever. It has always been well understood
amongst jurists in this country, that the citizens of each State constitute the
body-politic of each community, called the people of the State; and that the
citizens of each State in the Union are ipso facto citizens of the United States
Who are citizens of the United States? Sir, they are those, and those only,
who owe allegiance to the Government of the United States .... What I have
said on this question of United States citizenship, and the words "the people,"
as used in the Constitution of the United States, is sustained by jurists and the
decisions of the courts, Federal and State.
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (citation omitted).
396. Bingham quoted Rawle as stating:
The citizens of each State constituted the citizens of the United States when
the Constitution was adopted. The rights which appertain to them as citizens
of those respective Commonwealths accompanied them in the formation of the
great compound Commonwealth which ensued. They became citizens of the
latter, without ceasing to be citizens of the former; and he who was subsequently born a citizen of a State, became, at the moment of his birth, a citizen
of the United States.
Id. (citation omitted).
397. Bingham quoted Chancellor Kent as stating: "'If a slave, born in the United
States, be manumitted, or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage, or if a black man
be born within the United States, and born free, he becomes thenceforward a citizen."'
Id. (citation omitted).
398. Bingham quoted Chief Justice Taney as stating:
The words "people of the United States," and "citizens," are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the Government through their representatives.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the laws of the United States. " 399 The equivalence of these phrases
was reiterated by the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases in arguing
that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
included more than merely the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship enumerated by the majority. 400 The :first sentence of Section
1 was drafted in order to constitutionalize this position with respect to
citizenship, which Bingham had argued was already the position of the
courts and commentators on the subject.401 Under the first sentence of
Section 1, individuals born or naturalized in the United States are
guaranteed both state citizenship in the state where they reside and
citizenship of the United States. The question that the Slaughter-House
Court addressed was whether they also obtain a federal guarantee of the
privileges and immunities traditionally within the regulatory control of
state governments as well as those fl.owing from "national citizenship."
However, the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases was in error in
confining the meaning of "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" to merely "national" privileges and immunities. Use of
the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" as
opposed to "privileges or immunities of citizens in the several states"
indicates an intent on the part of the framers of the Amendment to make
it clear both that the privileges and immunities traditionally within the
control of the federal government were to be guaranteed against state
abridgment, as well as to emphasize that these privileges and immunities
fl.owed from an individual's status as a citizen of the United States.
Thus, it would seem that the protection afforded under the Clause is not
merely equality-based (forbidding discrimination), but also substantive.402 There is a closed set of privileges and immunities of citizens
that must be recognized in all the states, although differences may exist
from state to state in the regulation of these privileges and immunities.

399. Id.
400. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94 (1872) (Field, J. dissenting).
401. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).
402. Akhil Amar has concluded that those rights of citizens specified in the pre1866 Constitution receive what he terms "full" or "fundamental rights" protection under
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which presumably includes both substantive as
well as antidiscrimination protection. Amar, supra note 2, at 1231. Amar leaves the
question of whether other common-law rights that are also privileges and immunities of
citizens receive full protection or merely what he terms "equal" or "antidiscrimination"
protection. Id. However, protection afforded the peculiarly "national" privileges and
immunities of citizenship should not differ from that afforded those privileges and
immunities traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments since all
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States flow from an
individual's status as a citizen of the United States.
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C.

Incorporation of the Bill of Rights

The theory presented in this Article implies that the incorporation
thesis-that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights are "incorporated"
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment-is a misnomer. The Bill of Rights may be
viewed as declaring certain of the fundamental privileges and immunities
of citizens that shall be guaranteed against abridgment (and in some
cases, regulation) on the part of the federal government. In this light, it
is not surprising that certain of the privileges and immunities of citizens
should resemble certain of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
However, to understand the effect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as applying word for word certain provisions in the Bill of Rights
against the state governments is a mistake. 403 The state governments
remain free to regulate the mode in which the fundamental privileges
and immunities of citizens are exercised. Furthermore, not every
provision in the Bill of Rights represents a privilege or immunity of
citizens, and conversely, not every privilege or immunity of citizens may
be found in the Bill of Rights or explicitly in the body of the United
States Constitution.404 For example, privileges and immunities that
were traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments
and which were explicitly mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
such as the capacity to enter into contracts, testify in court, and pass
property through inheritance are certainly privileges and immunities of
citizens.405 However, these privileges and immunities are not explicitly

403. Akhil Amar has tentatively come to the same conclusion. Amar, supra note
2, at 1265-66.
404. See id.
405. Michael Kent Curtis has argued that Republicans thought these rights to be
"incidents of the absolute rights of individuals to 'personal liberty,' 'personal security,'
and 'private property' embraced by article IV" and therefore indirectly mentioned in the
constitutional text itself. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 116. However, this conclusion
seems to be at odds with several statements made by Republicans to the effect that the
privileges and immunities of citizens included rights not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution. For example, in 1871 Representative George F. Hoar stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment referred to "all the privileges and immunities declared to belong
to the citizen by the Constitution itself' plus "those privileges and immunities which all
republican writers of authority agree in declaring fundamental and essential to
citizenship." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871). The "republican writers"
of which Representative Hoar spoke probably included individuals such as Vattel,
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guaranteed against encroachment by the federal government within the
body of the Constitution. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the
privileges and immunities of citizenship include both more than and less
than those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights-a conclusion that has
also been reached by Akhil Amar. 406 However, the conclusions
reached in this Article differ somewhat from Amar's conclusions in two
respects.
First, the capacities of citizens that are termed "privileges and
immunities" of citizens include certain capacities that are nowhere
mentioned in the body of the Constitution. Capacities of citizenship
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments, such
as the right to testify, are clearly within the scope of the terms "privileges" and "immunities." However, neither the first eight Amendments nor
the body of the original Constitution refer to such a right. The only
possibility is that the Ninth Amendment's reference to "other rights not
enumerated" includes certain capacities of citizenship that are not
expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution.407
Second, this Article argues that looking to the Bill of Rights for
provisions to "incorporate" through the Fourteenth Amendment is a
mistaken project. For one thing, "privileges" and "immunities" are

Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui.
406. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1228, 1265-66 (stating that "[t]he best reading of
the Amendment suggests that it 'incorporates' the Bill of Rights in a far more subtle way
than [Justice] Black admitted, including both more and less than Amendments I-VIII.").
Amar's observation that the "English common law offers a crude but helpful test to sort
out which aspects of the pre-1866 Constitution were indeed privileges of individuals . . .
and which were instead structural provisions unique to the federal government and
inappropriate for imposition on states" is telling. Id. at 1268. However, Amar does not
carry his analysis far enough in order to explain why it is that the English common law
may act as an appropriate filter for his model of"refined incorporation." See also Maltz,
supra note 68, at 970 ("[T]he background of the privileges and immunities clause
provides evidence that the language encompasses not only the entire Bill of Rights, but
other rights as well.").
407. This idea seems to have been expressed by Senator Nye, who stated:
In the enumeration of natural and personal rights to be protected, the framers
of the Constitution apparently specified everything they could think of-"life,"
"liberty," "property," "freedom of speech," "freedom of the press," "freedom
in the exercise of religion," "security of person," ... and then, lest something
essential in the specifications should have been overlooked, it was provided in
the ninth amendment that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
should not be construed to deny or disparage other rights not enumerated."
This amendment completed the document. It left no personal or natural right
to be invaded or impaired by construction. All these rights are established by
the fundamental law. Congress has no power to invade them; but it has power
"to make all laws necessary and proper" to five them effective operation, and
to restrain the respective States from infracting them.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1072 (1866).
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guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the mode in which
they are exercised. Thus, this Article's conclusion that historically a
distinction was made between privileges and rights indicates that insofar
as the provisions of the Bill of Rights represent the modes in which
certain privileges and immunities may be exercised with respect to the
federal government, these modes are not constitutionalized as constraints
placed upon the states. It is true that certain "individual-rights"
provisions found in the Bill of Rights will mirror certain of the
privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Bill of Rights is declaratory of certain
fundamental powers of the citizenry that exist anterior to the establishment of all governments--both state and federal. It is also true that
what Amar terms "federalism provisions" will not be "incorporated"
since these cannot represent fundamental capacities of the citizenry
existing anterior to the establishment of government: one must have state
and federal governments established before one can worry about
"federalism protections."408 Thus, the theory presented in this Article
explains the conclusions that Amar has reached with respect to his
distinction between "individual rights" and "federalism" provisions.
However, it also shows the misguidedness of the incorporation approach
to understanding the original meaning of Section 1.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By analyzing the social compact theories of political philosophers such
as Locke, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel as well as the Roman law
of persons, this Article has presented a theory concerning the meaning
of citizenship in nineteenth century America and its relation to Section
408. Amar rejects Frankfurter's terminology of fundamental rights protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Amar, "the right question is not whether a
clause is fundamental, but whether it is truly a private right of the citizen rather than a
right of states or the public generally." Amar, supra note 2, at 1265. However, as the
analysis in this Article indicates, the capacities or powers to be protected under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause are the privileges and immunities of citizens--those
privileges and immunities inherent in the concept of citizenship, which are fundamental
in the sense that they exist anterior to the establishment of any form of government.
Thus, "fundamental rights" become analogous to Amar's "private right[s] of the citizen."
Id. However, as already stated, one must look beyond the constitutional text in order
to discover the full range of privileges and immunities of citizens. Section I guarantees
the "privileges or immunities of citizens" and not all of the "private right[s] of the
citizen" enumerated in the body of the Constitution.
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1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. During this period, citizens were
conceived of as members of a political community based on a social
compact, which was distinct from the form of government, from which
certain fundamental powers or capacities flowed. These relative rights
coupled with the absolute or inalienable rights of persons are the
privileges and immunities to which Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment refers. Section 1 struck down the constitutionally-mandated
system of caste with respect to citizenship of the United States erected
by the Court in Dred Scott as well as constitutionally-permitted systems
of caste with respect to state citizenship, which had arisen in the form
of the Black Codes. Section 1 nationalized citizenship, making
citizenship of the United States the primary form of citizenship. As a
result, the protection afforded under Section 1 was most probably
intended to be both substantive and antidiscrimination protection with
respect to both those privileges and immunities of citizens that were
peculiarly national in character and those privileges and immunities that
traditionally were within the regulatory control of the state governments.
However, some inequalities with respect to the way in which these
privileges and immunities were regulated by the states (the mode in
which citizens could exercise these privileges and immunities) may have
been permissible. The Amendment was not intended to dictate the civil
or criminal codes of the states.
As I have noted, there is an alternative interpretation of the
Clause--that one of the privileges of citizens of the United States is the
privilege of exercising the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states under Article N, Section 2, and, thus, there may not be a
constitutionally-mandated uniformity of privileges and immunities among
the states with respect to those privileges and immunities traditionally
within the regulatory control of the state govemments. 409 However,
the better interpretation is likely the former. For the moment, this
Article has attempted to shed some light on the original meaning of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as illustrated the value
of examining more closely, where appropriate, the writings of the natural
law theorists as well as those of civilian writers in gaining greater
understanding of our own written Constitution.

409.
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See supra text accompanying notes 328-29.

